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ABSTRACT 
 Recent development challenges highlight a pressing need to re-
evaluate whether the post-World War II behemoths of 
international development finance are up to the tasks being 
demanded of them today.  These challenges include both the 
problems to be addressed (climate change, HIV/AIDS, and abject 
poverty among them) and a change in attitude about the desired 
modalities for addressing them (financing via inclusive, 
participatory, partnerships rather than intergovernmental 
organizational fiat). 
The institutions that dominate the current order, the United 
Nations (―U.N.‖) and the World Bank, have undergone a crisis of 
legitimacy.  The U.N., though originally charged with protecting 
the global welfare, has not played a central role in the design and 
financial administration of the more recent innovations in 
development finance, such as carbon finance, microfinance, and 
public-private financing initiatives.  Instead, it has ceded primary 
responsibility for innovative international development financing 
to the World Bank.  However the World Bank, tasked with the 
responsibility of being the developing world‘s primary source of 
multilateral development finance, struggles with the inherently 
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schizophrenic nature of its role as a development institution on the 
one hand, and a bank on the other.  Repeatedly, its banking id 
prevails, too often to the detriment of the development agenda. 
Recognizing these inadequacies, the world‘s development aid 
donors are engaged in an ongoing quest to find alternatives to 
these institutions.  This quest takes the form of setting up 
numerous funds narrowly tailored to finance specific, narrowly-
defined needs.  Examples of these funds include the Global 
Environment Trust Fund (―GEF‖) and the Global Fund to Fight 
HIV Aids, Malaria and Tuberculosis.  The Climate Change Fund, 
proposed in the December 2009 Copenhagen Accord (and recently 
renamed the Green Climate Fund), is poised to follow this 
approach. 
This ad hoc special-purpose fund approach is reactive and 
lacks a coherent, unifying vision of how to meet today‘s 
development challenges.  The funds that have been created fill a 
need but are a fragmented, sub-optimal response to that need.  
They suffer from several deficits, ranging from governance gaps 
and lacunae in accountability, to uncertain status in the 
international political and legal order.  These deficits generate new 
risks and costs for the international aid architecture. 
In this Article, I argue that the time has come to redesign the 
interrelationship between these special-purpose funds and the 
U.N. and the World Bank so that these funds operate in sync with, 
rather than as bypasses to, those institutions.  I propose that this re-
design occur in two stages.  In the immediate term, I argue that the 
contributions that the special-fund phenomenon makes to the 
design of international development finance should be 
strengthened by addressing the governance and other deficits 
apparent in these funds‘ structures.  Efforts to strengthen these 
funds should be informed by an understanding of the task at hand, 
drawn from principles of principal-agent and accountability 
theory, as applied to third party financing arrangements.  In the 
longer term, I argue, the popularity of these special purpose funds 
as a form of collective finance points to a need to re-design key 
aspects of the way the U.N. and the World Bank do business so 
that those institutions can serve as effective facilitators and vehicles 
of such finance, rather than as pillars of an out-dated model that 
has to be circumvented.  In furtherance of these arguments, I make 
some preliminary suggestions for the kind of short-term and long-
term changes I advocate. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
Recent development challenges highlight a pressing need to re-
evaluate whether the post-World War II behemoths of 
international development finance are up to the tasks being 
demanded of them today.  These challenges include both the 
problems to be addressed (climate change, HIV/AIDS and poverty 
among them) and a change in attitude about the desired modalities 
for addressing them (financing via inclusive, participatory 
partnerships rather than intergovernmental organization fiat). 
The institutions that dominate the current order, the U.N.1 and 
the World Bank,2 as they presently operate, have undergone a 
 
1 The U.N. is a source of economic and technical assistance for 
underdeveloped countries.  See Pierre de Senarclens, The United Nations as a Social 
and Economic Regulator, in REGULATING GLOBALIZATION: CRITICAL APPROACHES TO 
GLOBAL GOVERNANCE 8, 9 (Pierre de Senarclens & Ali Kazancigil eds., 2007) 
(detailing the role of the U.N. system as ―the symbol of international community,‖ 
―an essential forum for multilateral diplomacy,‖ and ―a source of economic and 
technical assistance for numerous‖ developing countries).  Although ―[t]he 
maintenance of peace was the main objective for the foundation of the United 
Nations organization,‖ its founders believed that governments could not achieve 
international security without ―strong international cooperation aimed at 
promoting economic progress and social welfare,‖ goals reflected in Article 55 of 
the United Nations Charter.  Id. at 10.  Various UN-related organizations, such as 
the United Nations Development Programme (―UNDP‖), the Food and 
Agriculture Organization (―FAO‖), the World Food Programme (―WFP‖), and the 
World Health Organization (―WHO‖) provide development assistance.  See J. 
SAMUEL BARKIN, INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION: THEORIES AND INSTITUTIONS 107 
(2006) (detailing the role of international organizations in development).  Of these, 
the U.N. entity that is most directly focused on development is UNDP.  Id. (stating 
that the UNDP‘s ―remit is to provide technical assistance to developing countries‖ 
and that it ―is most directly focused on development assistance per se‖). 
2 The term ―World Bank‖ is commonly used to refer to the institution set up 
in 1944, on the heels of World War II, as the International Bank for Reconstruction 
and Development (―IBRD‖) for the purpose of making loans to member countries 
at below market rates.  See John W. Head, Law and Policy in International Financial 
Institutions: The Changing Role of Law in the IMF and the Multilateral Development 
Banks, 17 KAN. J.L. & PUB. POL‘Y 194, 196–97 (2007) (describing the early 
development of the World Bank).  Its loans were initially directed at the 
reconstruction of post-war Europe but are now exclusively directed at 
development for developing county members.  Id. (detailing the funds used by 
multilateral development banks (―MDBs‖), like the IBRD and the International 
Development Association (―IDA‖), to aid economic development in certain 
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crisis of legitimacy.3  The U.N., though originally charged with 
protecting the global welfare, has not played a central role in the 
design and financial administration of the more recent innovations 
in development finance, such as carbon finance, microfinance, and 
public-private financing initiatives.  Instead, it has ceded primary 
responsibility for those aspects of innovative international 
development financing to the World Bank.  The World Bank, on 
 
countries).  IBRD has since been joined by four additional institutions: (1) the 
International Finance Corporation (―IFC‖), which lends to the private sector; (2) 
the International Development Association (―IDA‖), which make interest-free 
loans to the poorest countries of the world; (3) the Multilateral Investment 
Guaranty Agency (―MIGA‖), which issues guarantees to the private sector against 
certain development country risks; and (4) the International Center for the 
Settlement of Investment Disputes (―ICSID‖), an arbitrating body.  See INT‘L BANK 
FOR RECONSTRUCTION AND DEV., INFORMATION STATEMENT 47 (2010), available at 
http://treasury.worldbank.org/cmd/pdf/InformationStatement.PDF (describing 
the IFC, IDA, and MIGA as ―affiliated‖ with the IRBD).  In this Article, the term 
―World Bank‖ will be used to apply interchangeably to IBRD or IDA whether 
acting separately or together.  See id. at 78–82 (noting that the IDA has no separate 
staff but is run wholly by IBRD).  
3 See Michael N. Barnett & Martha Finnemore, The Politics, Power, and 
Pathologies of International Organizations, 53 INT‘L ORG. 699, 723 (1999) (noting that 
the World Bank‘s worldview has translated into a record of development 
failures); Ruth W. Grant & Robert O. Keohane, Accountability and Abuses of Power 
in World Politics, 99 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 29, 29 (2005) (noting NGOs‘ views that the 
World Bank lacks accountability by not having to answer to those whom its 
policies affect).  The World Bank has been vilified by both aid skeptics, and pro-
aid, anti-globalization protestors.  See Jonathan R. Pincus & Jeffrey A. Winters, 
Preface to REINVENTING THE WORLD BANK, at viii (Jonathan R. Pincus & Jeffrey A. 
Winters eds., 2002) [hereinafter Pincus and Winters, Preface] (posing common 
questions concerning the Bank‘s operational capacity and whether it is the 
appropriate vehicle for its aid endeavors).  Aid skeptics, opposed to government 
generally, denounce the Bank as usurping reliance on private markets.  Jonathan 
R. Pincus & Jeffrey A. Winters, Reinventing the World Bank, in REINVENTING THE 
WORLD BANK 1, 2 (Jonathan R. Pincus & Jeffrey A. Winters eds., 2002) [hereinafter 
Pincus & Winters, Reinventing the World Bank] (discussing how the perception that 
the integration of global capital markets undermined the rationale of public sector 
development lending contributed to the general disappointment in the 
institution).  Pro-aid, anti-globalization protesters, on the other hand, denounce 
the Bank as being captive to the corporate interests of its more powerful members.  
Id.  Additionally, the ―Fifty Years is Enough‖ campaign surfaced around the 
fiftieth year of the Bank‘s founding.  See 50 YEARS IS ENOUGH: THE CASE AGAINST 
THE WORLD BANK AND THE INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND (Kevin Danaher ed., 
1994) (compiling various viewpoints of multiple groups opposing the World Bank 
for both political and economic reasons).  For additional discussion, see de 
Senarclens, supra note 1, at 26–35 (citing the ―crisis in the legitimacy and 
accountability‖ of the U.N. system); Daniel C. Esty, Good Governance at the 
Supranational Scale: Globalizing Administrative Law, 115 YALE L.J. 1490, 1506 (2006) 
(noting the trepidation of many national officials and citizens over assigning 
responsibility for important domains to an ―ineffectual‖ U.N.). 
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the other hand, though tasked with the responsibility of being the 
developing world‘s primary source of multilateral development 
finance, struggles with the inherently schizophrenic nature of its 
role as a development institution on the one hand, and a bank on 
the other.  Repeatedly, its banking id prevails, too often to the 
detriment of the development agenda.  For these reasons, there has 
been little public support for imposing new or expanded mandates 
on these institutions.4  Recognizing this reality, the world‘s 
development aid donors are engaged in an ongoing quest to find 
alternatives to these institutions. 
This quest takes the form of setting up numerous funds 
narrowly tailored to finance specific, narrowly-defined needs.  
Examples of these funds include the GEF and the Global Fund to 
Fight AIDS, Malaria and Tuberculosis.  The Climate Change Fund, 
proposed by the participants in the 15th Conference of the Parties 
of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change 
(―UNFCCC‖) (also known as the Copenhagen Summit),5 and 
recently renamed the Green Climate Fund,6 is poised to follow this 
approach.  The developed countries that participated in the 
Copenhagen Summit promised to collectively provide $30 billion 
in annual support over the near term (2010-2012) to finance this 
fund and financial resources of $100 billion a year by 2020.7  The 
 
4 See Helen V. Milner, Why Multilateralism? Foreign Aid and Domestic Principal-
Agent Problems, in DELEGATION AND AGENCY IN INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS, 
107, 110 (Darren G. Hawkins et al. eds., 2006) (noting the strong influence public 
sentiment has on member countries‘ support for international organizations).  
5 For more information on the Copenhagen Accord, see generally David 
Hunter, Implications of the Copenhagen Accord for Global Climate Governance, 10 
SUSTAINABLE DEV. L. & POL‘Y 4 (2010) (concluding that while better than nothing, 
the Copenhagen Accord will not motivate the world‘s leaders to prioritize long-
term climate goals over short-term political needs). 
6 See PEW CTR. ON GLOBAL CLIMATE CHANGE, SIXTEENTH SESSION OF THE 
CONFERENCE OF THE PARTIES TO THE UNITED NATIONS FRAMEWORK CONVENTION ON 
CLIMATE CHANGE AND SIXTH SESSION OF THE MEETING OF THE PARTIES TO THE KYOTO 
PROTOCOL, [hereinafter PEW CANCUN SUMMARY] available at 
http://www.pewclimate.org/international/cancun-climate-conference-cop16-
summary (recounting the discussions at Cancún including the articulated goals, 
and future measures to be taken).  The fund was renamed at the Sixteenth Session 
of the Conference of the Parties in Cancún in December 2010, at which time 
participants strengthened their financial commitments to the new fund and 
agreed on implementation mechanisms for financing.  Id. 
7 See U.N. Framework Convention on Climate Change [UNFCC] Draft Dec. -
/CP.16 ¶ 95, [hereinafter Cancún Accord], available at http://unfccc.int/files 
/meetings/cop_16/application/pdf/cop16_lca.pdf (detailing the general funding 
structure resulting from the Copenhagen Summit). 
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol32/iss4/1
SMYTH.DOC 4/24/2011  9:51 AM 
2011] COLLECTIVE FINANCE CHALLENGE 967 
financing is expected to come from a wide variety of sources, both 
public and private, as well as bilateral and multilateral.8  The 
participants agreed, however, that the World Bank will serve as 
interim trustee of the fund for the first three years.9 
This phenomenon of creating new funds to address special 
needs in developing countries, epitomized by the decision of the 
Copenhagen and Cancún Summit participants, reflects a seismic 
change in international development finance and is a byproduct of 
globalization.10  Ushered in by the end of the Cold War, 
globalization gives rise to both a need and a desire for countries 
and their citizens to collaborate together across sovereign 
boundaries in unprecedented ways.11  The global problems it has 
spawned are too big for any single country to address alone.  They 
demand a collective response.12  Moreover, the easing of fears of a 
Communist world takeover allows for inter-governmental 
 
8 Id. ¶ 99.  See Hunter, supra note 5, at 11 (stating further that while funds are 
supposed to come from this variety of sources, the institutional structure for 
delivering such finance has ―yet to be determined‖). 
9 Cancún Accord, supra note 7, ¶ 107.  See also PEW CANCUN SUMMARY, supra 
note 6, at 4 (stating that three years after the fund begins operations, the World 
Bank as interim trustee will be subject to a review).  A Transitional Committee 
was also established to design the fund which will report to the Seventeenth 
Session of the Conference of the Parties in December 2011.   Cancún Accord, supra 
note 7, ¶ 109. 
10 For the purposes of this Article, I take ―globalization‖ to connote an 
increased interdependence and interaction among countries and their citizens—
both as between developed and developing countries, and between developed 
countries inter se—that began with the end of the Cold War and the subsequent 
rise in opportunities for greater transnational activity.  See Robert Howse, The End 
of the Globalization Debate: A Review Essay, 121 HARV. L. REV. 1528, 1529 (2008) 
(reviewing RAWI ABDELAL, CAPTIAL RULES: THE CONSTRUCTION OF GLOBAL FINANCE 
(2007); JAGDISH BHAGWATI, IN DEFENSE OF GLOBALIZATION (2007); SASKIA SASSEN, 
TERRITORY, AUTHORITY RIGHTS FROM MEDIEVAL TO GLOBAL ASSEMBLAGES (2006); 
JOSEPH E. STIGLITZ, MAKING GLOBALIZATION WORK (2006)) (noting the end of the 
Cold War as a formation point for a pro-market consensus in the discussion of 
economic globalization). 
11 See JOSEPH E. STIGLITZ, MAKING GLOBALIZATION WORK 277–78 (2006) 
(reiterating that the Cold War necessitated collaboration between nations for 
development responsibility); Howse, supra note 10, at 1529 (discussing the 
dynamic struggle between right and left governmental policies at the close of the 
Cold War).  
12 See Esty, supra note 3, at 1493 (recognizing that national governments 
cannot singularly address the problems associated with globalization and must 
work collaboratively for the most effective response). 
Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository, 2014
SMYTH.DOC 4/24/2011  9:51 AM 
968 U. Pa. J. Int’l L. [Vol. 32:4 
collaboration in addressing longstanding needs in developing 
countries.13 
This increased need for extensive collective financing, when 
coupled with a loss of confidence in the established institutions 
charged with the primary responsibilities for collective 
development finance, presents a conundrum.  How should donors 
willing to pool their funds to address global and other problems in 
developing countries proceed when they have lost faith in the 
institutions that handle such financing?  This is the question I 
examine in this Article. 
I analyze this conundrum from the point of view of:  what will 
it take to create collective financing efforts that optimize the 
likelihood that monies pooled by donors for a collective purpose 
will be applied to that purpose?  This focus is not intended, 
however, to ignore or neglect the fact that the question of 
overarching importance is whether these financing efforts provide 
meaningful development assistance to their third-party 
beneficiaries—the citizens of the developing countries that these 
collective financing efforts are created to serve.  But I take the view 
that the development effectiveness of these efforts and the 
efficiency, equity, transparency, and accountability with which 
they disperse their resources are inextricably intertwined.  Taking 
measures to lower the agency costs and raise the accountability by 
which these efforts discharge their goals is not an exercise which 
takes place independent of the ultimate beneficiaries of these 
efforts.  It requires their involvement and ownership of the process 
and that involvement and ownership is a crucial step in these 
efforts achieving their goals.  
As it currently operates, I maintain that the ad hoc special-
purpose fund approach is reactive and lacks a coherent, unifying 
vision of how to meet today‘s development challenges.  The funds 
that have been created fill a need, but they are a fragmented, sub-
 
13 See How We Classify Countries, WORLD BANK, 
http://data.worldbank.org/about/country-classifications (last visited Aug. 16, 
2010) (noting that the World Bank classifies countries with a Gross National 
Income per capita under $12,196 as ―developing‖).  See also JEFFREY D. SACHS, THE 
END OF POVERTY: ECONOMIC POSSIBILITIES FOR OUR TIME 290 (2005) (discussing 
calculations for international development through collaboration among World 
Bank member nations); Howse, supra note 10, at 1541 (citing JOSEPH STIGLITZ, 
MAKING GLOBALIZATION WORK, supra note 11)) (recognizing that these needs, in 
addition to global problems, include the needs borne of conflict and abject 
poverty). 
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optimal response to that need.  They suffer from several deficits 
ranging from governance gaps and lacunae in accountability to 
uncertain status in the international political and legal order— 
deficits that generate new risks and costs for the international aid 
architecture.  Therefore, I claim that we need a new approach. 
I base my claim on an analysis of the agency costs,14 
accountability gaps, and other shortcomings that inhere in three 
major global special purpose funds that precede the Green Climate 
Fund and which will likely serve as precedents for it—the Global 
Environment Facility Trust Fund (―the GEF Trust Fund‖), the 
Education For All Fast Track Initiative Catalytic Trust Fund (―the 
Education Fund‖) and the Global Fund to Fight AIDS, 
Tuberculosis and Malaria (―the Global Fund‖).  I show how these 
three funds take two distinct approaches to limiting donors‘ 
reliance on the World Bank or U.N. to effectuate these funds‘ 
mandates and why, for differing reasons, neither approach offers 
an optimal mechanism for setting up a collective financing 
initiative.   
In advocating for a new approach, I aim for a solution that will 
enable special-purpose funds to operate in sync with—rather than 
as bypasses to—those institutions.  I propose that change be 
considered in two stages.  In the immediate term, I argue that the 
contributions that special purpose funds make to international 
development should be strengthened by addressing the 
 
14 The term ―agency costs‖ refers to the losses and costs donors incur when 
they convey funds to an intermediary for the benefit of a developing country and 
the World Bank or U.N. then engages in undesired independent action or does 
nothing at all.  ―Agency costs‖ also refer to the costs donors incur monitoring the 
intermediary.  See Darren G. Hawkins et al., Delegation Under Anarchy: States, 
International Organizations, and Principal-Agent Theory in DELEGATION AND AGENCY 
IN INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS, 3, 9 (Darren G. Hawkins et al. eds., 2006) 
(noting that ―[p]rincipals incur agency losses or costs when agents engage in 
undesired independent action or when they themselves expend resources to 
contract with or monitor and control those agents‖).  ―Agency costs‖ is also a term 
in law and economics scholarship on third-party financing arrangements.  See 
Robert H. Sitkoff, An Agency Costs Theory of Trust Law, 89 CORNELL L. REV. 621, 
636–37 (2004). 
[I]n economic rather than legal parlance, agency problems are caused by the 
impossibility of complete contracting when one party (the agent) has 
discretionary and unobservable decision-making authority that affects the wealth 
of another party . . . .  [U]nless there is a perfect correlation between the agent‘s 
effort and the project‘s observable profits . . . it will be difficult for the principal to 
prevent shirking by the agent . . . .  The losses to the parties that stem from such a 
misalignment of interests are called agency costs.  
Id. (internal citations omitted). 
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governance and other deficits that arise in these funds‘ structures.  
I maintain that efforts to strengthen these funds should be 
informed by an understanding of the task at hand, drawn from 
principles of principal-agent theory15 and accountability theory,16 
as applied to third-party financing arrangements.  In the longer 
term, I argue that the popularity of these special purpose funds as 
a form of collective finance points to a need to redesign key aspects 
of the way the U.N. and the World Bank do business.  If such 
reform occurs, those institutions can serve as effective facilitators 
and vehicles of collective finance rather than as pillars of an 
outdated model that has to be circumvented.  In support of my 
argument, I make preliminary suggestions for the kind of short-
term and long-term changes that I believe are warranted.   
To date, the theoretical underpinnings of these special purpose 
funds and their implications for the international legal order have 
been neglected.  This neglect occurs even though these funds give 
rise to the same issues of legitimacy and accountability as the 
World Bank and U.N., about which there is an extensive 
literature.17  Thus, this Article fills a gap in the legal scholarship on 
international development finance.  Furthermore, as billions of 
dollars pass annually from the developed world to the developing 
world through these initiatives,18 and the Green Climate Fund 
 
15 See Milner, supra note 4, at 10 (exploring ―variations in the pattern of 
multilateral aid giving over time and across countries using this principal-agent 
theory of multilateral allocation‖); Barnett and Finnemore, supra note 3, at 705 
(describing the principal-agent theory and its application to analyzing the 
autonomy of international organizations). 
16 See Grant & Keohane, supra note 3, at 41 (discussing the role of 
accountability mechanisms in relation to various actors in global politics and the 
various conditions necessary for accountability). 
17 See JOHN W. HEAD, LOSING THE GLOBAL DEVELOPMENT WAR 49–62 (2008) 
(detailing the origins and consequences of the global economic organizations‘ role 
in the ―Global Development War‖); Pincus & Winters, Preface, supra note 3, at vii–
x (prefacing academic responses to the ―reinvention‖ of the World Bank to better 
serve poor nations); NGAIRE WOODS, THE GLOBALIZERS: THE IMF, THE WORLD BANK, 
AND THEIR BORROWERS 22–38 (2006) (discussing a brief history of the World Bank 
and the IMF); de Senarclens, supra note 1, at 9 (discussing the social and economic 
regulatory role of the United Nations); BARKIN, supra note 1, at 105–06 (arguing 
that ―[t]he World Bank, as a regime, has been criticized from both efficiency and 
legitimacy perspectives‖). 
18 WORLD BANK, A MANAGEMENT FRAMEWORK FOR WORLD BANK ADMINISTERED 
TRUST FUNDS at i, World Bank Doc. 41063 (2007) [hereinafter WB TRUST FUNDS 
MANAGEMENT FRAMEWORK], available at http://www-wds.worldbank.org/external 
/default/WDSContentServer/WDSP/IB/2007/11/01/000020439_2007110116494
5/Rendered/PDF/410630R200710198.pdf (stating that over $4.4 billion worth of 
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gears up to expand this form of finance to an unprecedented 
level,19 discussing the elements of an optimal collective financing 
approach brings a theoretical optic to bear on an important policy 
goal.   
Two starting premises underpin my argument.  First, 
regardless of whether one believes that the developed world has a 
moral or ethical obligation to provide development assistance to 
the developing world,20 all can agree on the importance of having 
an infrastructure that maximizes the likelihood that the provided 
assistance will reach its intended beneficiaries.  Second, I proceed 
on the basis that providing the optimal airtight delivery 
mechanism falls squarely within the remit of the international legal 
order.21  All of development‘s stakeholders rely on the legal order 
 
disbursements under trust funds were managed by the World bank Group in 
2002).  Ilias Bantekas‘ recent monograph is one isolated, useful and timely 
exception to this neglect.  ILIAS BANTEKAS, TRUST FUNDS UNDER INTERNATIONAL 
LAW: TRUSTEE OBLIGATIONS OF THE UNITED NATIONS AND INTERNATIONAL 
DEVELOPMENT BANKS (2009). 
19 Cancún Accord, supra note 7, ¶ 8–10 (establishing the Green Climate Fund, 
which called for signing nations to significantly increase their contributions aimed 
at reducing worldwide greenhouse gas emissions). 
20 For discourse in favor of such a moral or ethical obligation, see AMARTYA 
SEN, DEVELOPMENT AS FREEDOM 8–10 (1999) (advancing the norms, values and 
principles associated with development); PETER SINGER, PRACTICAL ETHICS 218–46 
(2d ed. 1979) (arguing that developed countries have an ethical obligation to assist 
developing countries).  For the contrary view, see ROBERT J. BARRO, GETTING IT 
RIGHT: MARKETS AND CHOICE IN A FREE SOCIETY (1996) (emphasizing the role of 
markets over governments or assistance as the engine of economic growth and 
development).  Support for the existence of a moral imperative to provide aid 
does not preclude recognizing that many other motivations also drive aid.  See 
Milner, supra note 4, at 108 (noting that the literature on donor motivation points 
to two main motivations for aid: ―the satisfaction of recipient needs or of donor 
political goals‖ with donor interests being the dominant motive).  Furthermore, 
this support does note that aid has a checkered history and can have detrimental 
effects.  See generally DAMBISA MOYO, DEAD AID: WHY AID IS NOT WORKING AND 
HOW THERE IS A BETTER WAY FOR AFRICA (2009) (arguing that  aid to African 
nations is counter-productive and proposing alternatives  such as  microfinance 
and revised property laws).  Others argue forcefully that development aid is 
essential to global economic stability, pointing out that developing countries face 
challenges they cannot handle on their own.  See PAUL COLLIER, THE BOTTOM 
BILLION: WHY THE POOREST COUNTRIES ARE FAILING AND WHAT CAN BE DONE ABOUT 
IT (2007) (arguing that if failed states are ever to be helped, the G8 will have to 
adopt preferential trade policies, new laws against corruption, new international 
charters, and carefully calibrated military interventions); SACHS, supra note 13, at 
56–66 (―[E]ight major categories of problems can cause an economy to stagnate or 
decline.‖). 
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to provide the infrastructure within which development finance 
occurs. 
This Article is organized as follows.  Section 2.1 shows the 
expanding range of needs that collective finance efforts meet and 
the approaches on which donors rely to provide such finance.  I 
show how two competing models have emerged from donors‘ 
efforts to find alternatives to the World Bank and the U.N.  Section 
2.2 details the parameters of these models.  The first model is a 
trust fund set up under the auspices of the World Bank.  This 
model‘s donor-friendly governance structure allows the donors to 
take charge of allocating the fund‘s assets.  I refer to this model as a 
―Quasi-Entity Fund‖.  The other model consists of a stand-alone 
fund set up as a legal entity under a national law regime.  I refer to 
this model as a ―National Law Entity‖.  I show how both models 
rely on the World Bank and the U.N. to perform certain functions 
but differ from an approach that gives those institutions additional 
funds directly with broad discretion to address additional causes 
as they see fit. 
Section 3 critiques these models.  I argue that the theoretical 
logic of the Quasi-Entity Fund fails due to the extent of the model‘s 
continued dependency on the World Bank.  I show how this 
dependency causes such funds to be dominated by the World 
Bank‘s lending agenda22 rather than by the agenda of the donors 
 
21 I refer here to the coordinating role of the legal order.  See e.g., Duncan 
Kennedy, Three Globalizations of Law and Legal Thought: 1850–2000, in THE NEW LAW 
AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT 19–72 (David M. Trubek & Alvaro Santos eds., 2006) 
(arguing that ―[l]egal institutions and ideas have a dynamic, or dialectical, or 
constitutive relationship to economic activity‖).  
22 Pincus & Winters, Reinventing the World Bank, supra note 3, at 24 (describing 
the highly centralized nature of the World Bank and how a voluntary surrender of 
control is unlikely); WOODS, supra note 17, at 212 (―Each member government, and 
the IMF and World Bank, must balance private initiatives with public purpose, 
weighing competing priorities and making decisions which create winners and 
losers.‖); BARKIN, supra note 1, at 137 (discussing how developing countries are 
receiving greater decisional power in international organizations, though this 
change is ―concentrated in a small group of big and influential developing 
countries, led by China and India‖); STAFF OF S. COMM. ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, 
111TH CONG., REP. ON THE INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS: A CALL FOR 
CHANGE (Comm. Print Mar. 10, 2010) [hereinafter Senate Committee Report] 
available at http://www.google.com/url?sa=t&source=web&cd=1&ved 
=0CBIQFjAA&url=http%3A%2F%2Fforeign.senate.gov%2Freports%2Fdownload
%2F%3Fid%3D92182c41-3b05-45f8-99d9-59d3034485f2&ei=UHxxTOvsGML 
_lgfGsdixDw&usg=AFQjCNEqYLyrsnMsBD4z4Ifpm5I1SebOKA; Galit Sarfaty, 
Why Culture Matters in International Institutions: The Marginality of Human Rights at 
the World Bank, 103 AM. J. INT‘L L. 647, 682 (2009) (discussing how the decision 
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who created the fund, or the agenda of the fund‘s beneficiaries—a 
result this model was specifically designed to avoid.  I further 
show that the model‘s governance structure as currently conceived 
gives rise to several significant gaps in accountability23 with 
potentially negative outcomes for all stakeholders. 
I argue that the theoretical logic of the National Law Entity has 
promise.  It succeeds in avoiding some of the agency costs that 
donors would incur if they put these resources under the direct 
control of the U.N. or the World Bank.  The flexibility of its 
structure allows for greater input from beneficiary countries than 
occurs under the governance structures of those institutions.  I 
maintain, however, that this model is not a complete answer to the 
need for improved mechanisms for collective finance.  To date, this 
model has depended on existing institutions agreeing to cooperate 
with the National Law Entities in discrete but essential ways.  As 
these entities increase in size and scope, however, and begin to 
look like competitors of existing institutions, donors cannot count 
on that cooperation being indefinitely available.  Further, I point 
out that although donors may be committed to providing financial 
assistance for a particular purpose, they may not want to commit 
to the degree of responsibility and expense involved in this model.  
Lastly, I show that since special interest funds do not have legal 
status and capacity under international law, they may face 
obstacles that prevent them from operating optimally. 
Section 4 sounds a call for change.  The new collective finance 
models are symptoms of a larger issue that needs a long-term 
solution; specifically, that the institutions charged with primary 
responsibility for international development finance are not the 
kind of institutions the international community needs or wants 
anymore.  Any redesign of the interrelationship between the 
phenomenon of these special-purpose funds, the U.N. and the 
World Bank, however, will have to be tackled on a two-track basis:  
(1) a long-term solution with a new vision compatible with the new 
 
making process of the World Bank affected its decision not to adopt a human 
rights policy). 
23 These gaps include, but are not limited to, fiscal accountability, defined by 
Grant and Keohane as the ―mechanism through which funding agencies can 
demand reports from, and ultimately sanction, agencies that are recipients of 
funding.‖  Grant and Keohane, supra note 3, at 36.  Grant and Keohane note that 
this form of accountability is particularly important for ―organizations such as the 
United Nations and the World Bank, which rely on government appropriations to 
fund substantial parts of their activities.‖  Id. 
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world order, and (2) a more immediate solution comprised of 
various changes to make special purpose funds more effective in 
the interim.  I make some preliminary suggestions for the kind of 
short-term and long-term changes advocated. 
The long-term approach must inevitably entail an overhaul of 
the way in which the U.N. and the World Bank address the needs 
that special purpose funds serve.  The more immediate approach, 
focused on making special purpose funds work better, would 
involve several incremental but cumulative changes to the existing 
models.  I propose that these include creating a new institution—
an international development fund manager—the sole function of 
which would be to provide the financial management services 
required for collective financing.  I also suggest expanding the 
range of options upon which donors can draw to create 
autonomous collective financing efforts for development in both 
domestic and international law.   
In conclusion, my aim in filling the gap in legal scholarship on 
collective financing initiatives for development is to stimulate 
debate about the best way to create a framework for collective 
financing that meets the needs of the new world order, better 
serves the interests of all of development‘s stakeholders, and 
facilitates the delivery of funds to the purposes and people that 
depend upon them. 
2. THE COLLECTIVE FINANCE CHALLENGE 
2.1. Part I of the Collective Finance Challenge 
2.1.1. An Exponential Growth in Demand 
Globalization24 generates a significant demand for collective 
financing for development.  Critical global issues—including 
climate change, infectious diseases and financial crises—emerge as 
byproducts of globalization25 and are especially acute in 
developing countries.  Developing countries lack the resources to 
address these issues, but a failure to act puts the whole world in 
 
24 See BARKIN, supra note 1, at 7 (discussing globalization in the realm of 
international governance); Howse, supra note 10, at 1529 (reviewing various 
claims about the origins and theoretical end of globalization). 
25 See Esty, supra note 3, at 1500 (noting that globalization gives rise to a  
point of interconnectedness as unintended consequences of policy choices, e.g., 
the open borders of free trade and ―free travel create an exposure to the spread of 
disease, requiring a commitment to coordinated policy response‖). 
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jeopardy.26  Moreover, no single donor country can alleviate these 
issues alone.27  Accordingly, global problems create a need for 
extensive collective financing and a dynamic pooling of up-to-date 
knowledge on treatments, causes, effects, and cures.28   
Globalization has also spurred collective financing in other 
aspects of development aid.  At the start of the new millennium, 
globalization‘s contribution to new levels of prosperity in the 
developed world generated a more magnanimous and egalitarian 
approach to development.29  This led to a highly public 
commitment on the part of donor countries to ―eradicate‖ extreme 
poverty by 2015 and to work ―in partnership‖ with local 
governments and non-government entities to do so.  This 
commitment was memorialized in the Millennium Development 
Goals (―MDGs‖).30  The end of the Cold War, which sparked the 
process of globalization,31 also facilitated a norm of cooperation 
among donor countries in the aid effort.  For example, this norm is 
 
26 Id. at 1495–96 (discussing the benefits of global governance and adherence 
to a set of roles that are embodied in administrative law). 
27 See generally, Jeremy Heimans, Multifactor Global Funds: New Tools to 
Address Urgent Global Problems 1 (UN Univ. World Inst. For Dev. Econ. Research, 
Research Paper No. 2004/47, 2004), available at http://www.wider.unu.edu 
/publications/working-papers/research-papers/2004/en_GB/rp2004-
047/_files/78091745868055742/default/rp2004-047.pdf (considering how 
desirable multifactor global funds are for resource allocation and arguing that 
they promise to mobilize more public and private resources). 
28 See Esty, supra note 3, at 1500–01 (noting that supranational policymaking, 
of which one can view multilateral aid as a subset, can be advisable for many 
reasons, including the fact that ―[m]any policy problems have multiple 
dimensions, making response strategies that draw on both decentralized and 
centralized information optimal‖). 
29  SACHS, supra note 13, at 211–13 (listing the eight goals and eighteen targets 
of the Millennium Development Goals). 
30 At the United Nations Millennium Summit, representatives of most of the 
world‘s governments and its leading development institutions gathered at the 
Millennium Assembly of the United Nations to agree upon priorities for 
development aid for the new millennium, and agreed upon eight goals, the 
―Millennium Development Goals,‖ the eighth of which expressly acknowledged 
the importance of achieving development through partnerships.  Millennium 
Declaration G.A. Res. 55/2, U.N. Doc. A/RES/55/2 (Sept. 18, 2000). 
31 See ANNE-MARIE SLAUGHTER, A NEW WORLD ORDER 42 (2004) (opining that 
―[a]s the bipolar state system of the Cold War disappeared and nonstate, sub-
state, and supranational actors rode the tide of globalization, pundits and many 
scholars began heralding the era of complex, multilevel, global governance, tied 
together by networks‖). 
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reflected in the Paris Declaration on Aid Harmonization, in which 
donor countries agreed to harmonize their approaches to aid.32 
In addition to generating and facilitating an increased need for 
collective financing, globalization also brings new donors (and 
new recipients) into the international development fold.  These 
new actors consist most notably of non-governmental 
organizations (―NGOs‖), whose explosive growth is generally 
attributed to globalization.33  Numerous NGOs are now 
extensively involved in development as implementers of 
programs,34 as consultants to and observers of policy dialogues, 
and as watchdogs over countries‘ aid commitments.35  Other new 
actors include foundations that are significant development aid 
donors, such as the Gates Foundation and the Soros Foundation,36 
and for-profit entities, such as pharmaceutical companies engaged 
with donor governments in subsidized arrangements to produce 
 
32 See, e.g., Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness: Ownership, 
Harmonization, Alignment, Results and Mutual Accountability (Mar. 2, 2005), 
available at http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/11/41/34428351.pdf.  Later, in 2008, 
participating countries and organizations agreed to the Accra Agenda for Action, 
which was also non-binding.  Accra Agenda for Action, available at 
http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/11/41/34428351.pdf. 
33 Commentators also point to the role of the internet in facilitating NGOs‘ 
communication as a contributing factor in NGOs‘ growth, with the internet being 
seen as one of the cornerstones of globalization.  See Jessica T. Mathews, Power 
Shift, 76 FOREIGN AFF. 50, 51–67 (1997) (noting that the end of the Cold War 
brought a novel redistribution of power among states, markets and civil society, 
spurred on by the computer and telecommunications revolution); Peter J. Spiro, 
Accounting for NGOs, 3 Chi. J. Int‘l L. 161 (2002) (observing that the advent of 
globalization has empowered NGOs).  
34 See LAWRENCE ZIRING ET AL., THE UNITED NATIONS: INTERNATIONAL 
ORGANIZATION AND WORLD POLITICS 82–83 (4th ed. 2005) (discussing the role of 
NGOs in development policy decisions and the implementation of social and 
economic development programs). 
35 See id. at 82 (noting that the advice and support of NGOs can be crucial to 
the overall coordination of development programs); Milner, supra note 4, at 120 
(describing how NGO endorsement and evaluation of aid programs facilitates the 
strength and success of development programs). 
36 The Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation gave a combined total of over $2.28 
billion to global development and health programs in 2008.  See BILL & MELINDA 
GATES FOUND., 2008 ANNUAL REPORT 23 (2008), available at 
http://www.gatesfoundation.org/annualreport/2008/Documents/2008-annual-
report.pdf.  The same year, the Soros Foundations reported over $77 million in 
international initiatives.  See SOROS FOUND., 2008 NETWORK REPORT 88 (2008), 
available at http://www.soros.org/resources/articles_publications/publications 
/ar08_20090720/ar08_20090911.pdf. 
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the medications and vaccines that developing countries need.37  
The combination of all these factors has led to an exponential 
increase over the last fifteen years in the number of collective 
financing efforts created to address global problems and other 
development needs.38  The Green Climate Fund is poised to 
become one more. 
The programs and activities that these existing efforts finance 
are as diverse as the world they serve.  They address global 
problems and critical development needs.  They also include 
efforts to pilot innovative forms of financing to address these 
needs, such as microfinance and carbon finance.39  These efforts, 
 
37 See, e.g., Innovative Partnership, GLOBAL ALLIANCE FOR VACCINES AND 
IMMUNIZATION (―GAVI‖), http://www.gavialliance.org/about/in_partnership 
/index.php (last visited July 27, 2010) (representing a global partnership, whose 
members include ―governments, private sector philanthropists . . . the financial 
community, developed and developing country vaccine manufacturers [and] 
research and technical institutes,‖ dedicated to providing immunizations to 
children worldwide); Why IFFIm?, International Financing Facility for 
Immunizations (―IFFIm‖), http://www.iff-immunisation.org (last visited July 27, 
2010) (raising over $3 billion in funds for GAVI‘s immunization programs).  Many 
other kinds of corporations are also part of collective development aid initiatives, 
such as efforts to combat climate change and child health.  See, e.g., Prototype 
Carbon Fund, WORLD BANK CARBON FINANCE UNIT, http://wbcarbonfinance.org 
/Router.cfm?Page=PCF (last visited July 28, 2010) (partnering several Japanese 
utility companies and other private companies with six governments acting 
collectively to reduce greenhouse gas emissions). 
38 Reports of the rapid increase in the World Bank‘s involvement, as the 
preeminent international development entity, evidence the growing importance of 
this form of financing.  See BARKIN, supra note 1, at 103 (―The World Bank is the 
world‘s premier development lending institution.‖).  The exponential growth of 
this financing is well documented by the World Bank.  See, e.g., WORLD BANK 
OPERATIONS EVALUATION DEP‘T, THE WORLD BANK‘S APPROACH TO GLOBAL 
PROGRAMS: AN INDEPENDENT EVALUATION, PHASE 1 REPORT para. 3.13, at 14 (2002) 
[hereinafter OED PHASE I REPORT], available at http://lnweb90.worldbank.org 
/oed/oeddoclib.nsf/DocUNIDViewForJavaSearch/F97A9075E643981785256C070
0753005/$file/GPPP.pdf (noting that the World Bank‘s portfolio of funds for such 
programs increased from $383 million in 1997 to $515 million in 2001); see also WB 
TRUST FUNDS MANAGEMENT FRAMEWORK, supra note 18, para. 1.02, at 1 (noting that 
the World Bank administers funds for programs financed by over 290 different 
donors, including both governments and private sector (nonprofit and for-profit) 
entities).  See generally BANTEKAS, supra note 18, at 132 (noting the World Bank‘s 
practice of establishing funds after a natural disasters and other large scale 
emergencies to address the emergency); Sophie Smyth, World Bank Grants in a 
Changed World Order: How Do We Referee this New Paradigm?, 30 U. PA. J. INT‘L L. 
483, 518–26 (2008) (detailing the grants the World Bank issues from trust funds, 
IDA resources and the World Bank‘s net income). 
39 See Afghanistan Reconstruction Trust Fund, WORLD BANK, 
http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTAFGHANISTAN/Resources/Afghanista
n-Reconstructional-Trust-Fund/ARTF_information.pdf (follow ―ARTF 
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respectively, make funds available to new recipients and expand 
the pool of available financing.  In size, they range from a few 
hundred thousand dollars to several billion dollars.40  In the 
aggregate, these efforts play a vital role in helping narrow the 
eternal gap41 between the size of the developing world‘s needs and 
the size of developed countries‘ development aid budgets. 
2.1.2. Agency Costs and Collective Finance 
The rapid growth and current prevalence of collective 
financing shows a strong commitment to collective financing but 
masks the fact that the international legal framework for this 
financing fails to provide an adequate means for curbing agency 
costs; the bugaboo of the kind of third party financing 
arrangements that these collective efforts involve.42  A closer look 
 
Information‖ hyperlink) (last visited July 27, 2010) (providing post-conflict 
reconstruction assistance through joint efforts between the World Bank and the 
Afghani government); About Cities Alliance, CITIES ALLIANCE, 
http://www.citiesalliance.org/ca/about-cities-alliance (last visited July 27, 2010) 
(creating a global coalition of cities working together to reduce poverty and 
eradicate slum conditions); About Us, CONSULTATIVE GROUP TO ASSIST THE POOR 
(―CGAP‖), http://www.cgap.org/p/site/c/aboutus/ (last visited Mar. 2, 2011) 
(increasing access to finance for poor populations); Carbon Finance at the World 
Bank, WORLD BANK, http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/TOPICS 
/ENVIRONMENT/EXTCARBONFINANCE/0,,menuPK:4125909~pagePK:64168
427~piPK:64168435~theSitePK:4125853,00.html (last visited Mar. 18, 2011) 
(program piloted the purchase of greenhouse gas emission reductions for projects 
in developing countries); CARIBBEAN CATASTROPHIC RISK INSURANCE FACILITY, 
http://www.ccrif.org (last visited July 27, 2010) (allowing Caribbean 
governments to purchase natural disaster insurance at low prices); Community 
Development Carbon Fund, WORLD BANK, http://go.worldbank.org 
/QNLHGWLPS0 (last visited July 27, 2010) (providing carbon financing to poorer 
areas in the world).  In addition to these global initiatives discussed, see, for 
example, smaller initiatives such as the Critical Ecosystem Partnership Fund and 
the International Coral Reef Initiative, which are funded by a combination of 
NGOs, governments, and intergovernmental organizations.  See About CEPF, 
CRITICAL ECOSYSTEM PARTNERSHIP FUND, http://www.cepf.net 
/about_cepf/Pages/default.aspx (last visited July 27, 2010) (providing grants to 
NGOs and private sector partners to protect critical ecosystems); ICRI at a Glance, 
INTERNATIONAL CORAL REEF INITIATIVE, http://www.icriforum.org/about-icri (last 
visited July 27, 2010) (preserving coral reefs and related ecosystems). 
40  See WB TRUST FUNDS MANAGEMENT FRAMEWORK, supra note 18, para. 2, at i 
(outlining the variability in size of trust funds and discussing the steady growth of 
overall trust fund disbursements in recent years). 
41 See SACHS, supra note 13, at 273, 283 (discussing a five-part poverty 
reduction strategy and listing donors supporting the U.N. Millennium Project). 
42 See Sitkoff, supra note 14, at 636–38 (arguing that agency costs are a product 
of post-contractual asymmetric information). 
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at the tasks involved in creating and running a collective financing 
effort illustrates the challenges these efforts present, both at the 
practical and theoretical level. 
2.1.2.1. The Source of Agency Costs 
The creation of a new collective financing effort requires both 
financial administration and development-focused activities,43 two 
tasks that require different capacities.  Financial administration is a 
banking task that does not require development expertise.  In order 
for a group of donors to pool their resources in a central fund to 
finance the provision of assistance to developing countries, they 
must either appoint one of their group or retain a third party to 
serve as the financial administrator of the funding pool.44  Financial 
administration expertise is required to administer the donors‘ pool 
of funds.  For example, someone must be responsible for collecting 
donors‘ contributions, investing them pending their disbursement, 
disbursing them in accordance with the donors‘ instructions, and 
reporting regularly to donors on their use.45  In undertaking these 
functions, the financial administrator is generally regarded as 
having undertaken certain fiduciary duties to the donors.46 
Traditionally, donor countries do not manage each others‘ 
funds.47  Instead, they generally use a third party to serve as a 
 
43 See Sophie Smyth, A Practical Guide to Creating a Collective Financing Effort to 
Save the World: The Global Environment Facility Experience, 22 GEO. INT‘L ENVTL. L. 
REV. 29, 35–36 (2009) (discussing the choices parties have to make when creating a 
collective financing initiative). 
44 See id. at 97 (discussing how the structure of successful collective finance 
necessitates the appointment of a financial manager to facilitate the collective 
financing efforts of donors). 
45 See id. (describing the responsibilities for the financial manager of a 
collective fund). 
46 See BANTEKAS, supra note 18, at 27 (noting that under international law, 
trusts give rise to relationships that are more akin to contractual relationships 
than to the relationships based on fiduciary duties drawn from the common law 
of trusts, but that the common law principles of trust still provides useful 
analogies that can be drawn upon).  See generally Joseph Gold, Trust Funds in 
International Law: The Contribution of the International Monetary Fund to a Code of 
Principles, 72 AM. J. INT‘L L. 856, 860–65 (1978) (noting, for example, that the duty 
of loyalty prohibiting the fund manager from investing the donors‘ assets in 
securities owned or controlled by the fund manager applies to intergovernmental 
trusts). 
47 As part of their new commitment to harmonize aid approaches, some 
donor governments manage the aid funds of others, pursuant to collective 
approaches.  See generally Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness, supra note 32; 
Accra Agenda for Action, supra note 32 (increasing joint efforts to direct 
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financial manager for a new development effort.48  Donor countries 
are likely to seek an intergovernmental organization to act as a 
third party.  While commercial banks could also serve this role, 
they are more expensive49 and carry a liquidity risk.  Moreover, 
they are likely unfamiliar with the idiosyncrasies of the 
governmental aid appropriations processes, which augurs in favor 
of having an intergovernmental entity perform these functions.50   
The development task involved in a collective financing effort 
is distinct from the financial housekeeping involved in managing a 
fund‘s financial resources.  It consists of designing, appraising, 
executing, supervising and monitoring programs and projects 
intended to produce the results for which donors provide 
resources.51  The development task requires extensive development 
expertise and, depending on the scale of the activities involved, 
will likely engage multiple layers of intermediaries, including 
international and regional intergovernmental organizations, 
bilateral government aid agencies, developing country government 
agencies and NGOs.52 
Both the financial administration task and the development 
task necessitate reliance on third parties as intermediaries, or 
middlemen, and thereby give rise to agency cost concerns.  Faced 
with tasks that donor countries cannot perform themselves, they 
 
involvement of donor countries in delivering and managing aid); Norwegian 
Agency for Development Cooperation, NORDIC PLUS: PRACTICAL GUIDE TO 
DELEGATED COOPERATION, Annex 2 at 31 (2006), available at 
http://www.norad.no/en/Tools+and+publications/Publications/Publication+P
age?key=109585 (providing an overview of the financial management 
requirements of the Nordic Plus donors to increase aid effectiveness). 
48 See BANTEKAS, supra note 18, at 6–7 (describing an international trust fund 
in which the trustee, independent and distinct from the donor, manages the funds 
for the benefit of the beneficiary country). 
49 Although the World Bank charges a trust administration fee, it is set at a 
below-market rate.  See WB TRUST FUNDS MANAGEMENT FRAMEWORK, supra note 18, 
at 42 (discussing the World Bank‘s standard fees). 
50 See Smyth, supra note 43, at 33 (noting that managing a collective financing 
effort ―demands an affinity with the idiosyncratic, at times arcane, appropriations 
processes of national governments‖ and international institutions). 
51 See e.g., Project Cycle, WORLD BANK, http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE 
/EXTERNAL/PROJECTS/0,,contentMDK:20120731~menuPK:41390~pagePK:413
67~piPK:51533~theSitePK:40941,00.html (last visited Mar. 2, 2011) (detailing the 
World Bank‘s process for administering loans ―to low and middle-income 
countries to support development‖). 
52 See Milner, supra note 4, at 115 (noting that foreign aid, ―[l]ike all public 
spending, it involves long chains of delegation‖). 
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must choose either to (i) engage an existing entity or entities to 
perform those tasks, including, if necessary, amending such 
entities to equip them to serve, (ii) create a new entity or entities of 
their own design, or (iii) adopt a hybrid approach that uses 
selected aspects of existing entities but sets up a new mechanism to 
perform the functions that donors do not want the existing entity 
to perform.53  Donors‘ key concern is to find a mechanism that 
maximizes the likelihood that their resources will be used for the 
purposes for which they are making them available.  This is the 
Holy Grail of any third-party financing arrangement.54 
2.1.2.2. Agency Costs and Principal-Agent Theory 
Situating the donors‘ quest in the language of principal-agent 
theory, as articulated and applied to international development 
finance by Darren G. Hawkins, David A. Lake, Daniel L. Nielson, 
and Michael J. Tierney,55 the key aspect of agency costs that 
 
53 See id. at 114–22 (analyzing the conditions under which donor countries 
will opt to provide multilateral rather than bilateral aid); Esty, supra note 3, at 
1510 (―National governments must contract for decision-making authority to be 
lodged at the supranational level.  Nation-states will tend to engage in such 
delegation when they believe that it is in their best interest to do so, based on 
potential gains . . . in responding to collective action problems.‖). 
54 See Mona M. Lyne et al., Who Delegates? Alternative Models of Principals in 
Development Aid, in DELEGATION AND AGENCY IN INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS 
41, 43–44 (Darren G. Hawkins et al. eds., 2006) (proposing methods to determine 
whether and how well international organizations comply with the instructions of 
their principals).  While I recognize that the donors‘ ultimate goal is, of course, for 
a development result to be achieved (such as the containment of HIV/AIDS, 
global environmental degradation, or the attainment of universal primary 
education), assessing the development effectiveness of these funds, which 
requires a development analysis rather than a legal analysis, is beyond the scope 
of this Article‘s inquiry.  Concerns have been raised about the fragmentation of 
aid resulting from creating multiple special purpose funds.  See Shampa Biswas, 
W(h)ither the Nation-state? National and State Identity in the Face of Fragmentation and 
Globalisation, 16 GLOBAL SOC‘Y 175, 177, 194 (2002).  But these concerns must be 
weighed against the fact that special purpose funds generate a support for aid 
efforts that would not otherwise exist.  See Heimans, supra note 27, at 11–13 
(arguing that multi-actor global funds are magnets for additional funding and are 
created under the expectation that they will be able to mobilize additional 
resources that could not be raised through existing national or international 
financing channels). 
55 See Darren G. Hawkins et al., Delegation under Anarchy: States, International 
Organizations, and Principal-Agent Theory, in DELEGATION AND AGENCY IN 
INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS 3, 4–8 (Darren G. Hawkins et al. eds., 2006) 
[hereinafter Hawkins et al., Delegation Under Anarchy] (arguing that principal-
agent theory views international organizations as the agents of the principal 
member states which create them, and finds that the rules governing such 
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concerns development aid donors is agency slack.  Agency slack 
refers to independent action by the agent—the entity or entities to 
which donors entrust their pooled resources—that is undesired by 
the donors.56  In searching for an effective financing vehicle, 
therefore, donors are looking to minimize the likelihood of, and 
opportunity for, the occurrence of slack.57   
Slack may occur in two primary forms:  ―shirking, when an 
agent minimizes the effort it exerts on its principal‘s behalf, and 
slippage, when an agent shifts policy away from its principal‘s 
preferred outcome and towards its own preferences.‖58  Principals 
generally use one or more of three standard mechanisms to control 
agency slack.59  The first method requires crafting the principal-
agent relationship as a rule-based delegation by the principal to the 
agent, thereby limiting the agent‘s discretion.  The second method 
involves the establishment of ex post monitoring and reporting 
requirements.60  The third requires principals to select agents with 
preferences similar to their own, agents who are, therefore, 
naturally inclined to act as the principal would if it were 
implementing the task itself.61  A principal may also structure the 
agency relationship so as to rely on internal checks and balances in 
the agent institution.62  Lastly, a principal may use carrots and 
 
organizations are member governments‘ efforts to limit opportunities for 
international organizations to stray from their core mandate). 
56 Id. at 8.  See also Lyne et al., supra note 54, at 43–44 (providing 
recommendations in response to agency slack). 
57 See Hawkins et al., Delegation Under Anarchy, supra note 55, at 8 (defining 
―agency slack‖). 
58 Id. 
59 Id. at 30 (noting the different ways principals sanction agents and 
principals‘ tendency to impose more extensive rules and monitoring 
arrangements where an agent‘s preferences are unknown). 
60 Ex post monitoring and reporting requirements may take the form of direct 
monitoring of the agent by the principal to identify malfeasance (police patrols) or 
they may rely upon affected parties outside the agency relationship to bring 
evidence of slack to the principal‘s attention (fire alarms).  Id. at 28. 
61 Id. at 28–29. 
62 For example, the principal may ask one department in the agent institution 
to assume responsibility for the development task involved in a collective 
financing effort but a different department to furnish the principal with financial 
reports on the fund, so that some internal check occurs within the agent 
institution.  A principal may also empower more than one agent in order to 
induce competition between them, thereby increasing work productivity to the 
benefit of the principal.  Id. at 29–30 (discussing the checks and balances 
approach). 
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sticks—budgetary reductions when the agent disappoints, and 
expansions when the agent completes a desired action.63  Where a 
principal doubts that any of these mechanisms or a combination 
thereof will adequately address agency slack, the principal may 
appoint a new agent rather than relying on one of the pre-existing 
options.64 
When applied to collective development finance, principal-
agent theory frames donor countries‘ options in stark relief.  As 
Hawkins, Lake, Nielson, and Tierney note, ―[i]n ‗hiring‘ an agent, a 
principal can create one of its own, thereby constructing from 
‗scratch‘ an organization of her own design, or choose from among 
a pool of existing entities willing to serve as the agent.‖65  Creating 
a new agent is costly, but likely to produce an agent closer to the 
preferences and purposes of the principal (here donor principals).66  
Choosing an existing agent, on the other hand, avoids the start-up 
costs, but the principals may be unable to find an ideal agent that 
perfectly mirrors their preferences and is optimally designed to 
perform the appointed task.  Realization of this problem becomes 
particularly likely when delegating to an intergovernmental 
organization, as there are a limited number of such organizations 
to choose from.67 
2.1.3. Curbing the Agency Costs 
In applying the principal-agent theory to donors‘ quest for a 
collective financing vehicle, one might think that the most obvious 
choices among existing entities to serve as donors‘ agents would be 
the World Bank and the United Nations, the intergovernmental 
behemoths of collective financing for development.68  In fact, 
however, the story of collective finance for development is a story 
 
63 See id. at 30 (discussing the carrot-and-stick approach to mitigating the 
effects of agency slack). 
64 See id. at 31 (noting that  since control mechanisms are costly and 
imperfect, it‘s impossible to fully control all agents and therefore to completely 
avoid slack). 
65 Id. at 25. 
66 See id. (weighing the advantages and disadvantages of creating an agent 
from scratch as opposed to hiring an existing agent). 
67 See id. at 19, 26 (―Given a finite pool of possible agents and positive costs of 
creating new agents, however, the ‗exogenous‘ traits of agents are likely to matter 
. . . .‖). 
68 See supra notes 2–3 (describing functions, policies, and reactions to the 
World Bank and the U.N.). 
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of an ongoing quest to find alternatives to these behemoths as 
agents. 
2.1.3.1. Disillusion with Traditional Approaches 
Skepticism about the efficacy of the U.N. and the World Bank 
precludes either from being regarded as an ―ideal agent‖ to 
address post-globalization challenges.  The causes of this 
skepticism are multi-faceted, and have resulted in donor 
governments—or more accurately the citizens of those 
governments69—opposing increased funding for those institutions 
to assume new mandates.70  Moreover, recipient governments, 
eager for greater input in development efforts, increasingly express 
a similar opposition.71 
Skepticism about the World Bank stems largely from a concern 
that, at an operational level, the Bank‘s driving force is to make 
loans, and that this lending imperative permeates and dominates 
the Bank‘s relationship with its borrowing member countries.72  
 
69 See Milner, supra note 4, at 110 (discussing domestic politics and the 
problems that arise when the donor government and its public differ in interests, 
as well as how this affects multilateral aid). 
70 See Heimans, supra note 27, at 1 (discussing the desirability of multi-actor 
global funds as ―instruments for international financial mobilization, resource 
allocation and as a form of experimentation in global governance‖). 
71 See UN Climate Change Talks in Cancun Agree a Deal, BBC NEWS, Dec. 11, 
2010, 7:44 ET), http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/science-environment-11975470 
(discussing developed countries‘ insistence that the World Bank be a trustee, 
while other countries were negotiating for a different approach); John M. Broder, 
Climate Talks End with Modest Deal on Emissions, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 11, 2010, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/12/12/science/earth/12climate.html (noting 
countries‘ reluctance to combine many climate change finance efforts under the 
U.N.). 
72 See Bruce Rich, The World Bank under James Wolfensohn, in REINVENTING THE 
WORLD BANK 26 (Jonathan R. Pincus & Jeffrey A. Winters eds., 2002) (giving an 
overview of former World Bank president James Wolfensohn‘s failed efforts to 
―change the institution‘s embedded internal culture from one of loan approval—
in which staff were rewarded above all for pushing money‖); see also Pincus & 
Winters, Reinventing the World Bank, supra note 3, at 22 (noting that the Bank‘s 
incentive structure, which emphasizes new lending and volume over project 
quality and supervision, has played a role in the lack of development effectiveness 
of Bank projects); see Sarfaty, supra note 22, at 668 (noting that the Bank‘s incentive 
system emphasizes lending targets rather than results on the ground); Senate 
Committee Report, supra note 22, at 4 (noting that the World Bank, like all of the 
international financial institutions (―IFIs‖), ―suffer[s] from a ‗pressure-to-lend‘ 
culture that places more emphasis on signing project agreements and getting 
loans out the door than on actually improving the development level of the 
borrowing country‖). 
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The force of this lending imperative gives rise to a loss of 
confidence in the Bank.  Although the Bank was originally created 
to fund post-World War II reconstruction, in the ensuing sixty plus 
years, its supporters have come to expect it to serve as much more 
than a well-oiled banking machine.73  That hope, that the World 
Bank will be something more—a knowledge bank, a social 
reformer, an economic advisor, or a voice for the poor—is 
frequently dashed in the face of findings that the Bank‘s internal 
culture emphasizes getting loans out the door over assuming any 
of these roles.74  Repeatedly, these additional development goals 
end up in irreconcilable tension with the Bank‘s desire to make 
loans.75  Notwithstanding a wealth of Bank rhetoric to the contrary, 
when the Bank assumes any of these additional mandates they 
appear to become subsumed by and subservient to the Bank‘s loan 
approval culture.76 
 
73 See generally, Devesh Kapur, The Changing Anatomy of Governance of the 
World Bank, in REINVENTING THE WORLD BANK (Jonathan R. Pincus & Jeffrey A. 
Winters eds. 2002) (discussing the disempowerment of poorer countries in the 
international arena and the failure of governance structures to effect change); see 
Pincus & Winters, Reinventing the World Bank, supra note 3, at 20 (noting that ―[a]n 
institution that is at heart a development bank makes for a rather unlikely ‗voice 
for the poor‘: we would not expect the former to mount a political challenge to the 
status quo nor the latter to raise money cheaply on the international capital 
markets‖ as the World Bank does). 
74 See Pincus & Winters, Reinventing the World Bank, supra note 3, at 13–15, 20 
(noting that the Bank‘s rhetoric of acting in partnership actually results in the 
World Bank calling the shots because it is not a representative organization 
comprised of people or local communities, but countries). 
75 For example, in a meeting of senior Bank managers with then-President 
James Wolfensohn in 1996, one manager noted that the Bank has to choose 
between being a merchant bank whose clients are the governments of the 
developing countries to which it lends—a relationship in which there is no place 
for the environment, women in development, poverty alleviation and similar 
priorities—or being a development bank whose clients are the citizens of the 
borrowing countries, and who deals with borrowing country governments as 
agencies with whom the Bank works in order to meet its clients‘ needs.  See Rich, 
supra note 72, at 52.  
76 See Pincus & Winters, Preface, supra note 3, at viii (describing the World 
Bank as a ‖political organization, keenly aware of the image it projects‖ and 
noting that the ―World Bank staff . . . account[s] for a surprisingly large share of 
the published materials on the topic of the World Bank and World Bank reform‖); 
Pincus & Winters, Reinventing the World Bank, supra note 3, at 14–15 (noting that 
the Bank‘s efforts to transform itself from a development bank into a development 
agency began in the 1970s when its public pronouncements reflected a significant 
change in its conception of how the development process should be promoted).  
Those pronouncements indicated that the Bank no longer saw it as sufficient to 
transfer capital to viable projects.  Instead, development was also seen as 
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The Bank‘s pressure-to-lend culture is reinforced by skewed 
incentives for the staff responsible for the Bank‘s lending 
operations who are on the front lines of the Bank‘s interactions 
with its borrowing member countries.  Evidence suggests that 
inadequate account is taken of the development effectiveness and 
sustainability of the projects and programs for which Bank loans 
are made.77 
The U.N. is also ill-suited to take on the task of managing new 
collective financing efforts.  As documented by Pierre de 
Senarclens,78 structural problems have hampered the U.N.‘s 
effectiveness in social and economic matters since its creation, due 
in part to its founders‘ lack of a common vision on the mechanisms 
and strategies necessary to accomplish its economic progress and 
social welfare ideals.79  Its highly fragmented system of agencies, 
programs, and funds has diluted the effectiveness of any one of 
 
encompassing a sustained increase in a country‘s capacity to satisfy social 
preferences.  According to Pincus and Winters, the Bank‘s embrace of this broader 
concept of development widened the gap between its rhetoric concerning its 
mission and its actual performance.  Id. at 15. 
77 See Rich, supra note 72, at 26 (detailing Wolfensohn‘s changes which 
actually strengthened made the Bank‘s accommodation of its corporate and 
governmental clients and weakened the existing internal mechanisms for 
control—all of which decreased development effectiveness).  In support of this 
claim, Rich points to the conclusions of an internal Bank review entity called the 
Quality Assurance Group, which, in 1997, conducted a year-long study of 150 
projects and concluded that systemic weakness in the Bank‘s assessment of 
borrowing governments‘ commitment to a project, local capacity, and the more 
general risks in project implementation had their roots in a Bank culture which 
generates pressure to lend.  Id. at 43 (citing World Bank Quality Assurance Group 
Portfolio Improvement Program, Reviews of Sector Portfolios and Lending 
Instruments: A Synthesis Draft Internal Report (April 22, 1997)).  Further, Rich 
notes that a sub-report to that 1997 synthesis report—which indicated that only 
19% of the Bank‘s technical assistance projects were performing satisfactorily—
concluded that this poor performance resulted from the fact that staff view 
technical assistance loans as a second-class activity because they do not compare 
in size and importance to other resource flows and because doing technical 
assistance work does not gain a staff member recognition from Bank 
management.  See also WOODS, supra note 17, at 207, 211 (noting that there are few 
if any incentives for Bank staff to ensure that the Bank‘s projects and policies are 
sustained beyond the short-term lending period, and that the incentives for Bank 
staff need rewriting); see HEAD, supra note 17, at 57 (describing a strong criticism 
of the World Bank‘s staffing policies for not appropriately rewarding 
performance, while utilizing inappropriate promotion criteria). 
78 See de Senarclens, supra note 1 (detailing a plethora of problems that have 
constrained the U.N.). 
79 See id. at 26–35 (discussing how structural problems and lack of a unified 
vision have led to U.N. failure in solving certain social and economic problems). 
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them and has led to many of them being very poorly funded.80  
Repeated efforts to achieve greater coherence have failed and lack 
of support for the institution is widespread, not only on the part of 
the United States (which has denounced the U.N. as an ossified 
structure) but also on the part of other major powers.81  This 
negative image makes the U.N. a poor contender for spearheading 
new collective financing initiatives despite the fact that its original 
mandate, Article 55 of the U.N. Charter, contemplated the U.N. 
taking a leadership role in global development.82 
2.1.3.2. A Search for Alternatives 
Consistent with principal-agent theory, the logical response for 
a group of donors acting as a collective principal83 who are 
dissatisfied with an existing agent‘s capacity or suitability for 
carrying out their agenda would be to create a new agent, if 
necessary, constructing from ―scratch‖ an organization of the 
donors‘ own design.84  But the difficulties of garnering support for 
new initiatives, coupled with the limitations of the international 
legal order, constrain what donors can do.  Often, at the formative 
stage of a new initiative, broad support may be tentative and 
uncertain, making donors reluctant to invest in a whole new 
structure and apparatus.  Further, the international legal order has 
traditionally discouraged the proliferation, and therefore the 
 
80 See id. at 25, 28 (discussing how the involvement of many nations has 
added further confusion to many of the problems the U.N. has been charged with 
solving). 
81 See id. at 25–28 (asserting that "Western governments have regularly 
complained" about U.N. repeat agendas and inefficiency).  
82 See generally U.N. Charter ch. IX, art. 55, available at 
http://www.un.org/en/documents/charter/chapter9.shtml (describing the 
international economic and social goals, as well as the purposes, of the U.N.). 
83 Principals, like a group of donor countries, which have more than one 
actor individually or collectively delegating to the same agent are referred to in 
principal-agent theory as complex principals.  See Lyne et al., supra note 54, at 42.  In 
complex principal situations where a group of actors designs and has authority 
over a common contract and, having decided amongst themselves, negotiates a 
contract with an agent, the complex principal is referred to as a collective principal.  
Id. at 44.  A group of donors setting up a collective financing effort to be 
administered and implemented by one or more third parties would constitute a 
collective principal. 
84 See Hawkins et al., Delegation Under Anarchy, supra note 55, at 25 (arguing 
that a principal can choose to create its own agent, and while costly, this can lead 
to an agent whose existence and goals more clearly align with that of the 
principal). 
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creation, of new international organizations,85 although this norm 
is shifting.86  For these reasons, collective financing efforts for 
development have generally not been created as new entities under 
international law.  Instead, the overwhelming norm over the last 
several years has been for donors to use a new tool—a hybrid 
approach, whereby they use those aspects of the World Bank and 
the U.N. that seem useful but set up a different entity to perform 
the functions that they do not want those institutions to perform 
(or to have the exclusive right to perform). 
This hybrid approach may take one of two distinct legal forms, 
which co-exist as competing models.  The most common form of 
the hybrid approach, the Quasi-Entity Fund, involves setting up 
the collective financing effort under the auspices of the World 
Bank.87  The other form of the hybrid, the National Law Entity, 
involves setting up the new collective financing effort as a legal 
 
85 See BANTEKAS, supra note 18, at 133 (discussing contributing nations and 
their potential use of trust accounts); Niels M. Blokker, Proliferation of International 
Organizations: An Exploratory Introduction in PROLIFERATION OF INTERNATIONAL 
ORGANIZATIONS: LEGAL ISSUES 14–15 (Niels M. Blokker & Henry G. Schermers eds., 
2001) (noting that the majority of analysts emphasize the disadvantages of 
proliferation); Jose Alvarez, International Organizations: Then and Now, 100 AM. J. 
INT‘L L. 324, 324–47 (2006) (discussing the progression of international 
organizations).  Critics of proliferation cite problems of coordination, different 
interests and inefficiency.  See Blokker, supra, at 14 (discussing legal issues 
pertaining to the United Nations); C.W. Jenks, Co-Ordination a New Problem in 
International Organization, 77 Recuell des Cours (1950) p. 135-271; C. Wilfred 
Jenks, Some Structural Dilemmas of World Organization, 3 GA J. INT‘L & COMP. L. 1, 1–
13 (1973) (describing structural problems of international organizations).  Some 
criticism of proliferation is based on a lack of support for international 
organizations generally.  See Alvarez, supra, at 343–45 (describing the growing 
awareness among developing countries that international organizations have not 
leveled the playing field between developed and undeveloped countries, making 
the value of international organizations as ―neutral‖ venues questionable). 
86 The trend is shifting towards supporting proliferation.  Alvarez, supra note 
85, at 343 (discussing the troubling future of the international organization).  See 
generally Joel Trachtman, The Theory of the Firm and the Theory of the International 
Economic Organization: Toward Comparative Institutional Analysis, 17 NW. J. INT‘L L. 
& BUS. 470 (1997) (noting the potential for organizations to increase transactional 
gains, decrease losses and costs, notwithstanding problems of overlapping, 
competition and conflicting interests). 
87 See BANTEKAS, supra note 18, at 26 (noting that the World Bank is the 
leading trustee of humanitarian projects funded by states).  The World Bank‘s 
dominant role in this area tracks a broader trend towards the increased 
dominance of the World Bank and the correlated fading relevance of UN entities 
in setting the international development agenda.  See de Senarclens, supra note 1, 
at 27 (noting that the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund, as the 
most resource-rich multilateral aid institutions, increasingly ―call the tune‖). 
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entity under national law and then having that entity contract out 
specific financial management and development tasks to the World 
Bank and the U.N., among others.  Both forms of the hybrid reflect 
standard mechanisms for controlling agency slack but also include 
their own unique twist.  The Quasi-Entity Fund involves the 
donors heavily in fund governance as a way for donors to exercise 
control over their agent (the World Bank).  The National Law 
Entity approximates the creation of a customized agent for the 
principal‘s purposes but retains ties with pre-existing agents (the 
World Bank and the UN) in certain respects.  
 
2.2. Part II of the Collective Finance Challenge 
2.2.1. The Emergence of a New Approach:  Two New Models 
The potential of both forms of the hybrid approach to constrain 
agency slack88 depends on whether they enable donors to retain 
greater control over their contributions than they retained under 
the traditional approach.   
2.2.1.1. The Quasi-Entity Fund 
Within the hybrid model, donors create a new collective 
financing effort under the auspices of the World Bank as a separate 
fund dedicated to a specific development purpose.  The financing 
effort will often be a discrete part of a broader collaborative effort 
to tackle an identified need in a coordinated way.  For example, the 
GEF Trust Fund is the financing arm of the GEF—a collaboration 
that involves 182 countries that have undertaken a joint approach 
to addressing global environmental issues.89  Similarly, the 
Education Fund is the financing arm of the Education for All Fast 
 
88 This article‘s focus is on the potential for both forms of the hybrid 
approach to minimize agency costs.  Evaluating the extent to which these models 
quantifiably minimize agency costs would require an empirical analysis of data 
that is beyond this article‘s scope.  Nonetheless, meaningful deductions can be 
made as to the potential of these models to promote the likelihood that donors‘ 
fund goals will be honored to the fullest extent feasible, by analyzing how these 
models address perverse incentives and other challenges posed by the operating 
environment. 
89 See What is the GEF?, GLOBAL ENVIRONMENT FACILITY (―GEF‖), 
http://www.thegef.org/gef/whatisgef (last visited Mar. 18, 2011) (providing a 
description and a brief history of the GEF). 
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Track Initiative, a broad-based partnership of donor and recipient 
countries that aims to achieve universal primary education.90   
This separate fund has a specific governance structure that 
gives donors an ongoing role in allocating the fund‘s assets.91  The 
donors and the World Bank characterize these Quasi-Entity Funds 
as World Bank trust funds and the World Bank as their trustee.92  
In its trustee capacity, the Bank manages the Quasi-Entity Fund‘s 
financial resources and keeps them separate from the Bank‘s 
regular resources, disbursing them in accordance with donors‘ 
allocation choices.93  The Bank is also involved in developing the 
funds, including proposing, supervising and monitoring fund-
financed projects, although it usually shares these tasks with other 
entities rather than exercising exclusive control.94   
2.2.1.1.1. The Origin of the Quasi-Entity Fund 
The GEF Trust Fund pioneered the Quasi-Entity Fund model.  
It is a multi-billion dollar Fund created in 1994 to provide financial 
support to developing countries for projects designed to protect 
the environment.95  Its structure grew out of donors‘ (internally 
conflicting) desires to avail themselves of the World Bank‘s 
capacity to manage the Fund while simultaneously preventing the 
World Bank from exercising complete control over it. 
 
90 See About FTI, EDUCATION FOR ALL, 
http://www.educationfasttrack.org/about-fti (last visited Mar. 18, 2011) 
(describing the Fast Track Initiative). 
91 These World Bank Quasi Entity Funds are to be distinguished from the 
programs and funds set up under the U.N., which together constitute the 
mainstay of the U.N.‘s development arm (some, such as UNDP, began as U.N. 
Trust Funds and subsequently reorganized into more formal entities).  See de 
Senarclens, supra note 1, at 11 (describing the organization of the various U.N. 
commissions and programs).  The U.N.‘s mix of funds and programs reflect how 
the UN has always done business in the international development arena.  In 
contrast, these World Bank Quasi Entity Funds are an add-on to the World Bank‘s 
core business of issuing loans.  See WOODS, supra note 17, at 164–65 (describing the 
loan operations of the World Bank). 
92 Ibrahim F. I. Shihata, Techniques to Avoid Proliferation of International 
Organizations–The Experience of the World Bank, in PROLIFERATION OF INTERNATIONAL 
ORGANIZATIONS: LEGAL ISSUES 111, 125 (Niels M. Blokker & Henry G. Schermers 
eds., 2001) (explaining how the Bank oversees various trust funds). 
93 See BANTEKAS, supra note 18, at 33 (outlining the various ways to structure 
international trust funds). 
94 See infra notes 131–32, 156, 163, 174. 
95 See Smyth, supra note 43, at 40 (describing the intentions of the GEF‘s 
creators). 
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In asking the World Bank to manage the Fund, the GEF Trust 
Fund donors drew upon the Bank‘s long tradition of serving as an 
administrator of externally financed funds, which are referred to 
by the Bank and all interested parties as World Bank Trust Funds.96  
Prior to the GEF Trust Fund‘s creation, however, the standard 
practice for such funds was for donors to impose little control on 
the Bank‘s discretionary use of the funds‘ resources within the 
broad parameters of the funds‘ objectives.97  The pre-GEF Trust 
Fund model, the World Bank Trust Fund, is essentially an 
accounting mechanism.  It consists of a designated account held by 
the World Bank, for use by the World Bank, for the purposes 
designated by the donors.98  Donors depend on several ex post facto 
controls to manage agency slack in these traditional World Bank 
Trust Fund arrangements.  For example, donors require the Bank 
to make regular financial and progress reports on the use of the 
trust fund‘s assets.99  In principal-agency terms, this is a police 
 
96 The World Bank began administering funds created by other donors to 
finance specific activities that served the Bank‘s purposes early on in its existence.  
See Shihata, supra note 92, at 125 (discussing early projects undertaken by the 
World Bank when administering donated funds).  The World Bank began to use 
the term ―trust fund‖ for these funds in the late 1970s, shortly after the IMF 
established the IMF Trust Fund and undertook to manage that fund‘s assets in 
accordance with six principles which then-IMF General Counsel, Sir Joseph Gold, 
described as ―fundamental principles of the law of trusts.‖  Gold, supra note 46, at 
865.  The Bank assumes the role of trustee of World Bank trust funds pursuant to 
its inherent powers, consistent with the inherent power of all international 
organizations, to establish funds to the extent needed to promote their purposes.  
Shihata, supra note 92, at 125. 
97 Steven A. Silard, The Global Environment Facility: A New Development in 
International Law and Organization, 28 GEO. WASH. J. INT‘L L. & ECON. 607, 624–25 
(1994–95)  
98 BANTEKAS, supra note 18, at 133–34 (discussing distinct funds created by the 
World Bank that serve the Bank‘s purpose or a closely related purpose). 
99 See id., at 220–21 (explaining the reporting responsibilities of groups 
responsible for or connected to the use of trust funds); WORLD BANK, WORLD BANK 
OPERATIONAL MANUAL, OPERATIONAL POLICIES, OP 14.40/BP14.40, para. 8 (July 1, 
2008), available at http://go.worldbank.org/MSNAYLJX60 [hereinafter World 
Bank OP/BP 14.40] (outlining the Bank‘s responsibilities as a trustee, which 
include providing financial reports to donors and others involved with the fund).  
By contrast, under a national law regime that incorporates Anglo-Saxon trust 
principles, the trustee of a charitable trust reports to the state office charged with 
the oversight of charitable trusts, not to the donors.  Jonathan Klick & Robert H. 
Sitkoff, Agency Costs, Charitable Trusts, and Corporate Control: Evidence from 
Hershey’s Kiss-Off, 108 COLUM. L. REV. 749, 770–81 (2008). 
Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository, 2014
SMYTH.DOC 4/24/2011  9:51 AM 
992 U. Pa. J. Int’l L. [Vol. 32:4 
patrol form of reporting and monitoring,100 whereby donors 
control agency slack by themselves playing the role of the police.101   
The disadvantage of the traditional World Bank Trust Fund, 
and the reason the donors to the GEF Trust Fund did not want to 
follow this model, is that under the World Bank Trust Fund model 
the World Bank has extensive control and discretion over the 
funds.  In light of the World Bank‘s lending agenda, giving broad 
discretion over the use of a fund‘s resources could be perceived as 
tantamount to asking Henry Ford to figure out how to improve the 
lives of Detroit‘s poor.  Henry Ford could be counted on to 
conclude that what every poor family in Detroit really needed in 
order to improve its standard of living was a car.  Likewise, there is 
a perception that the World Bank would conclude that what every 
developing country really needs in order to develop is a loan.  
Following this logic, the World Bank could be seen as likely to use 
the resources of any externally financed fund for which it is 
responsible to grease the wheels for making a loan.102  In the 
language of principal-agent theory, the preferences and incentives 
of the donors/principals of these funds and their agent, the World 
Bank, are misaligned.103   
A simple hypothetical illustrates why a fund‘s donors might 
not want the Bank‘s lending agenda to dominate a fund.  Assume, 
for example, that a group of donors sets up a World Bank Trust 
Fund to support small scale farming in Africa.  Further, assume the 
Bank as trustee has a choice of whether to issue a grant to perform 
a feasibility study for building new irrigation systems or a grant to 
 
100 See Hawkins et al., Delegation Under Anarchy, supra note 55, at 28. 
101 Id.  See BanModel Form of Multi-Donor Administration Agreement, 
WORLD BANK (Sept. 16, 2004) [hereinafter Standard Conditions] (on file with 
Author); Klick & Sitkoff, supra note 99, at 770–81 (providing an example of donors 
forcing trustees to account for use of trust funds and noting that states 
increasingly give donors standing, concurrent with the state attorney general, to 
enforce a charitable trust).  The World Bank Trust Fund created by the application 
of these principles has been described by one commentator as a sui generis 
financing vehicle, peculiar to international law.  See BANTEKAS, supra note 18, at 24 
(―The sui generis nature of these funds does not give rise to a single model by 
which the intergovernmental trust concept can be explained.‖). 
102 See WOODS, supra note 17, at 212 (pointing out that entities such as the 
World Bank make decisions by balancing competing interests, as well as taking 
into account their own interests); Senate Committee Report, supra note 22 
(discussing the way in which the World Bank decides between competing 
interests and the need to influence those decisions in order to get more adequate 
results). 
103 Hawkins et al., Delegation Under Anarchy, supra note 55, at 26–28. 
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set up a farmer training program.  Finally, assume that the grant 
for the feasibility study is quite likely to result in a finding that the 
recipient needs several new irrigation systems (and, therefore, a 
World Bank loan to pay for them), but that the grant for farmer 
training is unlikely to generate any need for a World Bank loan.  
Faced with the choice between these two grant proposals, the 
concern would be that the Bank‘s lending agenda would lead the 
Bank staff to issue the grant for the feasibility study, regardless of 
which proposal best fits the recipient‘s needs or the donors‘ 
objectives.104   
When the creators of the GEF Trust Fund opted to form the 
Fund as a World Bank Trust Fund,105 there was an immediate 
outcry from the global environmental NGO community.106  At the 
time, the World Bank‘s record of addressing environmental 
concerns was dismal;107 opponents worried that the Bank would 
either use the Fund to advance its own lending projects regardless 
of whether they were likely to affect optimal environmental results 
(agency slippage) or do nothing (agency shirking).  To frame this 
outcry in principal-agent terms, the complex collective principal, 
comprised of donor governments, was under pressure from 
constituents within individual governments to take bold measures 
to address what those constituents viewed as a high risk of agency 
slack entailed by the donors‘ selection of the Bank as agent.108   
 
104 Empirical data would be useful to confirm this hypothesis.  Absent the 
availability of such data, however, there are other materials that lend ample 
support to the validity of this hypothesis.  See Pincus & Winters, Reinventing the 
World Bank, supra note 3, at 20–23 (pointing to the misalignment between the 
Bank‘s lending agenda and the expectation that its loan officers make decisions on 
how to use a fund‘s resources, independent of that agenda, coupled with evidence 
of how the Bank‘s lending agenda has, from time to time, usurped other roles 
assumed by the Bank). 
105 A number of reasons, including expense-saving concerns, prompted this 
choice.  See Silard, supra note 97, at 622–23 (outlining the considerations that 
prompted the donors of the GEF Trust Fund to choose a trust fund form). 
106 See id. at 633 (discussing the contentious debates over the structuring of 
the GEF Trust Fund). 
107 See generally Bruce M. Rich, The Multilateral Development Banks, 
Environmental Policy, and the United States, 12 ECOLOGY L.Q. 681 (1985) [hereinafter 
Rich, MDBs] (considering how multilateral development banks could effectively 
promote sound environmental policies). 
108 Hawkins et al., Delegation Under Anarchy, supra note 55, at 27. 
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2.2.1.1.2. A Governance Structure Designed to Reduce Agency 
Slack 
In response to this outcry, a governance structure was designed 
to control the World Bank‘s role in the new Fund and, thereby, 
reduce the risk inherent in the Bank‘s role as trustee.  Components 
of the resulting structure effected major innovations in the 
standard World Bank Trust Fund structure.  For one thing, the 
Fund, in addition to financing projects proposed by the World 
Bank, is designed and intended to also finance projects proposed 
by other entities.109  Indeed, from the start, donors identified the 
United Nations Environment Programme (―UNEP‖) and the 
United Nations Development Program (―UNDP‖) as entities that, 
along with the World Bank, would propose projects for Fund 
financing (with each of UNEP, UNDP, and the World Bank being 
an ―Implementing Agency‖).110  Previous World Bank Trust Funds, 
under the traditional structure, financed World Bank projects 
only.111  The Implementing Agencies, which comprise one 
component of the GEF‘s governance structure, serve as 
intermediaries between the donors and the beneficiaries of the 
Fund by proposing projects to be financed, and by monitoring and 
supervising recipients‘ execution of these projects.   
In addition, the Fund‘s structure includes two governing 
bodies, the GEF Assembly and the GEF Council.112  The center of 
power is the GEF Council, which includes representatives from 
each donor country and representatives from recipient countries.  
These representatives, inter alia, approve the Implementing 
 
109 WORLD BANK, INSTRUMENT FOR THE ESTABLISHMENT OF THE RESTRUCTURED 
GLOBAL ENVIRONMENT FACILITY, 33 I.L.M. 1273, 1294–95 (March 16, 1994) 
[hereinafter GEF Instrument] (outlining the fiduciary duties and responsibilities of 
the GEF Fund‘s trustee, including the way funds are allocated). 
110 See id. para. 9(b) (describing eligibility requirements for funding). 
111 Silard, supra note 97, at 624 (discussing how the GEF Trust Fund broke 
new ground in intra-organizational cooperation); David Freestone, The 
Establishment, Role and Evolution of the Global Environment Facility: Operationalising 
Common but Differentiated Responsibility?, in LAW OF THE SEA, ENVIRONMENTAL LAW, 
AND SETTLEMENT OF DISPUTES: LIBER AMICORUM JUDGE THOMAS A. MENSAH 1077, 
1079–82 (Tafsir Malick Ndiaye & Rudiger Wolfrum eds., 2007) (discussing how 
calls for restructuring included calls for ensuring transparent and democratic 
governance, and a balanced and equitable representation of the interests of 
developed and developing countries). 
112 See GEF Instrument, supra note 109, paras. 11–20 (establishing the 
structure and responsibilities of the GEF Assembly and the GEF Council). 
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Agencies‘ work program.113  The GEF Assembly is an overseeing 
body that meets every three years.114  The World Bank is not a 
member in either the GEF Council or the GEF Assembly.115   
The other key components of the GEF‘s structure are the 
Secretariat and the Trustee.116  The Secretariat, designed to be 
―functionally independent,‖117 is made up of several staff headed 
by a Chief Executing Officer (―CEO‖)118 who is selected by, and 
answerable to, the GEF Council.119  The Secretariat is responsible 
for convening meetings of the GEF Council and Assembly and for 
preparing the agenda and the proposed GEF work program for the 
GEF Council‘s review.  The Bank serves as Trustee of the GEF 
Trust Fund but, given the functions of the other component parts, 
the trustee role consists solely of financial management.120  In sum, 
although the Bank has three separate and distinct roles in the 
GEF—Implementing Agency, Trustee, and host to the Secretariat—
these three roles, taken together, amount to less Bank control than 
exists under a traditional World Bank Trust Fund.  
2.2.1.1.3. The Proliferation of Quasi-Entity Funds 
Following the GEF Trust Fund‘s creation, the Quasi-Entity 
Fund model quickly became a norm when creating collective 
financing efforts for development.121  The Bank‘s apparent 
 
113 See id. (stating that the GEF Council is responsible for monitoring and 
evaluating the progress of the Implementing Agencies).  The governance structure 
also includes a Scientific and Technical Advisory Committee (―STAP‖) to provide 
technical advice to the GEF Council.  Id. 
114 See id. para. 13 (―The Assembly shall consist of Representatives of all 
Participants.  The Assembly shall meet once every three years.‖). 
115 See id. paras. 13, 16 (outlining the membership of the two bodies, neither 
of which include the World Bank). 
116 See id. para. 2, Annex B (describing the roles and duties of the Trustee and 
the focus areas of the GEF). 
117 Id. para. 21. 
118 See id. paras. 20(j), 21(―The CEO shall be appointed to serve for three years 
on a full time basis by the Council on the joint recommendation of the 
Implementing Agencies.‖). 
119 See id. para. 21 (providing for the appointment of the Chief Executing 
Officer (―CEO‖) of the Secretariat).  The CEO is appointed by the GEF Council for 
a three-year term on the joint recommendation of the Implementing Agencies and 
is accountable to the GEF Council for running the Secretariat.  Id. 
120 See id. at Annex B (providing for the role and fiduciary responsibilities of 
the Trustee). 
121 See WB TRUST FUNDS MANAGEMENT FRAMEWORK, supra note 18, at 1–2 
(discussing the growth and development of trust funds and stating that ―[t]rust 
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willingness to accommodate and participate in an arrangement 
with a donor-friendly governance structure, as evidenced by its 
role in the GEF, unleashed a pent-up demand for customized 
collective financing arrangements.122  Now, donors have a way to 
control a fund more tightly than they did under a traditional 
World Bank Trust Fund, making this model more attractive than 
the alternative strategy of making general contributions to an 
institution‘s budget. 
First, Quasi-Entity Funds are magnets for fundraising from 
public and private sources because they create a sense of urgent 
and focused attention on a particular issue.123  Setting up special 
funds to address specific development issues has more political 
appeal than general pleas for increases in aid.124  The fact that 
donors receive reports on the use of a fund‘s resources makes fund 
resources easier to track, and therefore this structure is more 
transparent than contributions to the general budget of an 
institution.125  Further, the donor participation and control 
advanced by the Quasi-Entity Fund model reassures a reluctant 
 
funds have emerged as a key instrument of development finance in recent years‖); 
Smyth, supra note 38, at 499 (discussing how changes in overseas development aid 
norms since the 1990s have resulted in a shift toward the use of trust funds). 
122 See OED Phase I Report, supra note 38, para. 1, at ix (stating that, in 
responding to changes in the global environment, ―the Bank has become the 
largest manager of trust funds for global programs‖).  In fact, the majority of 
global programs supported by the World Bank are less than 13 years old.  Id. para. 
5, at x.  The Bank has recently evaluated its performance and needs in light of this 
shift in demands.  Id. para. 1.1.  Changes have been suggested to ―help bring 
about greater coherence and clarity among the Bank‘s diverse global roles, reduce 
transactions costs, and communicate roles and responsibilities to partners . . . .‖  
Id. para. 15, at xii.  Changes include effective standards for involvement in global 
programs, internal oversight mechanisms, diversifying the instruments available 
for proper functioning, and improving linkages between global and country 
programs.  Id. para. 14, at xii.  See also WORLD BANK, 2007 TRUST FUNDS ANNUAL 
REPORT, at 14 (2007), available at http://siteresources.worldbank.org/CFPEXT 
/TrustFunds/21892003/TFAnnualReport_2007.pdf [hereinafter WB TRUST FUNDS 
2007 REPORT] (noting that Recipient-Executed Trust Funds ―continued to serve as 
a versatile instrument of Bank support‖ in the 2007 fiscal year) (emphasis 
omitted). 
123 See Heimans, supra note 27, at 2 (noting that these funds ―promise an 
aggressive focus on results, to the point of withholding funding to non-
performing recipients‖). 
124 See id. at 3 (arguing that the popularity of global funds ―reflects the 
political implausibility of raising much-needed new funds through the U.N.‖). 
125 See id. at 2 (highlighting how multi-actor global funds are result-driven). 
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legislature that the donor country‘s goals in providing support will 
be advanced.126 
Second, Quasi-Entity Funds offer a flexible mechanism that 
works for a world that embraces development as a process, 
engaging developed-country donors working in partnership with 
developing countries and non-government entities.  The Quasi-
Entity Fund‘s governance structure—providing for donor 
governing bodies composed of donor and recipient countries as 
well as a range of non-World Bank implementing agents—suggests 
the possibility of including many kinds of entities in a discreet, 
self-contained fund, small enough in size for such diverse 
participants to have an impact. 
A third, and more prosaic, factor contributing to donors‘ 
preference for the Quasi-Entity Fund over the traditional World 
Bank Trust Fund model stems from the discovery in 2001 of 
widespread corruption in certain World Bank trust funds.127  
Following this discovery, the Bank instituted reforms aimed at 
improving trust fund controls.128  Audits of World Bank Trust 
Funds conducted in 2004 and 2005, however, showed continued 
significant lapses.129  These findings reinforced donors‘ preference 
for the Quasi-Entity Fund, which they believe affords them more 
control over such agency slippage.130 
 
126 In deference to this political reality, World Bank President Robert Zoellick 
recently suggested that the developing world create a vulnerability fund with a 
governance structure that will provide support to failing financial institutions in 
developing countries.  See Robert B. Zoellick, A Stimulus Package for the World, N.Y. 
TIMES, Jan. 23, 2009, at A27.  Absent this political reality, one would expect the 
President of the World Bank to call for an increase in the Bank‘s budget, rather 
than for the creation of a new fund. 
127 See Stephen Fidler, Corruption Leads to Freeze on Trust Funds, FIN. TIMES, 
Feb. 7, 2001, at 14 (describing a kickback scheme in the awarding of contracts that 
led to the suspension of five trust funds). 
128 See id. (noting that 54 companies and individuals involved in the 
corruption were disbarred and prohibiting all consultant trust funds from hiring 
any Danish, Swedish, or Norwegian consultants). 
129 Out of ten audits of World Bank Trust Funds conducted by the Bank‘s 
internal auditing department, ―all were rated less than satisfactory, and of those, 
five were rated ‗unsatisfactory.‘‖  WB TRUST FUNDS MANAGEMENT FRAMEWORK, 
supra note 18, para. 4.01, at 31.  It should be added that the audits also revealed 
corruption within the donors‘ aid agencies themselves and, therefore, a need for 
donors to tighten internal controls in addition to controlling external agency 
slippage. 
130 Id. at 31 (noting poor documentation practices and fiduciary review 
compliance issues). 
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Donors‘ repeated use of this model shows a strong need for 
collective financing vehicles.  An important caveat to bear in mind, 
however, is that the repeated use of this model does not necessarily 
show that the Quasi-Entity Fund model is a success.  To draw that 
conclusion from these funds‘ proliferation alone would be to 
ignore the pressures under which many of them are created,131 the 
institutional tendency of donors (and the World Bank) to replicate 
out of inertia,132 and the limitations of existing alternatives.  As 
shown in Part III, infra, donors have embraced this model without 
paying adequate attention to the agency costs it perpetuates, the 
accountability gaps that it generates, and the negative outcomes 
that flow from these deficiencies.133 
2.2.1.2. The National Law Entity 
Under this form of the hybrid approach, donors create a new 
collective financing effort as an independent legal entity under the 
national law of a country whose location and legal provisions for 
nonprofit entities meet donors‘ needs.  The independent legal 
status of these efforts diminishes the agency costs that accrue from 
being a dependent entity under the auspices of the World Bank or 
other existing intergovernmental organization.  This is not to 
suggest that there are no agency costs associated with this model.  
To the contrary, as shown by Helen Milner in Why Multilateralism? 
Foreign Aid and Domestic Principal-Agent Problems, all multilateral 
aid efforts involve multiple forms of agency costs.134  The National 
 
131 See BANTEKAS, supra note 18, at 132 (explaining that, although trust funds 
set up to address urgent needs lack certain legal personality, they are nonetheless 
―governed by a complex structure that resembles that of large international 
organizations‖); Heimans, supra note 27, at 2–3 (describing the heated political 
context under which these funds are created and the conflicts regarding how they 
are managed). 
132 See WOODS, supra note 17, at 2 (noting that the World Bank tends to fall 
back on existing habits and solutions to deal with unforeseen and unexpected 
problems). 
133 See OED PHASE I REPORT, supra note 38 (explaining how the rapid 
expansion of these funds, without attention to governance details, was raised as a 
concern by the World Bank‘s internal Independent Evaluation Group). 
134 See Milner, supra note 4, at 115 (observing that ―[f]oreign aid in general 
poses a principal-agent problem‖ because, ―[l]ike all public spending, it involves 
long chains of delegation‖).  Milner points out, however, that foreign aid adds at 
least two elements to the delegation chain that are distinct from domestic 
spending programs: ―[l]onger chains of delegation and the fact that, unlike with 
domestic spending programs where voters can see for themselves the benefits of 
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Law Entity model as it has evolved, however, does succeed in 
preventing the donors‘ agenda from being hijacked by the 
competing agenda of the World Bank or other organizations.  As 
the history of this model‘s use shows, this result has been achieved 
in increments rather than in one fell swoop—and at a cost.  
Creating this model involves a substantial investment of financial 
and other resources.  Moreover, the operations of the vertical funds 
that result from the model can be difficult to integrate with a 
beneficiary‘s macro policy in the sector that is the target of the 
fund‘s assistance. 
2.2.1.2.1. The Origin of the National Law Entity 
The National Law Entity model emerged as a widely accepted 
option when the G8 countries135 set up the Global Fund to Fight 
AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria (the Global Fund) in 2001.136  The 
Global Fund is a $1.3 billion fund137 that finances efforts to combat 
HIV/AIDS, malaria, and tuberculosis in developing countries.138  
 
the spending, voters in donor countries cannot measure aid performance reliably 
mean additional principal-agent problems.‖  Id. at 116. 
135 The Group of Eight (―G8‖) is a forum, created by France in 1975, that 
originally included France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the United Kingdom, and the 
United States and has since added Canada and Russia.  Every year representatives 
of the countries convene to discuss global issues.  See UNIVERSITY OF TORONTO, G8 
Information Center, http://www.g8.utoronto.ca/what_is_g8.html (last visited 
Aug. 18, 2010). 
136 See G.A. Res. S-26/2, U.N. Doc. A/RES/S-26/2, para. 90, at 14 (Aug. 2, 
2001) available at http://www.un.org/ga/aids/docs/aress262.pdf (expressing the 
General Assembly‘s resolution to take global measures aimed at combating HIV, 
including providing additional funding for the prevention and treatment of 
AIDS).  Note that the Global Fund is not the only example of a group of sovereign 
donors joining private sector donors to create a collective financing effort under a 
national law regime.  However, it is unparalleled in its potential to serve as a 
precedent because it is a comprehensive and deliberate effort to operationalize an 
alternative to the post-World War II intergovernmental organizations‘ way of 
delivering development finance. 
137 See WORLD BANK, TRUSTEE FOR THE GLOBAL FUND TO FIGHT AIDS, 
TUBERCULOSIS AND MALARIA, TRUSTEE REPORT, GF/B7/6, 2 tbl.3 (Feb. 2004), available 
at http://www.theglobalfund.org/documents/board/07/gfb76.pdf (detailing the 
finances of the Global Fund). 
138 See GLOBAL FUND, THE FRAMEWORK DOCUMENT OF THE GLOBAL FUND TO 
FIGHT AIDS, TUBERCULOSIS AND MALARIA (2002), available at 
http://www.theglobalfund.org/documents/TGF_Framework.pdf [hereinafter 
GLOBAL FUND FRAMEWORK DOCUMENT] (establishing the title, purpose, principles 
and scope of the Fund).  See generally Anna Triponel, Global Fund to Fight AIDS, 
Tuberculosis and Malaria: A New Legal and Conceptual Framework for Providing 
International Development Aid, 35 N.C. J. INT‘L L. & COM. REG. 175 (2010) (discussing 
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Set up by many of the same core countries that set up the GEF 
Trust Fund, the degree to which its legal status, structure, and 
modus operandi differ from the GEF Trust Fund is striking.  These 
differences result, in part, from the lessons and experience gleaned 
from the GEF, and in part from adjustments needed to reflect a 
divergent recipient base, and an expanded range of potential 
donors. 
From the outset, the Global Fund‘s donors wanted to create an 
effort that could channel resources to the grassroots level.139  
Research showed that the prevention and treatment of the target 
diseases was most likely to be effective if assistance was available 
at the local clinic level and not confined to the coffers of 
government health ministries.140  In addition, the donors wanted to 
structure their funding with sufficient flexibility to incorporate the 
contributions and participation of the private sector, as they judged 
input from the pharmaceutical sector, in particular, to be of vital 
importance to the Fund‘s success.141  Both of these goals pointed 
donors away from, rather than towards, creating the Fund as an 
add-on to the World Bank, the Joint United Nations Programme on 
HIV/AIDS (―UNAIDS‖), or the World Health Organization 
(―WHO‖), and set the stage for exploring alternatives.  The 
alternative the Global Fund‘s donors selected was to set the Fund 
up as a nonprofit foundation under Swiss law.142 
 
the recent increase of multilateral funding mechanisms, and the creation of the 
Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria as an example). 
139 See STEVEN RADELET, CTR. FOR GLOBAL DEV., THE GLOBAL FUND TO FIGHT 
AIDS, TUBERCULOSIS AND MALARIA: PROGRESS, POTENTIAL, AND CHALLENGES FOR THE 
FUTURE 4 (2004), available at http://www.theglobalfund.org/documents 
/library/studies/position_papers/PP_GEN1_full.pdf (asserting that the Global 
Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria has taken a hands-off approach to 
its financing, preferring to leave much of the responsibility with country 
representatives and local groups); How the Global Fund Works, GLOBAL FUND, 
http://www.theglobalfund.org/en/how (last visited, Aug. 18, 2010) (describing 
how the Global Fund operates). 
140 See Triponel, supra note 138, at 197–99 (stressing the importance placed on 
local management of resources distributed from the Fund and how such local 
control leads to more efficient management). 
141 See FIRST MEETING OF THE TRANSITIONAL WORKING GROUP TO ESTABLISH A 
GLOBAL FUND TO FIGHT AIDS, TUBERCULOSIS, AND MALARIA 5 (2001), available at 
http://www.theglobalfund.org/documents/twg/Meeting_report_F_011030.pdf 
(questioning ―whether there is some legally separate organization or entity that 
can perform services for the Fund without sacrificing the independence of the 
Fund and its ability to seek contributions from both public and private sources‖). 
142 See THE GLOBAL FUND, FIFTH BOARD MEETING, REPORT OF THE GOVERNANCE 
AND PARTNERSHIP COMMITTEE, Annex 6, at 2–3 (2003), available at 
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2.2.1.2.2. A Governance Structure Designed to Eliminate 
Agency Slack 
The basic design of the Global Fund, in contrast to the GEF 
Trust Fund, is a fund that is largely the donors‘ own show.  It is a 
paradigmatic example of a group of donors acting as a collective 
principal to create an agent of its own design.143  The Fund has 
both a global-level and a country-level governance structure.144  At 
the global level, it consists of a Board of Directors, Secretariat, 
Technical Review Panel, and the World Bank as Trustee.145  At the 
regional and country level, it consists of an innovative apparatus 
that includes Country Coordinating Mechanisms (―CCM‖), 
Regional Coordinating Mechanisms, Principal Recipients, and 
Local Funding Agents.146  These innovations aim to give effect to 
the founders‘ belief that the Fund should be a non-bureaucratic 
and lean financing agency that differs from, and operates more 
effectively than, existing bilateral and multilateral aid mechanisms.  
The Fund works through local stakeholders rather than U.N. 
agencies or other multilateral or bilateral development partners.147 
The Fund‘s Board of Directors is drawn from developed and 
developing countries, civil society, and the private sector.  The 
 
http://www.theglobalfund.org/documents/board/05/gfb57annex6.pdf 
[hereinafter GLOBAL FUND REPORT ANNEX 6] (providing a historical analysis of why 
the Global Fund chose to incorporate itself as a nonprofit under Swiss  law).  As a 
nonprofit foundation, it operates under the supervision of the Swiss Federal 
Supervisory Board for Foundations. 
143 See Hawkins et al., Delegation Under Anarchy, supra note 14, at 25 
(explaining that while a principal may want to construct its own agent in order to 
ensure the agent is more in-line with the principal‘s own preferences, this process 
is more costly than other options). 
144 See Triponel, supra note 138, at 195 (stating that ―[t]he Global Fund has 
both a country and a global level governance structure,‖ and briefly describing 
the mechanisms of each). 
145 See generally GLOBAL FUND FRAMEWORK DOCUMENT, supra note 138, 
(describing the Fund‘s oversight mechanisms). 
146 Id. at 5–6 (describing the roles of the Fund‘s Board of Directors, CCM, 
Regional Coordinating Mechanisms, Principal Recipients, and Local Funding 
Agents). 
147 See Alexander Shakow, GLOBAL FUND & WORLD BANK, GLOBAL FUND–
WORLD BANK HIV/AIDS PROGRAMS COMPARATIVE: ADVANTAGE STUDY 18–19 (2006) 
(outlining the strengths of the Global Fund); see also GLOBAL FUND, GUIDELINES FOR 
PROPOSALS ROUND SEVEN 35 (2007), available at http://www.theglobalfund.org 
/documents/rounds/7/Guidelines_for_Proposals_R7_en.pdf [hereinafter 
GLOBAL FUND ROUND SEVEN GUIDELINES] (detailing the administrative components 
of the Global Fund). 
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World Bank, WHO, and UNAIDS are non-voting members of the 
Board.148  The ―supreme governing body of the [f]oundation‖ is the 
Foundation Board,149 and it plays a role similar to the role played 
by the GEF Council, including making final funding decisions.150  
The Secretariat handles the Fund‘s day-to-day management and 
reports to the Board of Directors.151  Its responsibilities include 
receiving proposals for Fund financing, commissioning the 
Technical Review Panel (a body of experts that advises on scientific 
matters such as new treatment protocols),152 and forwarding 
proposals that receive positive recommendations from the 
Technical Review Panel to the Board of Directors for final 
decision.153  It also negotiates and executes the Fund‘s grant 
agreements.154  
As Trustee, the World Bank‘s role is extremely limited.155  It 
collects, administers, and invests the fund‘s resources, disburses 
them to grant recipients in accordance with the instructions of the 
 
148 See GLOBAL FUND, BY-LAWS art. 7.1 (2010), available at 
http://www.theglobalfund.org/documents/core/Core_GlobalFund_Bylaws_en.
pdf [hereinafter GLOBAL FUND BYLAWS].  See also Triponel, supra note 138, at 205, 
fig.2 (depicting the voting groups of the Global Fund‘s Board of Directors).  For a 
complete list of the members of the Global Fund‘s Board of Directors, see GLOBAL 
FUND, Board Members, http://www.theglobalfund.org/en/board/members/ (last 
visited Aug. 18, 2010). 
149 GLOBAL FUND BYLAWS, supra note 148, art. 7.4. 
150 Id. at 4–6 (explaining how the Fund‘s  Board of Directors appoints Board 
members, sets policies and strategies for the Fund, sets operational guidelines, 
work plans, and budgets for the Secretariat and the Technical Review Panel, and 
generally exercises all powers required to carry out the purposes of the Fund). 
151 Id. at 8 (detailing the responsibilities of the Secretariat). 
152 The Technical Review Panel reviews all funding proposals submitted to 
the Global Fund for technical merit.  See Technical Review Panel, GLOBAL FUND, 
http://www.theglobalfund.org/en/trp/ (last visited Aug. 18, 2010) (describing 
the role and composition of the Technical Review Panel); see also GLOBAL FUND 
ROUND SEVEN GUIDELINES, supra note 147, at v (stating how the Technical Review 
Panel reviews proposals based on the following criteria: soundness of approach, 
feasibility, and potential for sustainability). 
153 See GLOBAL FUND FRAMEWORK DOCUMENT, supra note 138, § VIII(A)(5) 
(―The Secretariat will forward the recommendations from the Technical Review 
Panel to the Board for final decision.‖).  
154 See GLOBAL FUND BYLAWS, supra note 148, art. 8.2; GLOBAL FUND 
FRAMEWORK DOCUMENT, supra note 138, § VIII(A)(3) (―The Secretariat will ensure 
that all the required information is included, before forwarding proposals to the 
independent Technical Review Panel.‖). 
155 See GLOBAL FUND FRAMEWORK DOCUMENT, supra note 138, § 10(C) 
(outlining the role of the World Bank as Trustee). 
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Board of Directors,156 and periodically reports to the Board of 
Directors on the status of the Fund‘s resources.157  It does not enter 
into grant agreements with the Fund‘s recipients; such agreements 
are made directly between the Fund and the Principal Recipients.  
Nor does the Bank play any role in supervising or monitoring the 
recipients‘ use of the Fund‘s resources. 
At the country level, the Global Fund‘s point entity is the 
Country Coordinating Mechanism (―CCM‖) which coordinates the 
submission of each country‘s proposal for funding to the Global 
Fund‘s Secretariat and selects the Principal Recipients of the Global 
Fund‘s grants.158  The Regional Coordinating Mechanism (―RCM‖) 
performs similar functions as the CCM regarding regional 
proposals.159 
The Principal Recipient is the entity selected by the CCM to 
enter into a grant agreement with the Fund and to receive the 
proceeds of a Fund grant directly from the World Bank as Trustee, 
either for the Principal Recipient‘s own direct use or for on-
granting as appropriate.160  The Principal Recipient is financially 
 
156 See id. § 10(C)(1)(a)–(b) (describing the Trustee‘s responsibility for 
―collection, investment, and management of funds‖ and for ―disbursement of 
funds to national-level entities‖). 
157 See id. § 10(C)(1)(c) (―Through the Board, the Trustee would report to the 
GFATM stakeholders as a group on the financial management of the Fund, and 
the allocation of Fund resources.‖). 
158 See id. § 7(A)(3) (―Country proposals will be accepted from a Country 
Coordination Mechanism (―CCM‖) that includes broad representation from 
government agencies, NGOs, community-based organizations, commercial sector 
organizations (where these exist) and bilatereal [sic] and multilateral agencies.‖).  
See generally GLOBAL FUND, GUIDELINES AND REQUIREMENTS FOR COUNTRY 
COORDINATING MECHANISMS (2007), available at 
http://www.theglobalfund.org/documents/board/16/GF-BM16-
07_PC_Attachment1.pdf [hereinafter GLOBAL FUND CCM GUIDELINES] (outlining 
the purpose, structure, responsibilities, and composition of the Country 
Coordinating Mechanisms and the principles they must advance).  The 
composition of each Country Coordinating Mechanism usually includes 
representation from governments, NGOs, civil society, multilateral and bilateral 
agencies, key affected populations, and the private sector.  See id. pt. 5(12) (listing 
actors that, whenever possible, should be included in a country‘s CCM). 
159 See GLOBAL FUND, ROUND NINE FREQUENTLY ASKED QUESTIONS 7 (2008), 
available at http://www.theglobalfund.org/documents/rounds/9/CP_Pol_R9 
_FAQ_en.pdf (explaining that CCM and RCM both fall under the heading of 
―Coordinating Mechanism‖). 
160 See Principal and Sub-Recipients, GLOBAL FUND, 
http://www.theglobalfund.org/en/recipients (last visited Aug. 18, 2010) 
(outlining the role of the Principal Recipients and their interaction with the Sub-
Recipients).  The Principal Recipient is often a government ministry but may also 
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accountable to the Global Fund for the grant proceeds and 
implementation of the program being financed by the Global 
Fund‘s grant.161  Accordingly, the Principal Recipient is responsible 
for overseeing the program implementation of any sub-recipients 
to which it makes sub-grants and for regularly auditing sub-
recipients‘ financial arrangements.162  The CCM monitors the 
Principal Recipients.163  Finally, the Local Fund Agents are in-
country entities (such as local accounting firms) that the Fund hires 
to assess (in accordance with criteria approved by the Board of 
Directors)164 the financial capacity of a proposed Principal 
Recipient to assume responsibility for a grant.165 
2.2.1.2.3. The Evolution of the National Law Entity 
Since the Global Fund was created, the Swiss Government has 
accorded it enhanced legal stature and its autonomy has also 
expanded.  Its legal stature improved in 2003 when, responding to 
pressure from the Fund‘s donors for enhanced privileges and 
immunities, the Swiss Government agreed to accord the Fund 
privileges and immunities similar to those it accords international 
organizations.166  The Government conferred this status on the 
Fund by entering into a Headquarters Agreement with it.167 
 
be a nongovernmental or faith-based organization or a private sector firm or 
foundation.  ROUND NINE FREQUENTLY ASKED QUESTIONS, supra note 159, at 33. 
161 See GLOBAL FUND, FIDUCIARY ARRANGEMENTS FOR GRANT RECIPIENTS 3 
(2003), available at http://www.theglobalfund.org/documents 
/6_pp_fiduciary_arrangements_4_en.pdf [hereinafter GLOBAL FUND FIDUCIARY 
ARRANGEMENTS] (stating that, after receiving disbursements of funds from the 
World Bank as Trustee, the Principal Recipients must ―periodically report on 
progress made with the grant proceeds to the Global Fund and to the CCM‖). 
162 See GLOBAL FUND, ROUND SEVEN GUIDELINES, supra note 147, § 4.8.2 
(describing the responsibilities of the Principal Recipient, including ―overseeing 
the financial arrangements of [sub-recipients], and preparing a plan for the annual 
audit of [sub-recipient] activities under the grant‖). 
163 See GLOBAL FUND CCM GUIDELINES, supra note 158, pt. 3(7) (specifying that 
it is the responsibility of the CCM to select and evaluate the Principal Recipients). 
164 See GLOBAL FUND FIDUCIARY ARRANGEMENTS, supra note 161, at 3 (―The 
Global Fund . . . contracts for independent advice from . . . Local Fund Agents 
(―LFAs‖). . . . The Global Fund normally contracts with one LFA per grant-
receiving country . . . .‖). 
165 See generally, Local Fund Agents, GLOBAL FUND, 
http://www.theglobalfund.org/en/lfa (last visited Aug. 3, 2010) (providing 
additional information on the Local Fund Agents). 
166 See Press Release, Global Fund, Global Fund Gains Privileges and 
Immunities Similar to Int‘l Orgs. (Dec. 13, 2004), available at 
http://www.theglobalfund.org/en/pressreleases/?pr=pr_041213 [hereinafter 
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Under the Headquarters Agreement the Global Fund‘s assets, 
income, and property are exempt from tax and the Fund is 
immune from legal process and enforcement in the conduct of its 
business.168  In addition, the archives of the Fund are inviolable.169  
Further, the Fund‘s staff, including the members of its Board of 
Directors, enjoy certain privileges and immunities in Switzerland, 
including immunity from liability for acts performed in their 
official capacity and tax exemptions.170 
As for the Fund‘s expanded autonomy, when the Fund‘s 
donors initially set it up, they provided for its Secretariat staff to 
serve on contracts of employment with the WHO, pursuant to the 
terms of an Administrative Services Agreement between the Fund 
and the WHO.171  The Global Fund‘s Executive Director, though 
 
Global Fund Gains Privileges and Immunities] (citing the ―nature and scale of the 
[Global Fund‘s] activities‖ as the primary reasons why the organization was 
granted the types of privileges and immunities typically reserved for international 
organizations).  The Swiss Government expressly based its willingness to accord 
the Fund this status on the importance Switzerland attaches to the fight against 
AIDS.  See GLOBAL FUND, SIXTH BOARD MEETING, REPORT OF THE GOVERNANCE AND 
PARTNERSHIP COMMITTEE, GF/B6/7,  9 (Oct. 15–17, 2003) available at 
http://www.theglobalfund.org/documents/board/06/gfb67.pdf [hereinafter 
GLOBAL FUND SIXTH BOARD MEETING] (referring to the intervention of the Swiss 
President, Pascal Couchepin, at the U.N. Special Session on AIDS on September 
22, 2003). 
167 See GLOBAL FUND SIXTH BOARD MEETING, supra note 166, at 10 (―[T]he Swiss 
government confirms the principle to conclude a headquarters agreement with 
the Global Fund which will grant to the Global Fund the privileges and 
immunities normally accorded to an intergovernmental organization.‖).  The 
Headquarters Agreement between the Global Fund and the Swiss Federal 
Council, determining the final legal status of the Global Fund in Switzerland, was 
signed on December 13, 2004.  Global Fund Gains Privileges and Immunities, 
supra note 166.  See generally GLOBAL FUND, EIGHTH BOARD MEETING, REPORT OF THE 
GOVERNANCE AND PARTNERSHIP COMMITTEE, GF/B8/7, Annex 4a (2004) available at 
http://www.theglobalfund.org/documents/board/08/gfb87_annex4a.pdf 
[hereinafter HEADQUARTERS AGREEMENT] (including the text of the Headquarters 
Agreement between the Swiss Federal Council and the Global Fund to Fight 
AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria). 
168 See HEADQUARTERS AGREEMENT, supra note 167, arts. 5, 7 (stating that the 
Global Fund is generally immune from any legal process or enforcement with 
several listed exceptions and summarizing the Fund‘s tax exemptions). 
169 See id. art. 13 (confirming the ―inviolability of all official papers, data 
storage media and documents‖ associated with the Members of the Board in the 
official discharge of their responsibilities). 
170 See id. arts. 13, 15 (listing the privileges and immunities enjoyed by 
Members of the Board and all officials of the Global Fund). 
171 See GLOBAL FUND, FOURTH BOARD MEETING, REPORT ON LEGAL STATUS 
OPTIONS FOR THE GLOBAL FUND, , GF/B4/12, 6 (Jan. 29–31, 2003), available at 
http://www.theglobalfund.org/documents/board/04/GF%20B4%2012%20Legal
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selected by the Fund‘s Board of Directors, also served on a contract 
of employment with the WHO.172  In December 2008, however, the 
Fund terminated the Administrative Services Agreement with the 
WHO173 so as to give its Secretariat staff independence, freeing 
them from the conflict of serving two entities with distinct 
agendas—the Fund and the WHO.174  The Executive Director of the 
Fund‘s Secretariat and the Secretariat staff now serve on 
employment contracts with the Fund.175  As of January 1, 2009, the 
Global Fund is a wholly ―autonomous, international financing 
institution.‖176 
Following its experience in negotiating the legal status of the 
Global Fund with the Fund‘s founders, in January 2008, the Swiss 
Government enacted a new statute, the Host State Act, under 
which groups of donor governments working collectively inter se 
or with nongovernmental entities and private sector entities may 
apply to the Swiss Government for the equivalent of international 
organization status under Swiss law.177 
 
%20Status%20Report.pdf [hereinafter GLOBAL FUND REPORT ON LEGAL STATUS 
OPTIONS] (acknowledging the benefits of the Global Fund‘s arrangements with the 
WHO but stating that the arrangements are ―neither effective nor cost-effective‖ 
and lamenting the persisting structural issues and institutional liability). 
172 See id. (discussing the administrative relationship between the Global 
Fund and the World Health Organization). 
173 See GLOBAL FUND, SIXTEENTH BOARD MEETING, Decision Point 
GF/B16/DP21 (NOV. 12–13, 2007), available at 
http://www.theglobalfund.org/documents/board/16/GF-BM16-
Decisions_en.pdf (deciding that ―the Global Fund shall discontinue the 
Administrative Services Agreement with the World Health Organization‖ by 
December 31, 2008); see also GLOBAL FUND, EIGHTEENTH BOARD MEETING, REPORT OF 
THE SEVENTEENTH BOARD MEETING, GF/B18/2, 10–11 (Nov. 7–8, 2008) available at 
http://www.theglobalfund.org/documents/board/18/GF-B18-
02_ReportSeventeenthBoardMeeting.pdf (discussing delays in implementing the 
new administrative arrangements and recommending an interim solution). 
174 See GLOBAL FUND REPORT ON LEGAL STATUS OPTIONS, supra note 171, at 4 
(―[E]mployees of the Secretariat have a duty to serve their employer, WHO, while 
also having a duty to serve the Global Fund as a private entity.  The differing and 
distinct mandates of WHO and the Global Fund create chronic conflicts of interest 
for Global Fund staff.‖). 
175 See supra note 173 and accompanying text. 
176 GLOBAL FUND, NINETEENTH BOARD MEETING, REPORT OF THE EXECUTIVE 
DIRECTOR, GF/B19/3, 27 (May 5–6, 2009), available at 
http://www.theglobalfund.org/documents/board/19/GF-B19-
03_EDReport.pdf. 
177 See Loi sur l‘Etat hôte [LEH] [Swiss Host Act], June 22, 2007, Recueil 
systematique du droit federal [RO] 6637, art. 25, available at 
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol32/iss4/1
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The developments in the Global Fund that prompted this 
statute are already serving as a precedent for other initiatives.  In 
2008, the participants in another global health initiative, the Global 
Alliance Vaccine Initiative Foundation (―GAVI Foundation‖) 
(which began life as an informal collaboration between donor 
governments, the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation, WHO, 
UNAIDs, the World Bank, and several vaccine manufacturers) 
restructured the initiative and filed an application with the Swiss 
Government for international organization status under this 
statute.178 
3. CURRENT FINANCING MODELS FAIL TO MEET THE 
CHALLENGE 
As discussed supra, donors to collective financing efforts for 
development face the challenge of designing a framework that 
maximizes the likelihood that their resources will be used for the 
purposes they intended.179  Neither the Quasi-Entity Fund nor the 
National Law Entity meets this challenge. 
3.1. The Deficits in the Quasi-Entity Fund 
The GEF Trust Fund, giving rise to the Quasi-Entity Fund 
model, materially altered the principal-agent dynamic of the World 
Bank Trust Fund.  By inserting themselves into the fund‘s 
governance and reserving for themselves the right to allocate the 
fund‘s assets (including the right to allocate funding to entities 
other than the World Bank), the donors to the GEF Trust Fund 
changed the nature of the traditional delegation between the 
donors to a World Bank Trust Fund and the Bank.  Restricting the 
 
http://www.admin.ch/ch/e/rs/1/192.12.en.pdf (defining international non-
governmental organizations (―INGOs‖) for purposes of the Host State Act). 
178 See GAVI ALLIANCE, SECRETARIAT TRANSITION, Doc # AF.12, 2 (June 25-26, 
2008), available at http://www.gavialliance.org/resources 
/12__GAVI_Secretariat_transition.pdf (providing an update on GAVI‘s 
application for international status and confirming that the Foreign Affairs 
Department intended to support the organization).  See generally GAVI ALLIANCE, 
GAVI ALLIANCE PROGRESS REPORT (2008), available at http://www.gavialliance.org 
/resources/2008_GAVI _Alliance_Progress_Report.pdf (providing an overview of 
the GAVI Alliance‘s efforts and accomplishments in 2008). 
179 See Hawking et al., Delegation Under Anarchy, supra note 55, at 119 (noting 
that a key challenge of third-party financing arrangements involves implementing 
a system that succeeds in matching donors‘ contributions with the projects that 
the donors wish to support). 
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trustee function to perfunctory financial management tasks 
emasculates the trustee role.  The innovations of the Quasi-Entity 
Fund introduced the possibility that the donors to a new fund 
could disaggregate the functions they wanted the World Bank to 
perform in connection with a fund.180  At the same time, they 
opened up new issues about the locus and scope of accountability 
for these funds between the donors and the Bank when such 
disaggregation occurs. 
These issues limit the potential of the Quasi-Entity Fund to 
serve as a new and improved model over the traditional World 
Bank Trust Fund for two distinct but related reasons. 
First, the potential of this model to give rise to a lower risk of 
agency slack can only be realized if:  (1) the World Bank agrees to 
perform the different disaggregated functions donors call upon it 
to perform; and (2) the international legal order facilitates that 
disaggregation.  Second, a related limitation arises from the fact 
that creating a Quasi-Entity Fund involves disaggregating a variety 
of other controls that traditionally apply under a World Bank Trust 
Fund.  The donors to a Quasi-Entity Fund must recognize the need 
to create an alternative framework of controls in order for Quasi-
Entity Funds to constitute accountable financing mechanisms both 
in theory and in practice.  The record shows that neither of these 
limitations has been adequately addressed. 
3.1.1. Unabated Agency Slack 
The GEF Trust Fund‘s donors were reluctant to give the World 
Bank control over the fund because of the Bank‘s poor record, at 
that time, of caring for the environment.181  Even when the Bank‘s 
position on the environment is not an issue, donors‘ pervasive 
concern is that giving the World Bank‘s broad discretion over their 
funds will result in the Bank using the funds to advance its lending 
agenda at the expense of the donors‘ priorities.  This concern 
 
180 For example, in unbundling the tasks involved in managing the GEF Trust 
Fund, and splitting up the responsibilities of trustee, secretariat, and 
implementing agent, the GEF introduced the idea of the World Bank as an 
institution whose different trust fund-related functions could be decentralized, 
with donors potentially free to pick and choose which of those functions they 
want to engage. 
181 See Rich, MDBs, supra note 107, at 688–702 (exploring the adverse 
environmental impacts of bank-funded agriculture and energy projects in 
developing countries). 
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol32/iss4/1
SMYTH.DOC 4/24/2011  9:51 AM 
2011] COLLECTIVE FINANCE CHALLENGE 1009 
derives from the force of the Bank‘s lending agenda.182  The Bank‘s 
drive to lend, and the internal institutional ethos that comes with 
this drive, is especially problematic for the Quasi-Entity Fund as a 
model, because it affects the ability of the Bank to serve as a 
disinterested trustee or administrator.  It also limits the degree to 
which any Secretariat of a Quasi-Entity Fund can make the goals of 
a fund‘s governing body the fund‘s top priority. 
3.1.1.1. An Operational Stake as a Quid Pro Quo for Financial 
Management Services 
When the Quasi-Entity Fund first emerged, the Bank 
conditioned its willingness to serve as trustee on donors agreeing 
that a sizeable proportion of the projects funded by the new effort 
would be World Bank projects.183  When the GEF Trust Fund was 
created, for example, the Bank insisted that two-thirds of the 
fund‘s resources would be allocated to World Bank projects.184  
Over time, the strictures of this quid pro quo have loosened but the 
Bank‘s willingness to serve as trustee of a fund is usually still 
conditioned on its having an operational stake in the fund.  This 
generally translates into an understanding (explicit or implicit) that 
some part of the fund‘s resources will finance Bank operations.  
Again, hypothetically, assume that instead of setting up a 
traditional World Bank Trust Fund to support small-scale farming 
in Africa, the group of donors set up the fund as a Quasi-Entity 
Fund.  Under the Quasi-Entity Fund model the donor governing 
body, not the World Bank, chooses how to allocate the fund‘s 
resources among the categories of recipients that the donors have 
decided, at the time of the fund‘s creation, will be eligible to apply 
for funding. 
 
182 See supra note 75 and accompanying text (discussing the tension between 
the aspirations of supporters of the World Bank and the Bank‘s lending agenda).  
183 See BANTEKAS, supra note 18, at 132–35 (discussing the legal personality of 
trust funds under the administrative direction of the World Bank); Smyth, supra 
note 43, at 34, 57 (stating that, although the World Bank had limited powers as a 
trustee of the GEF, these limitations were offset by its substantial involvement 
with GEF projects and, at least initially, the World Bank and the other two 
Implementing Agencies (UNEP and UNDP) successfully pushed their own 
agendas). 
184 See Smyth, supra note 43, at 37–38 (explaining that, at its inception, the 
GEF‘s governance structure formally included the World Bank, UNDP, and UNEP 
as Implementing Agencies but that, practically, ―the World Bank . . . controlled 
the Fund‖). 
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Faced with the choice of funding a feasibility study for building 
new irrigation systems or a farmer training grant, for example, the 
purpose of the Quasi-Entity Fund is to enable the donors to choose 
which proposal best fits with their goals.  However, if one of these 
proposals is for a World Bank project and the other is not, and 
there is an understanding that part of the fund‘s resources will 
fund World Bank projects, then the need to fulfill that 
understanding constrains the donors‘ choice.  This may force 
donors to select the World Bank‘s project even though it is not their 
first choice.  Thus, this understanding curtails the extent to which 
the Quasi-Entity Fund model can serve as an added brake on 
agency slack when donors rely on the World Bank to serve as a 
trustee. 
This Bank practice of conditioning its availability to perform 
the financial management task required for a collective financing 
effort on its having an operational stake undercuts the potential of 
the Quasi-Entity Fund as an optimal collective financing 
mechanism.  How much impact this practice has on a fund‘s 
independence depends on the bargain the Bank makes with the 
donors.  The Bank does not simply hire itself out as a financial 
manager without the quid pro quo for two reasons:  one involves 
self-interested turf protection, and the other prudential financial 
management. 
On the turf protection side, the quid pro quo is driven by the 
Bank‘s lending agenda.  Bank Task Managers want to be able to 
dangle the promise of free trust fund resources as a carrot to 
encourage a borrower to take on a loan.  They can only do so if the 
fund will co-finance World Bank projects.  Not all the reasons for 
the quid pro quo are so ignoble, however.  On the prudential 
financial management side, the quid pro quo approach reassures the 
Bank that it will not end up serving as trustee of an initiative that 
finances poorly designed, non-World Bank projects.  Projects that 
do not comply with Bank standards or their equivalent could 
potentially expose the Bank‘s reputation and credibility to 
significant risks.  Also, serving as trustee has traditionally been 
linked with issuing grants of fund resources and undertaking to 
supervise and monitor the recipients‘ activities, while the quid pro 
quo approach avoids having the Bank take on a task on which it 
cannot deliver.  The risk of taking on monitoring tasks becomes 
even greater if the Bank has no active operations in a particular 
sector of a country—a situation that would require new staff to be 
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trained and stationed in order to effectively supervise and monitor 
the grant.   
Given the difficulty of sorting out whether legitimate or 
illegitimate concerns are at play, having the Bank insist on an 
operational stake as the quid pro quo of its providing financial 
management services suggests a need for change.  In many 
instances, the agenda of a collective financing effort will overlap 
with the Bank‘s agenda, but the cause of development is not well-
served by perpetuating a situation in which the Bank dominates.  
An alternative approach could allow for the donor community to 
create a separate independent entity—an international 
development fund administrator—to perform the financial 
administration services for these efforts.  
Creating a new independent entity to provide financial 
administrative services would enable donors to have their 
collective financing effort administered by an entity 
uncompromised by a competing lending agenda.  The mandate of 
such an entity would be strictly limited to financial administration.  
The development-specific tasks (including supervision and 
monitoring) requiring specific development expertise would be the 
responsibility of such entities as the donors might choose to have 
serve as financial intermediaries between the financial 
administrator and the ultimate recipients.  Such intermediaries 
could include the World Bank in its operational (as distinct from a 
financial administrator) capacity.  As indicated above,185 several 
factors point to the wisdom of structuring any such new entity as 
an intergovernmental entity. 
In sum, in order for donors to gain the autonomy for their 
collective financing efforts that the Quasi-Entity Fund aims to 
achieve, they should create a separate and distinct entity to serve 
as financial administrator of such efforts.  This step would remove 
the conflict of interest between donors and the Bank that is 
inherent in the Quasi-Entity Fund as it is currently conceived.  This 
step, however, would not alone be sufficient to make the Quasi-
Entity Fund an optimal funding mechanism.  Additional changes 
 
185 See Hunter, supra note 5, at 11 (noting the tension between the United 
States, which supports using the World Bank as the institutional structure that 
will distribute financial resources for addressing climate change, and developing 
countries, which prefer to use an entity with more ―representative decision 
making structures‖). 
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in the design of this model would also be necessary, as illustrated 
below. 
3.1.1.2. Illusory Independence 
The World Bank‘s lending agenda also drives it to actively limit 
and interfere with the independence of a Quasi-Entity Fund‘s 
secretariat.  Such interference defeats the purpose of the Quasi-
Entity Fund model, but is facilitated by the nature of the legal 
arrangements on which the Quasi-Entity Fund model is based.  
Briefly, the legal status of a Quasi-Entity Fund is based on the 
arrangements into which the donors enter with the World Bank as 
Trustee,186 which are generally regarded as governed by 
international law.187  These arrangements incorporate certain 
fundamental principles of the law of trusts,188 including the 
principle that a trust is not a legal entity in the sense that it does 
 
186 See BANTEKAS, supra note 18, at 133–34 (pointing out that the World Bank 
does not differentiate between trust funds and the actual accounts that contain the 
funds, but rather commingles the trust fund assets it maintains). 
187 See id. at 25–26 (explaining that trusts under international law are formed 
by the agreement of both the trustee and the donor, and that the legal form of the 
contract is left up to the parties); ANDRES RIGO SUREDA, THE LAW APPLICABLE TO 
THE ACTIVITIES OF INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT BANKS, 308 Recueil des Cours of The 
Hague Academy of International Law, 192 (2004) (discussing the chain of 
accountability created through World Bank trust funds).  In the case of private 
sector donors, however, such arrangements would be governed by private 
international law.  See JOSÉ E. ALVAREZ, INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS AS LAW-
MAKERS 1–4 (2005) (recognizing that transnational corporations and non-
governmental organizations ―help [] to make and enforce modern international 
law‖ but distinguishing them from international organizations in that they are not 
―constituted by one of the recognized sources of international law, an 
international agreement‖); C.F. AMERASINGHE, PRINCIPLES OF THE INSTITUTIONAL 
LAW OF INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS 10 (2d rev. ed. 2005) (listing the differences 
between private and public international organizations including the fact that 
public international organizations, unlike private ones, are created by 
international agreement or established under international law).  A full discussion 
of the law governing these arrangements and their enforceability at international 
law is beyond the scope of this Article.  See generally BANTEKAS, supra note 18, 
passim (comparing and contrasting the generally similar, but sometimes different, 
treatment of trusts under domestic versus international law); Head, supra note 2 
(detailing the history, legality, and policy surrounding important international 
financial institutions); Smyth, supra note 38, at 527–29 (discussing the uncertainty 
surrounding what form of law should govern the legal status of World Bank grant 
agreements, and maintaining that all such agreements should specify that they are 
governed by public international law).  The arrangements do not contain a 
governing law clause.  See Standard Conditions, supra note 101. 
188 See Shihata, supra note 92, at 125–26 (describing the structure of the World 
Bank‘s trust funds). 
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not bear rights or hold duties.189  Instead, all rights and duties 
owed by and to a trust fund are held by and owed to the trustee.190  
A trust fund itself does not have any independent legal personality 
or capacity.191 
The application of this principle to a Quasi-Entity Fund means 
that all rights and duties owed by or to the fund are owed by or to 
the World Bank as the fund‘s trustee.192  The donors as a group 
have no collective legal capacity to engage with third parties, for 
example, as an employer.193  The fund they create from their 
pooled resources does not have this capacity, either.194  Instead, the 
World Bank as the trustee of a Quasi-Entity Fund hires the CEO of 
a fund‘s secretariat.  Further, the World Bank as Trustee hires any 
staff that a CEO recruits to serve on the secretariat, and these staff 
members thereby become World Bank employees. 
This arrangement, by which a Quasi-Entity Fund‘s CEO serves 
on a contract of employment with the World Bank, is fraught with 
conflicts of interest.  On the one hand, the donors specifically select 
the CEO to advance the fund‘s priorities.  On the other hand, the 
CEO, by entering into a contract of employment with the World 
Bank, undertakes, pursuant to the Bank‘s Articles of Agreement, to 
owe his or her duty entirely to the Bank and not to any other 
 
189 See BANTEKAS, supra note 18, at 22–23 (discussing the formal and 
customary principles of trust law, including the customary requirement that ―the 
trust relationship . . . does not generate obligations for third States or entities‖); 
Gold, supra note 46, at 863 (discussing the restrictions on the use of Trust Fund 
resources, including the requirement that they be used solely for the benefit of 
potential beneficiaries and the condition that they be ―kept separate from the 
property and assets of the IMF and . . . all other accounts . . . that it administers in 
a fiduciary capacity‖). 
190 See BANTEKAS, supra note 18, at 22 (clarifying that while there is a body of 
international law regarding intergovernmental trust funds, the basic principle that 
rights and duties are owed only to the trustee is not generally altered). 
191 See id. (discussing the importance of administration agreements and 
treaties, the mechanisms that actually bind donors and trustees). 
192 See id. (noting that when the World Bank acts as trustee, its agreements 
with donors are based on standard model treaties that reference the Bank‘s 
Articles of Agreement and internal Bank documents and policies in accordance 
with which the agreements must be construed). 
193 See id. (asserting that, by accepting the donor-trustee agreement and the 
terms and conditions of the trust, the donor States lose their status as independent 
entities and become bound to the trust). 
194 See id. (―[T]he assets of the trust are in the trust ownership of the trustee 
and . . . [the trust] does not generate obligations for third States or entities . . . .‖). 
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authority.195  The CEO also agrees to be bound by the World Bank‘s 
Staff Rules and Principles of Employment.  Under those rules, the 
CEO is answerable to his or her World Bank supervisor.196 
Simply revealing that this conflict of interest exists does not 
demonstrate that it prevents the Quasi-Entity Fund model from 
being an effective means of limiting the agency slack inherent in a 
World Bank trust fund.  With the CEO placed in this position of 
serving two masters, however, one of two possible scenarios seem 
likely to emerge, neither of which serves the stakeholders of these 
funds well.  Under the first scenario, the CEO finds that her World 
Bank supervisor is a more immediate presence to please than a 
non-standing body of donor representatives.  In this case, the CEO 
will be under the thumb of the Bank, and the fund‘s agenda is 
likely to be co-opted by that of the Bank.  Such subservience results 
in a scenario similar to the one that exists under a traditional 
World Bank Trust Fund model, which the Quasi-Entity Fund 
model is intended to change.  Under the second scenario, the 
Quasi-Entity Fund is large and high-profile and, as a result, the 
CEO has leverage to speak with an independent voice.  A 
secretariat with that kind of independence, however, will be 
threatening to the World Bank, an institution accustomed to calling 
the shots.  As a result, such a secretariat and the Bank seem poised 
to become locked in a continuing struggle that will result in back-
biting, unnecessary delays, stalemates, and a waste of both entities‘ 
resources. 
Developments in the GEF Trust Fund show how the second 
scenario can play out in a large Quasi-Entity Fund.197  The 
 
195 See INTERNATIONAL BANK FOR RECONSTRUCTION AND DEVELOPMENT, 
ARTICLES OF AGREEMENT, art. V, § 5(c), (Feb. 16, 1989), available at 
http://siteresources.worldbank.org/EXTABOUTUS/Resources/ibrd-
articlesofagreement.pdf (explaining that, in addition to owing his or her entire 
loyalty to the World Bank, the Bank‘s President, officers, and staff shall ―respect 
the international character of this duty‖ and refrain from being influenced in 
discharging their responsibilities). 
196 These are standard undertakings for all World Bank employees.  See 
generally WORLD BANK, STAFF MANUAL, sec. 00 Principles of Staff Employment, 
available at http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTSTAFFMANUAL/Resources 
/StaffManual_WB_web.pdf (setting out the guiding principles that govern the 
World Bank‘s internal staff rules and policies). 
197 The evidence regarding smaller Quasi-Entity Funds is harder to quantify, 
absent empirical research.  The positions the World Bank has taken with respect to 
the larger Quasi-Entity Funds, however, reinforce the impression that any World 
Bank employee serving as the CEO of a smaller Quasi-Entity Fund will feel 
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protracted tension between the Bank and the GEF Secretariat 
illustrate the unresolved issues that arise.  For example, in 2001, 
emboldened by swelling contributions to the GEF Trust Fund, the 
CEO of the GEF Secretariat sought greater autonomy for the 
Secretariat.198  He proposed that the GEF be restructured to give 
the Secretariat the authority to formulate GEF-specific policies, to 
conduct GEF country assistance strategies with recipient countries 
independent of the World Bank and the other Implementing 
Agencies, and to sign agreements with external parties such as 
country governments on the GEF‘s behalf.199  He also sought the 
right to determine the terms and conditions of Secretariat staff 
independent of the World Bank‘s Staff Rules and Policies.200 
Not surprisingly, the World Bank opposed all aspects of the 
Secretariat‘s bid for expanded powers.201  In effect, the CEO was 
seeking powers for the Secretariat equivalent to those of the World 
Bank, such that the GEF would operate like a mini-World Bank for 
the environment.  As a compromise, the Bank and the Secretariat 
devised and agreed on a matrix of responsibilities clarifying who 
 
pressure from the Bank to discharge his or her responsibilities in a manner that 
advances the Bank‘s agenda. 
198 See GEF COUNCIL, OVERALL STRUCTURE, PROCESSES AND PROCEDURES OF THE 
GEF, GEF/C.18/8, para. 63(a) (Dec. 5–7, 2001), available at 
http://www.thegef.org/gef/sites/thegef.org/files/documents/C.18.8%20SPP%2
0FINAL.pdf [hereinafter STRUCTURE, PROCESSES AND PROCEDURES] (proposing to 
―[s]trengthen the coordinating and collaborative role of the GEF Secretariat vis-à-
vis the Convention Secretariats‖ to ―help . . . clarify the autonomous role of the 
GEF and the GEF Secretariat‖).  See also GEF Instrument, supra note 109, para. 34, 
at 1293 (providing that amendments to the GEF Instrument can only be made 
with the consensus of the GEF‘s supreme governing body, the GEF Assembly, and 
that requests for amendments should be channeled to the Assembly through the 
GEF Council). 
199 See STRUCTURE, PROCESSES AND PROCEDURES, supra note 198, para. 36 
(suggesting that the Secretariat should ―play a pivotal coordinating role in the 
programmatic dialogue with the countries‖ and ―have an important coordination 
and policy oversight function in developing GEF programmatic approaches and 
in proposing commitments on behalf of the GEF‖). 
200 See id. paras. 56, 63(h) (stating that although ―all GEF staff are [World] 
Bank staff,‖ greater clarification is necessary with respect to the ―role of the CEO 
in relation to appointment and dismissal of staff‖). 
201 See id. at annex C1–7 (revising the text of the proposal to confine the 
Secretariat‘s authority and clarify that its powers are kept in check by the 
Implementing Agencies).  
Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository, 2014
SMYTH.DOC 4/24/2011  9:51 AM 
1016 U. Pa. J. Int’l L. [Vol. 32:4 
would be responsible for what, at the instruction of the GEF 
Council.202  But the matrix proved a short-lived détente. 
In June 2009 the GEF Secretariat, under a new CEO, renewed 
the bid for wide-sweeping institutional and governance changes.203  
The CEO is sought authority for the GEF Secretariat to issue GEF 
grants directly to GEF recipients, thus allowing a direct 
relationship between the GEF and recipients independent of any 
intermediaries.204  She also proposed, inter alia, that the GEF 
Secretariat be solely responsible for mobilizing resources for the 
GEF (a responsibility currently shared with the World Bank as 
Trustee) and that the Secretariat be exempted from certain World 
Bank employment policies.205  Like her predecessor CEO, she also 
sought independent legal personality and legal capacity for the 
GEF.206  These proposals have been tabled for further review.207  In 
 
202 See GEF COUNCIL, JOINT SUMMARY OF THE CHAIRS, paras. 19–22, (May 15–17, 
2002), available at http://207.190.239.143/COUNCIL/GEF_C19 
/Joint%20Summary%20of%20the%20Chairs%20-%20FINAL.pdf (recognizing the 
importance of coordination between the Secretariat and Implementing Agencies 
as well as the need for greater power and independence for the Secretariat); GEF 
COUNCIL, CLARIFYING THE ROLES AND RESPONSIBILITIES OF THE GEF ENTITIES, 
GEF/C.19/8,  paras. 5–10 (May 15–17, 2002), available at 
http://207.190.239.143/COUNCIL/GEF_C19/C.19.8%20Roles%20and%20Respon
sibilities.pdf (clarifying the roles and responsibilities of each GEF entity including 
the Secretariat). 
203 See GEF COUNCIL, DRAFT GEF POLICY, INSTITUTIONAL, AND GOVERNANCE 
REFORMS, GEF/R.5/15, paras. 125–27, (June 25–26, 2009,), available at 
http://www.thegef.org/gef/sites/thegef.org/files/documents/GEF.R.5.15.pdf 
[hereinafter GEF Fifth Replenishment Reform] (advocating for a clarification and 
strengthening of the Secretariat's legal capacity in order to increase the overall 
effectiveness and efficiency of the GEF). 
204 See id. para. 88 (listing suggested reforms such as ―[c]onferring onto the 
GEF Secretariat the primary role for resource mobilization‖). 
205 See id. app. 1, paras. 12–14 (acknowledging  that World Bank Staff Manual 
rules ―apply to all staff members alike‖ and that variance is permitted only for 
―compelling business‖ reasons). 
206 The GEF Secretariat argues that the GEF already has independent legal 
personality and capacity, a view opposed by the World Bank.  Whatever the 
merits of this view, the fact remains that the CEO of the GEF Secretariat, and all 
GEF Secretariat Staff, along with the CEOs and staffs of all other Quasi Entity 
Funds, serve on contracts of employment with the World Bank on the 
understanding that the Bank, as the trustee of such funds, is the sole entity with 
legal capacity to employ them. 
207 See GEF Fifth Replenishment Reform, supra note 203, at i (proposing 
reforms in five principal areas: (1) accountability to conventions, (2) 
responsiveness to recipient countries, (3) delivery of measurable results to the 
international community, (4) the increase and nature of resources for the GEF, and 
(5) institutional and governance reforms). 
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due course, however, both the donors and the Bank will have to 
address them, most likely in the context of determining what role, 
if any, the GEF Secretariat will have in the Green Climate Fund.208 
These fifteen years of cat-and-mouse negotiations between the 
GEF Secretariat and the World Bank cast doubt on whether the 
concept of a fund within the World Bank, with a functionally 
independent secretariat, is workable.  The ambitions of a secretariat 
inevitably expand with the amount of funding placed under its 
control, and the appearance of a conflict of interest in the 
secretariat serving two masters may become an unworkable 
reality. 
Conflicts also dogged the relationship between the World Bank 
and the Education Fund in the first seven years after the fund was 
established in 2003.  The donors to the Education Fund209 had 
extensive experience in the education sector from previous funding 
efforts.210  Thus, though committed to pooling their resources in 
support of a harmonized approach, they were determined to stay 
actively involved in the fund.211  They initially provided for this 
active involvement by creating a donor governing body (a Strategy 
Committee)212 to select what countries would receive financing 
 
208 See supra note 3 (discussing the ―crisis of legitimacy‖ that the World Bank 
has suffered due to perceptions that it is ineffective and beholden to powerful 
corporate interests). 
209 The donors currently consist of seventeen countries and the European 
Union.  See Donors, EDUCATION FOR ALL FAST TRACK INITIATIVE, 
http://www.educationfasttrack.org/partners/donors-agencies (last modified 
Sept. 16, 2010) (listing the major countries and organizations that have donated to 
Education for All). 
210 See id. (―The Fast Track Initiative encompasses all major donor countries 
and agencies working in education . . . .‖).  The founding donors of this fund, the 
Netherlands, Norway, Belgium, and Spain, had extensive bilateral aid programs 
for education prior to the fund‘s start in 2002.  See UNITED NATIONS EDUCATIONAL, 
SCIENTIFIC AND CULTURAL ORGANIZATION (―UNESCO‖), EFA GLOBAL MONITORING 
REPORT 2010: REACHING THE MARGINALIZED, 432, available at 
http://unesdoc.unesco.org/images/0018/001866/186606E.pdf. 
211 See Sophie Smyth & Anna Triponel, Education as a Lynchpin of Development: 
Legal and Policy Considerations in the Formation of the Education For All—Fast Track 
Initiative Catalytic Trust Fund, 6 SUSTAINABLE DEV. L. & POL‘Y 8, 9–10 (2005) 
(describing the formation of the Education for All Fast Track Initiative ―Catalytic 
Fund‖ which is administered by the World Bank as trustee and was set up to 
provide short-term funding to ―donor orphans,‖ countries that have developed 
strategies to reduce poverty and bolster education but that have too few donors to 
make those plans a reality). 
212 See id. at 10 (explaining the structure of the Strategy Committee which was 
―comprised of a senior representative from each donor and a representative from 
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from the Education Fund and in what amounts.213  There was a 
small secretariat in the World Bank when the Education For All 
Fast Track Initiative was created, which ran a knowledge-sharing 
initiative on education.214  By default, this secretariat became the 
Secretariat of the Education Fund.215  Once the secretariat became 
responsible for a financing mechanism, rather than simply a 
knowledge exchange, the position‘s power changed.  Friction soon 
arose between its CEO and the Bank as the Education Fund 
ballooned in size. 
The friction between the Bank and the Fund was caused by 
several factors.  When first established, the Fund provided money 
for the education sector on terms and conditions that were 
different from those that applied to IDA funding (the source of 
Bank funding for the countries that are the Education Fund‘s target 
beneficiaries, all of which qualify for IDA funding).216  Education 
Fund grants were made without the kind of specificity regarding 
deliverables, measurable outcomes, and policy reforms that 
equivalent IDA financing would require.217  This disparity in terms 
and conditions ended in 2007 when, pursuant to a bank-wide 
policy change regarding the terms and conditions applicable to 
bank-supervised grant funding, World Bank policies and 
 
the [World] Bank‘s senior management, who serves as the Committee‘s 
chairperson‖). 
213 The fund was created pursuant to an initiative to improve worldwide 
literacy, the Education For All initiative (―EFA‖), which was founded by a group 
of 155 countries and 150 organizations at the World Conference on Education, 
held by the UNESCO in Thailand in 1990.  See Smyth & Triponel, supra note 211, 
at 8 (stating that goals of the EFA were to greatly reduce worldwide illiteracy by 
2000, and, ultimately, to make basic education available to all). 
214 See id. at 8–9 (explaining that EFA-FTI is a partnership formed in 
collaboration with the UNESCO, the World Bank, and donor and recipient 
countries and ―supported by a small secretariat, housed in the World Bank, which 
performs a knowledge sharing and coordination role‖). 
215 See id. at 10 (detailing the two-tiered governance structure of the Catalytic 
Fund and its progress reporting system which required team leaders to provide 
updates on recipient countries directly to the Secretariat of the EFA-FTI). 
216 See EDUCATION FOR ALL FAST TRACK INITIATIVE, FRAMEWORK 7 (2004), 
available at http://www.educationfasttrack.org/media/library 
/FrameworkNOV04.pdf (providing a chart illustrating the process by which the 
EFA-FTI functions). 
217 See Smyth & Triponel, supra note 211, at 10 (detailing the flexible 
monitoring and supervision of countries receiving funding pursuant to the 
Education for All—Fast Track Initiative ―Catalytic Fund‖). 
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procedures governing grants to IDA countries were applied to all 
Education Fund grants supervised by the Bank.218 
A further cause of conflict between the Education Fund and the 
Bank arose from the fact that when the Education Fund was 
created, the externally financed funds of the World Bank were not 
fully integrated into the Bank‘s regional portfolio management.219  
This meant that Bank staff involved in the education sector did not 
get the same credit for work on Education Fund grants as they got 
for work on Bank-funded activities.  This disparity created 
perverse incentives for the World Bank departments and staff that 
the Education Fund was counting on to deliver its assistance.220  It 
gave rise to a conflict between the Fund‘s interests and the interests 
of Bank staff whose time would get diverted to working on 
monitoring and supervising Education Fund grants instead of 
being spent on career-building core World Bank work.221  In the 
face of such perverse incentives, a Quasi-Entity Fund cannot 
operate as an effective control on the risk of agency slack that 
arises due to the World Bank serving as trustee.  In principal-
agency terms, the collective principal‘s (the donors‘) objectives and 
the Bank staff‘s (the agent‘s incentives) were out of alignment—a 
situation virtually guaranteed to lead to stalemate.222 
The Education Fund‘s record is replete with evidence of a 
stalemate in the first seven years of its existence.  The Bank‘s 
involvement in the Fund was marked by ambivalence.  There were 
 
218 See Smyth, supra note 38 (detailing the terms and conditions applicable to 
grants issued by the World Bank). 
219 See id. at 529–32 (discussing the problems arising from the lack of 
administrative coordination between external funds and the World Bank). 
220 See Hawkins et al., Delegation Under Anarchy, supra note 55, at 26 (noting 
the importance of agents having preferences that are closely aligned with those of 
the principal). 
221 See Sarfaty supra note 22, at 667–68 (exploring how incentive programs 
within the World Bank have impacted its organizational culture).  For the same 
reasons, Bank staff have been reluctant to work on loans for technical assistance 
because such loans are relatively small and perceived by Bank staff as 
unimportant to Bank management, and, therefore, unlikely to advance a staff 
member‘s career.  See also Rich, supra note 72, at 26 (stating that despite 
Wolfensohn‘s aspirations of changing staff incentives, World Bank staff culture 
still remains tied to money pushing). 
222 See e.g. Rich, supra note 72, at 26 (commenting on how former President of 
the World Bank, James Wolfensohn attempted to change the culture of the World 
Bank instead of rewarding staff for ―pushing‖ money); see also Milner, supra note 
4, at 110 (explaining that tensions between donor governments and their publics 
make it so that their ―preferences . . . are likely to diverge‖). 
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long delays before the Bank agreed to a basic framework and 
guidelines for country education plans (which countries must 
comply with in order to be eligible for a grant from the Fund).223  
Following agreement on a framework, long delays ensued before 
the Bank convened the initial meeting necessary to initiate the 
Education Fund.224  Further delays in securing an agreement from 
the Bank on the terms of the Fund‘s expansion ensued after the 
Fund was launched.225 
The Bank‘s ambivalence about the Fund also played out in 
disputes between the Bank and the donors over the responsibilities 
of the Secretariat and reporting channels for the Secretariat head.  
The Bank sought to confine the Secretariat to ministerial functions 
and to have Bank staff serve as the fund‘s technical experts—
responsible for, inter alia, formulating normative criteria for eligible 
country plans.226  But the head of the Secretariat saw the 
Secretariat‘s role as a substantive one and appealed to (and 
obtained) some donor support for that vision.  This support came 
at a cost, however, because in its relatively short existence the Fund 
has had four different heads of the Secretariat.227  Final agreement 
on the reporting lines between the head of the Secretariat, the 
donors, and the Bank‘s Vice Presidency for Human Development 
(of which the Bank‘s Education Sector Units are a part) languished 
 
223 See KATIE MALOUF, OXFAM INTERNATIONAL, RESOURCING GLOBAL 
EDUCATION: HOW REFORM OF THE FAST TRACK INITIATIVE SHOULD LEAD TO A GLOBAL 
FUND FOR EDUCATION 13–17 (January 19, 2010), available at 
http://www.oxfam.org/sites/www.oxfam.org/files/resourcing-global-
education.pdf (discussing bureaucratic delays within the Bank).  
224 See id. (detailing the involvement of the World Bank, and how a lack of 
autonomy for the FTI in this regard led to initial and continuing confusion and 
delays). 
225 See id. at 14–16 (arguing that further bureaucratic delays resulted from the 
fact that the World Bank‘s Board of Executive Directors set the grant and 
disbursement rules instead of the FTI governing bodies). 
226 See Note on Bank‘s Multiple Roles in the FTI Partnership; EFA-FTI Draft 
Charter (dated September 21, 2006) (on file with author) (discussing proposed 
responsibilities of the Secretariat, and raising  issues of Secretariat accountability 
and Secretariat‘s reporting obligations to the World Bank). 
227 See generally EDUCATION FOR ALL FAST TRACK INITIATIVE, 2009 ANNUAL 
REPORT (2009), available at http://www.educationfasttrack.org/media/library 
/Annual-report-2009/annual-report-2009.pdf (pointing out how, in December 
2009, Robert Prouty was selected as the new head of the FTI Secretariat); 
EDUCATION FOR ALL FAST TRACK INITIATIVE 2008 ANNUAL REPORT (2008), available at 
http://www.educationfasttrack.org/media/library/Annual_Report_2008_EFA_F
TI.pdf (noting that the secretariat is lead by Desmond Bermingham and Robert 
Prouty). 
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and was unresolved for two years, between 2007 and 2009.228  
These kinds of conflicts between the World Bank and the 
secretariats of Quasi-Entity Funds diminish the value of the Quasi-
Entity Fund as a collective financing vehicle.  The interests of a 
fund‘s donors and beneficiaries are not well served by the time, 
effort, and other resources such conflicts consume. 
The Quasi-Entity Fund model might appear on its face to be a 
useful first step to get a new effort off the ground, but history 
suggests otherwise.  These funds do not convert seamlessly into 
independent, autonomous efforts in due course.  Instead, their 
functionally independent secretariats and the World Bank seem to 
be on a collision course from the funds‘ inception.  This history 
indicates that a preferred approach would be to create these funds 
as autonomous entities from the outset, free to advance their 
donors‘ goals as their paramount objective.229  Even as an 
autonomous entity, however, the design of the Quasi-Entity Fund 
would need to be improved to allow for greater accountability 
before it could serve as an optimal mechanism. 
3.1.2. Lacunae in Accountability 
The Quasi-Entity Fund model gives rise to several weaknesses 
in accountability.  As detailed by Ruth Grant and Robert Keohane 
in their seminal work, Accountability and Abuses of Power in World 
Politics, 230 accountability requires a state of affairs in which some 
 
228 At that time, the parties ultimately agreed that the CEO would report 
jointly to the Bank‘s Vice President for Human Development (consistent with the 
terms of his contract of employment with the Bank) and to the executive body of 
the Education For All Fast Track Initiative Partnership as a whole.  See 2009 
Annual Report, supra note 227. 
229 See discussion infra Part 4 (arguing for greater Quasi Entity Fund 
autonomy).  
230 For a relevant source analyzing institutional design, see Joshua Cohen & 
Charles F. Sabel, Global Democracy?, 37 N.Y.U. J. INT‘L L. & POL. 763, 774–75 (2005) 
(relying on Ruth W. Grant and Robert G. Keohane, Accountability and Abuses of 
Power in World Politics, 99 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 29, 29 (2005).  See generally Sumon 
Dantiki, Note, Power Through Process: An Administrative Law Framework for United 
Nations Legislative Resolutions, 40 GEO. J. INT‘L L. 655, 677 (2009) (pointing out the 
problematic transfer of power from states to less accountable international 
institutions through delegated legislative authority); Esty, supra note 3, at 1537–41 
(discussing the problems of divided responsibility, informality, institutional 
weakness, and the participation of private actors); Veerle, Heyvaert, Levelling 
Down, Levelling Up, and Governing Across: Three Responses to Hybridization in 
International Law, 20 EUR. J. INT‘L L. 647 (2009) (arguing for the establishment of 
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actors have the right to (a) hold other actors to a set of standards, 
(b) judge whether those actors have fulfilled their responsibilities 
in light of these standards, and (c) impose sanctions if they 
determine that these responsibilities have not been met.231 
Accountability arises as a concern in the Quasi-Entity Fund for 
the following reason:  the Quasi-Entity Fund creates a different 
relationship between the donors to a fund and the World Bank as 
trustee, than exists under a World Bank Trust Fund.  The Quasi-
Entity Fund shifts the locus of responsibility for the use of a fund‘s 
resources.  While a World Bank Trust Fund gives that 
responsibility to the World Bank, under a Quasi-Entity Fund, the 
donors retain that responsibility themselves.  This shift in 
responsibility, therefore, requires the creation of a new framework 
of accountability which should address two key aspects of how the 
fund will work:  (i) who will assume responsibility for monitoring 
the use of the fund‘s resources, and how; and (ii) the responsibility 
of  the donor governments, acting as a donor governing body, to 
their citizens (whose taxes supply the resources that governments 
contribute to these funds) for the decisions they will make as a 
donor governing body and the policies and procedures they will 
follow in making those decisions. 
To put this shift in principal-agent terms, under the Quasi-
Entity Fund, the citizens of the donor governments become a 
collective principal, and the donor governing body, charged with 
responsibility for allocating the fund‘s resources, assumes the role 
 
individual state responsibility for technical and financial assistance so there can be 
greater accountability from the parties from whom it is necessary). 
231 See Grant & Keohane, supra note 3, at 29–30 (discussing accountability 
systems and problems experienced with them on the global level).  Grant and 
Keohane provide this definition of accountability in the context of assessing 
whether the democratic deficit that accompanies international institutions (and 
impugns their legitimacy as instruments of global governance) can be 
compensated for by accountability mechanisms.  Id. at 30–33 (crafting a concept of 
accountability at the global level by distinguishing between two different models 
of accountability: a participation model, according to which the performance of 
the power wielders is evaluated by those who are affected by their actions, and a 
delegation model, under which the performance of the power wielders is 
evaluated by those who entrust them with power).  I adopt the delegation model 
as the most appropriate for the purposes of analyzing fiscal accountability in a 
collective financing vehicle for development (while recognizing that a 
participation model may be more apt for other purposes (e.g., for evaluating the 
development effectiveness of a given initiative)). 
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of those citizens‘ agent.232  The donor governing body, therefore, is 
directly accountable to the donor countries‘ citizens for its actions.  
These responsibilities exist alongside (not instead of) the 
responsibilities the Bank as Trustee owes to the donors, though the 
responsibilities to the donors are more limited than under a World 
Bank Trust Fund. 
Grant and Keohane maintain, further, that accountability in a 
relationship between power-wielders and those holding them 
accountable exists when there is a general recognition on the part 
of all interested parties ―of (i) the operative standards for 
accountability and (ii) the authority of the parties to conduct the 
relationship (one to exercise particular powers and the other to 
hold them to account).‖233  As applied to the Quasi-Entity Fund 
model, this means that the donors, secretariat and World Bank 
must not only follow clear standards, but they must also recognize 
and own their respective responsibilities. 
The accountability failure in the Quasi-Entity Fund arises from 
the fact that neither donors nor the World Bank have faced up to 
the implications of the changes wrought in the World Bank Trust 
Fund by the Quasi-Entity Fund, nor to the resulting need that the 
Quasi-Entity Fund model generates to clarify operative standards 
for their responsibilities or their respective lines of responsibility.  
Instead, as the history of the GEF Trust Fund and the Education 
Fund show, the Bank and donors routinely fail to provide a 
meaningful accountability framework when they create a Quasi-
Entity Fund. 
This failure arises in part because the accountability gaps in 
this model are not immediately apparent.  Quasi-Entity Funds are 
routinely labeled ―World Bank Trust Funds‖,234 a label that masks 
the difference in the nature of responsibilities that donors and the 
World Bank assume under the Quasi-Entity Fund model, as 
compared with a World Bank Trust Fund, and the need for a new 
accountability framework that the difference brings about.  As put 
by one jurisprudence scholar, ―the identity of terms seems 
 
232 See generally Lyne et al, supra note 54, at 44 (explaining the inter-workings 
of collective principals). 
233 See Grant & Keohane, supra note 3, at 29–30.  
234 The designation of these funds as World Bank Trust Funds is pervasive.  
See generally WB TRUST FUNDS 2007 REPORT, supra note 122 (referring to various 
Quasi Entity Funds as World Bank Trust Funds in the World Bank‘s Annual 
Report). 
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irresistibly to suggest an identity between the ideas expressed by 
them.‖235  But the resulting failure in accountability has actual and 
potential negative outcomes.  These outcomes include gaps in the 
oversight of the funds‘ resources resulting from misaligned 
responsibilities among the fund‘s organs; liability and reputational 
risk for donors and the Bank; the application of ad hoc rather than 
optimal fiduciary practices; and unnecessarily high transaction 
costs.  Issues that have arisen with the GEF Trust Fund show both 
these flaws and these outcomes. 
The GEF provides several examples of conceptual confusion.  
From the beginning, the terms of the GEF Instrument show 
misunderstanding.  In disregard of the limited role the Bank as 
Trustee was accorded in the GEF—which amounts to no more than 
that of a financial functionary—236the GEF Instrument makes the 
World Bank as Trustee the entity responsible for ensuring that the 
GEF Trust Fund‘s resources are being used in accordance with the 
terms of the GEF Instrument and the decisions of the GEF Council.237  
Making the World Bank as Trustee responsible for overseeing the 
Implementing Agencies‘ use of GEF Trust Fund resources reflects a 
misalignment of responsibilities because the Bank as Trustee lacks 
the authority, substantive knowledge, and resources to exercise 
such oversight. 
The Bank as Trustee lacks the authority to police the 
Implementing Agencies‘ use of GEF Trust Fund resources.  The 
GEF Instrument mandates that it commit and disburse funds to the 
Implementing Agencies pursuant to the decisions of the GEF 
 
235 See Dan Sarooshi, Conferrals by States of Powers on International 
Organizations: The  Case of Agency, in THE BRITISH YEAR BOOK OF INTERNATIONAL 
LAW 291, 297–98, n.7 (Oxford 2004). 
If the expression of widely different ideas by one and the same term resulted only 
in the necessity for . . . clumsy paraphrases, or obviously inaccurate paraphrases, 
no great harm would be done; but, unfortunately, the identity of terms seems 
irresistibly to suggest an identity between the ideas expressed by them. 
Id. (quoting T. Holland, ELEMENTS OF JURISPRUDENCE 83 (1906), quoted in W. 
Hohfeld, Some Fundamental Legal Conceptions as Applied in Judicial Reasoning, 23 
YALE L. J. 16, 33–34 (1914)). 
236 See Smyth, supra note 43, at 32–33 (describing in detail the Bank‘s 
functions in relation to the GEF Trust Fund). 
237 See GEF Instrument, supra note 109, Annex B, para. 4(d) (providing, that 
the Trustee shall be responsible for the ―monitoring of the application of 
budgetary and project funds . . . so as to ensure that the resources of the [GEF 
Trust Fund] are being used in accordance with the [GEF] Instrument and the 
decisions taken by the Council‖). 
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Council without giving it any authority to withhold funds if the 
Implementing Agencies cannot account to the Bank for their use of 
GEF Trust Fund resources already received.238  The Bank also lacks 
the substantive knowledge to police UNDP and UNEPs‘ use of 
resources.  When the GEF Trust Fund donors set up the GEF Trust 
Fund, they agreed with the Bank, UNEP, and UNDP that each 
Implementing Agency would apply its own operational policies 
when making grants of GEF Trust Fund resources to other 
recipients.239  The Bank as Trustee, unfamiliar with the specifics of 
UNEP and UNDPs‘ operational policies, would be in no position to 
monitor whether they were being observed.240 
In short, it was misguided for the GEF Instrument to make the 
Bank as Trustee responsible for overseeing these agencies‘ use of 
GEF resources.  In the case of UNEP and UNDP, the parties 
resolved this mis-alignment by means of a side-agreement, 
whereby they agreed that the Bank as Trustee would not oversee 
UNEP and UNDPs‘ application of their respective operational 
policies but would simply require UNEP and UNDP to furnish it 
with regular audited financial statements.241  But this side-
agreement did not resolve the broader accountability gap that the 
Quasi-Fund model poses with respect to oversight and the 
 
238 See GEF Instrument, supra note 109, Annex B, para. 3 (holding that the 
Fund shall be administered according to provisions of the Instrument and the 
Trustee by-laws and rules, as well as any Council decisions made under the 
Instrument). 
239 See generally Smyth, supra note 43, at 62 (clarifying that while each agency 
would apply its own policies, the World Bank was allowed by the Council to stop 
sending funds to agencies if they did not meet their reporting requirements after a 
grace period of thirty days).  
240 The idea of World Bank staff monitoring and supervising UNDP and 
UNEPs‘ execution of their projects is also inconsistent with the co-equal statures 
of the World Bank and the UN, which, along with the UN‘s organs and 
Specialized Agencies, co-exist in the international sphere without either bowing to 
the other.  See About Us, UNITED NATIONS, http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE 
/EXTERNAL/EXTABOUTUS/0,,contentMDK:20040610~menuPK:41691~pagePK
:43912~piPK:44037,00.html (last updated June 30, 2003) (stating the Bank‘s formal 
relationship with the United Nations ―is defined by a 1947 agreement which 
recognizes the Bank as an independent Specialized Agency of the UN as well as a 
member and observer in many UN bodies‖). 
241 See generally GEF COUNCIL, EXPANDED OPPORTUNITIES FOR EXECUTING 
AGENCIES, GEF/C.12/10, para. 15 (Oct. 14-16, 1998), available at 
http://www.thegef.org/gef/sites/thegef.org/files/documents/GEF.C.12.10.pdf 
[hereinafter GEF Expanded Opportunities] (listing those entities which would be 
able to take advantage of the newly expanded opportunities to access GEF 
financing). 
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standards the component bodies of a Quasi-Entity Fund should 
follow. 
These broader questions resurfaced in the GEF in connection 
with a provision in the GEF Instrument not used in the early years 
of the GEF Trust Fund‘s existence.242  This provision allows the 
GEF Council to allocate GEF Trust Fund resources to a wide range 
of intermediaries, including multilateral development banks, other 
specialized agencies and programs of the U.N., other international 
organizations, bilateral development agencies, national 
institutions, NGOs, private sector entities and academic 
institutions, in addition to the three Implementing Agencies.243  
Beginning in the late 1990s, the GEF Council began to allocate GEF 
Trust Fund resources to some regional development banks and 
several U.N. agencies and programs.244  This expanded pool of 
intermediaries forced the GEF Council to confront the questions 
left open in the GEF Instrument—namely what standards the 
Council should apply in selecting additional entities, how the 
Council should determine whether an entity met those standards, 
what sort of oversight should be exercised over new 
intermediaries, and what would be the appropriate body to 
exercise oversight. 
The Council adopted a set of criteria devised by the Secretariat 
for the selection of new intermediaries,245 which focused on an 
entity‘s technical expertise to contribute to the GEF‘s mission.246  It 
 
242 See Smyth, supra note 43, at 57 (discussing how in the early years of the 
GEF's existence, the GEF Council only allocated resources to the Implementing 
Agencies; in time, the complaints of development banks and other entities about 
being shut out were heard, and the allocation procedures subsequently changed). 
243 See GEF Instrument, supra note 109, para. 28 ("The Secretariat and the 
Implementing Agencies under the guidance of the Council shall cooperate with 
other international organizations to promote achievement of the purposes of the 
GEF.‖) 
244 See generally GEF COUNCIL, CRITERIA FOR THE EXPANSION OF OPPORTUNITIES 
FOR EXECUTING AGENCIES, GEF/C.17/13, para. 3–5 (May 9-11, 2001), available at 
http://www.thegef.org/gef/sites/thegef.org/files/documents/C.17.13.pdf 
(detailing the GEF Council‘s decision to include four development banks and 
three United Nations agencies among the entities to which it would allocate GEF 
resources directly). 
245 See id. (listing three criteria by which the GEF Council would judge the 
suitability of an entity including strategic match, capacity, and complementarity).  
The Council adopted these criteria some time after making some one-off rulings 
affirming the eligibility of certain specific entities to serve as intermediaries.  Id. 
246 See id. (focusing on the three criteria such that the entity would be able to 
work to fulfill the needs of the GEF (strategic match) at the necessary levels 
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also assigned the Secretariat the lead role in deciding, in 
consultation with the Implementing Agencies, 247 whether an entity 
met those criteria.  But the Council‘s ruling left gaps.  Deciding on 
standards of technical expertise is only part of the task; a donor 
governing body of a Quasi-Entity Fund must also clarify what 
fiduciary standards a recipient or intermediary must meet.  The 
criteria the Council approved omitted any criteria concerning an 
entity‘s financial management capacity. 
The omission concerning the entity‘s financial management 
capacity raised the question of whether the GEF Council would 
consider potential new intermediaries to have sufficient financial 
management capacity as long as they could furnish financial 
reports to the Bank as Trustee, as agreed for UNDP and UNEP.248  
It also raised the question of whether the Bank‘s role as Trustee to 
ensure that GEF Trust Fund resources are used in accordance with 
the terms of the GEF Instrument and the decisions of the GEF 
Council would be discharged by the Bank‘s simply securing 
financial reports from these new intermediaries.  
The Bank as Trustee pressed the GEF Council for clarity 
regarding its responsibilities as Trustee.  In response, the Council 
ruled that securing financial reports from the new intermediaries 
would fulfill the Bank‘s oversight responsibilities as Trustee.249  At 
the Bank‘s urging, the Council also ruled that the GEF Instrument 
should not be read as precluding the Bank as Trustee from 
withholding the commitment or disbursement of funds to any 
intermediary that failed to provide the Bank with the required 
 
(capacity) while also being able to fully commit to the program 
(complementarity)). 
247 See id. (describing how, after the Council's initial review and acceptance of 
an entity, the Secretariat would "complete the necessary legal and procedural 
arrangements" and further review the agency before it was invited to become an 
intermediary for the GEF). 
248 See supra note 241 and accompanying text (detailing how the World Bank 
as Trustee of the GEF Trust Fund agreed with UNEP and UNDP that UNEP and 
UNDP would furnish the World Bank annually with audited financial reports, the 
receipt of which would satisfy the Bank's obligation to ensure that GEF Trust 
Fund resources were being used in accordance with the terms of the Instrument 
and the GEF Council's decisions). 
249 See GEF COUNCIL, TRUSTEE REPORT, GEF/C.23/Inf.3, para. 13 (Apr. 19, 
2004), available at http://207.190.239.143/COUNCIL/GEF_C23/C.23.Inf.3_Trustee 
_Report_FINAL.pdf [hereinafter GEF Trustee Report] (―[A]n appropriate manner 
for the Trustee to discharge [its] responsibility would be for it to require, and 
accept from, the Implementing Agencies an annual audited financial report . . . .‖). 
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financial reports.250  This ruling gave the Bank as Trustee the police 
powers necessary to fulfill the auditor-like role it had agreed to 
assume.251   
Although the Council‘s ruling resolved the open questions 
concerning the scope of the Bank‘s responsibility in its capacity as 
Trustee of the GEF Trust Fund, the dilution of fiduciary oversight 
to the mere securing of financial reports is not a reassuring 
paradigm for the accountability of the Quasi-Entity Fund model.  
When intermediaries are large institutions, such as U.N. agencies 
with standard financial and other controls,252 the limited measure 
of securing financial reports may provide adequate fiduciary 
oversight.  However, the risk calculation changes in a broad 
universe of diverse intermediaries with diverse fiduciary policies, 
which may or may not conform to standards similar to those 
applied by the World Bank and U.N. entities.   
In the case of the GEF Trust Fund, the donors became alert to 
inadequate fiduciary accountability belatedly when the number of 
intermediaries expanded rapidly in the early 2000s.253  At that time, 
they asked the World Bank as Trustee to develop a set of policy 
proposals to strengthen the fiscal accountability of all GEF 
intermediaries.254  The Bank as Trustee duly presented a set of 
 
250 See id. para. 15 (authorizing the Bank as Trustee to ―suspend commitment 
and disbursement‖ whenever a recipient is out of compliance with its financial 
reporting obligations for thirty days or more after issuance of written notice by 
the Trustee). 
251 Id. 
252 See generally U.N. Secretary-General, Financial Regulations and Rules of the 
United Nations, U.N. Doc. ST/SGB/2003/7 (May 9, 2003) (containing amended 
directives for the financial management of the U.N.). 
253 Until 1998 the GEF Council only allocated funds directly to the three 
Implementing Agencies: the World Bank, UNDP, and UNEP.  By 2003, however, 
it had decided to also was also allocate funds to seven executing agencies 
pursuant to a series of decisions  designed to give e give expanded access to GEF 
resources.  See GEF Expanded Opportunities, supra note 241, at 2–5 (discussing the 
roles of the World Bank, UNDP, and UNEP as Implementing Agencies and their 
efforts to expand opportunities for executing agencies); GEF COUNCIL, REVIEW OF 
EXPERIENCE WITH EXECUTING AGENCIES UNDER EXPANDED OPPORTUNITIES, 
GEF/C.22/12, para. 20 (Oct. 24, 2003), available at http://www.thegef.org/gef 
/sites/thegef.org/files/documents/C.22.12_Executing_Agencies_FINAL.pdf 
(stating that the policy of expanded opportunities has clarified the role of the 
executing agencies and has provided the agencies with greater access to GEF 
resources both directly and indirectly through the Implementing Agencies). 
254 See GLOBAL ENV‘T FACILITY, SUMMARY OF NEGOTIATIONS ON THE FOURTH 
REPLENISHMENT OF THE GEF TRUST FUND Annex A, para. 22 (Oct. 9, 2006), available 
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minimum fiduciary standards which the Council asked every 
intermediary to implement within a year.255  This step 
strengthened the fiduciary accountability of the GEF Trust Fund. 
The Council‘s demand that the Bank as Trustee develop such 
standards, however, again manifests conceptual confusion 
regarding the roles and responsibilities—and, therefore, the 
accountability—of the Quasi-Entity Fund model.  In principle, 
there is nothing wrong with the GEF Council asking the World 
Bank to develop a set of minimum fiduciary standards for GEF 
intermediaries.  As an institution that has developed a 
comprehensive set of fiduciary safeguards for its own 
operations,256 the Bank is well placed, in the abstract, to perform 
this standard-setting function.  In the context of the Bank‘s role as 
Trustee of the GEF Trust Fund, however, things are more 
complicated.  As the primary intermediary of GEF Trust Fund 
resources, and as an entity that opposed expanding the pool of 
GEF intermediaries,257 the Bank‘s ability to appear objective in 
devising fiduciary standards for other GEF intermediaries is 
tainted. 
The Bank‘s inability to assume an untainted role as standard-
setter is unfortunate given that it has the necessary expertise.  If, in 
the future, the donor community decides to create a separate legal 
entity—a sixth member of the World Bank Group, to serve as an 
international development fund administrator for donors‘ 
collective financing efforts—such an entity would be well-placed to 
also serve as an advisor on fiduciary standards for intermediaries 
 
at http://207.190.239.143/GEF-3-4Replenishment/Reple_Documents 
/SummaryofNegotiations_Revised_October2006.pdf [hereinafter GEF FOURTH 
REPLENISHMENT] (―The use of GEF resources should be subject to the highest 
international fiduciary standards.‖).  The Council asked that the proposals set 
minimum financial standards consistent with international best practices.  Id. 
255 See GLOBAL ENV‘T FACILITY, RECOMMENDED MINIMUM FIDUCIARY STANDARDS 
FOR GEF IMPLEMENTING AND EXECUTING AGENCIES para. 12 (2007), available at 
http://www.thegef.org/gef/sites/thegef.org/files/documents/Recommended_
Minimum_Fiduciary_Standard.pdf [hereinafter GEF FIDUCIARY STANDARDS] (―The 
Council requests each agency to present a report to the GEF Secretariat on its 
compliance with the fiduciary standards and, as necessary, plans to remedy any 
shortfall.‖). 
256 See generally WB TRUST FUNDS MANAGEMENT FRAMEWORK, supra note 18, at 
31–40 (detailing a risk-based approach to trust fund management). 
257 See Smyth, supra note 43, at 63 (detailing how the World Bank initially 
opposed regional banks and other entities gaining direct access to GEF resources, 
as distinct from having access exclusively through sub-grants from the 
Implementing Agencies). 
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and direct recipients.258  This advisory role is precluded when the 
Bank assumes the multiple roles it currently holds under the 
Quasi-Entity Fund model. 
The Bank as Trustee was also the wrong entity to set standards 
for GEF intermediaries because of the risk it took by assuming that 
its standard-setting role would expand to include a role overseeing 
whether those standards were being met.  This overseer role is 
inconsistent with the limited financial functionary role the Bank 
has as Trustee of the GEF.  Although setting minimum fiduciary 
standards for intermediaries does not necessarily entail assuming 
oversight responsibilities over intermediaries‘ compliance with 
those standards, it is a slippery slope.  This was especially true in 
the context of the GEF Trust Fund, where the Bank as Trustee had 
to forcibly wean donors from depending on the Bank to perform 
an oversight function it was not equipped to fulfill. 
To create a situation where the donors of a Quasi-Entity Fund 
would rely on the Bank as Trustee to exercise fiduciary oversight 
over the fund‘s intermediaries and/or recipients, while at the same 
time excluding the Bank from having any input in selecting those 
intermediaries and/or recipients, would not serve the interests of 
development‘s stakeholders.  For example, given the lack of input 
the Bank as Trustee of the GEF Trust Fund has in selecting GEF 
intermediaries, if the Bank assumed responsibility for such 
intermediaries‘ use of trust fund resources it would effectively be 
taking on unmanageable amounts of responsibility and risk.  
Instead, the donor governing body (the GEF Council) is the 
appropriate body to bear the risk of selecting a fraudulent or 
incompetent entity because it holds the authority to choose 
intermediaries or recipients.259  This arrangement properly aligns 
control with responsibility.   
 
258 An expanded role for the World Bank as a standard-setter of financial 
assessment and fiduciary monitoring practices would fit within the 
characterization of the World Bank as having the potential to play a significant 
role in the evolving field of global administrative law.  See generally Benedict 
Kingsbury et al., The Emergence of Global Administrative Law, 68 L. & CONTEMP. 
PROBS. 15 (2005) (discussing the transnational regulatory systems that are 
emerging to tackle intergovernmental issues, such as assistance to developing 
countries and banking and financial regulation, which cannot adequately be 
addressed by domestic national administrative institutions). 
259 See BANTEKAS supra note 18, at 156–57 (noting that an executive board—
such as the GEF Council—of an intergovernmental trust fund with a governance 
mechanism owes obligations to a range of stakeholders, including the donors 
themselves). 
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Ultimately, the Bank as Trustee avoided taking responsibility 
for vetting the GEF‘s intermediaries or for monitoring 
intermediaries‘ compliance with the policies and procedures they 
had agreed to apply.  Instead, the GEF Council ordered the 
intermediaries to report to the Secretariat on their progress in 
implementing the standards the Bank as Trustee had 
recommended.260  Designating the Secretariat to vet and monitor 
the intermediaries‘ compliance with the standards the Bank as 
Trustee devised helped offset the appearance of a conflict of 
interest in having the Bank serve as standard-setter.  As an exercise 
in finding the right body for the job, however,261 this result is also 
suboptimal.  The Secretariat is primarily staffed with 
environmental experts (rather than accounting or financial 
management folks), and so lacks the right expertise to perform the 
task.  Meanwhile, the Bank, as the designer and proponent of the 
minimum fiduciary standards, has the correct expertise, but cannot 
participate due to potential conflicts in ensuring compliance with 
other roles the Bank has already assumed.  This is not an optimal 
division of labor or use of institutional resources. 
The hit-or-miss quality of the decisions that led to the ultimate 
division of labor between the different components of the GEF 
structure does not inspire confidence in the Quasi-Entity Fund as a 
model.  That same hit-or-miss quality was evident in the first 
drafting of the Education Fund by the donors and Bank, and their 
struggles with balancing between the Bank‘s need to observe 
prudent financial management standards and the donors‘ desire 
for autonomy within the constraints of the Quasi-Entity Fund 
model. 
The conceptual confusion about accountability is evident in the 
Education Fund in connection with the donor governing body‘s 
selection of recipients.  The Education Fund‘s donor governing 
body (the Strategy Committee) was designated to select which 
countries would receive assistance262 and also to recommend to the 
 
260 See GEF FIDUCIARY STANDARDS, supra note 255, para. 12 (requesting ―each 
agency to present a report to the GEF Secretariat on its compliance with the 
fiduciary standards and, as necessary, plans to remedy any shortfall‖). 
261 See Hawkins et al., Delegation Under Anarchy, supra note 55, at 25–26 
(discussing the considerations that the principal must take into account when 
―hiring‖ an agent, and noting the importance of aligning a principal‘s demands 
with an agent‘s capacity). 
262 Pursuant to the World Bank‘s Operating Policies governing the Bank‘s 
administration of trust funds, each donor to a fund enters into a Trust Fund 
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Bank as Trustee the specific recipients that should receive Fund 
resources.  Recommended recipients could be chosen from an 
unlimited range of recipient entities.263  The Bank as Trustee, 
however, retained the final say in selection.264  In principle, this 
arrangement was intended to allow the Bank as Trustee to avoid 
providing fiduciary oversight over an entity that would not meet 
its fiduciary or social safeguards.  The Fund‘s constituent 
documents, however, did not specify what standards the Strategy 
Committee would apply in selecting recipients.  As a result, since 
the final say on recipient selection lay with the World Bank as 
Trustee, the Bank‘s fiduciary and social safeguards became the 
default standards. 
The terms and conditions of the Education Fund provided that 
the Bank‘s standards would apply to all grants from the Education 
Grant except when the Strategy Committee selected a non-
government recipient, in which case the Bank would not supervise 
the recipient.  The terms were entirely vague, however, regarding 
which policies and procedures any such recipients would be 
required to observe.265  The absence of clear and transparent 
standards to guide when the Strategy Committee might make such 
an allocation and/or what sort of substitute oversight procedures 
would apply created a significant gap in accountability.  The terms 
of the Fund include an express disclaimer by the Bank of any 
responsibility to account to the donors for any such recipient‘s use 
of the Fund‘s resources.266  The power of this disclaimer to protect 
the Bank‘s reputation if a malfeasance occurred, however, and the 
wisdom of the institution relying on such a disclaimer to protect 
itself are dubious. 
 
Administration Agreement or its equivalent with the World Bank as trustee.  See 
World Bank OP/BP 14.40, supra note 99, at BANK PROCEDURES, para. 6.  
Accordingly, each Education Fund donor has entered into a Trust Fund 
Administration Agreement with the World Bank, the terms and conditions of 
which create, inter alia, the fund‘s governance structure.  See WORLD BANK, 
AGREEMENT BETWEEN DONOR AND THE INTERNATIONAL BANK FOR RECONSTRUCTION 
AND DEVELOPMENT AND THE INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT ASSOCIATION 
CONCERNING THE EDUCATION FOR ALL FAST TRACK INITIATIVE CATALYTIC FUND, TF 
No. 051061, Annex 1, para. 2 (2007), [hereinafter Education Fund Administration 
Agreement] (on file with author). 
263 Education Fund Administration Agreement Annex 1, supra note 262, para. 
2. 
264 Id. 
265 Id. paras. 2, 7.b. 
266 Id. para 7.b. 
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These types of accountability gaps are not present under a 
World Bank Trust Fund.  When a group of donors set up a World 
Bank Trust Fund, they enter into legal agreements with the World 
Bank which govern the administration of the fund and set out the 
terms and conditions under which the World Bank will carry out 
its trustee responsibilities.  These agreements provide a relatively 
clear accountability framework.267  They set out precisely which 
policies and procedures the Bank will follow in its discharge of its 
trustee responsibilities.268  Under the default rule, of the World 
Bank‘s internal policies when administering a World Bank Trust 
Fund, the World Bank must apply the same rules and policies to 
the use of the fund‘s resources as applied to its own resources.  The 
full panoply of processes and procedures that the Bank has 
developed for its lending activities will apply. 
The Bank‘s lending polices set out a comprehensive set of 
standards that apply to two different aspects of the recipient 
selection process.  They prescribe the requirements that an entity 
must meet in order to qualify as an eligible recipient of financing—
a set of standards collectively referred to as the Bank‘s fiduciary 
safeguards.269  They also prescribe the requirements a recipient must 
observe while carrying out the activity being financed by the grant.  
 
267 See SUREDA, supra note 187, at 191 (describing the principles that must be 
included in trust fund administration agreements). 
268 See generally World Bank OP/BP 14.40, supra note 99 (describing the 
responsibilities of groups with regards to the use of trust funds).  In 2006, the 
Bank introduced a set of Standard Terms and Conditions for World Bank Grants, 
which incorporate these policies.  See generally WORLD BANK, STANDARD 
CONDITIONS FOR GRANTS MADE BY THE WORLD BANK OUT OF VARIOUS FUNDS (July 
20, 2006), available at http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTLAWJUSTICE 
/Resources/STDGC-English-06.pdf.  See also Smyth, supra note 38, at 529–35 
(discussing the World Bank‘s transition from its original approach to grant 
agreements, which allowed for variable terms and conditions, to its current 
emphasis on uniformity, and noting the Bank‘s authority to cancel or suspend 
grants when necessary). 
269 The fiduciary safeguards allow the World Bank to preliminarily vet a 
potential recipient‘s capacity to handle grant funds.  For example, they require 
that the grant recipient maintain a financial management system—including 
accounting, financial reporting, and auditing systems—that is satisfactory to the 
Bank.  See World Bank Safeguard Policies, WORLD BANK, 
http://go.worldbank.org/QL7ZYN48M0 (last visited Feb. 22, 2011) (describing a 
series of policies to assure that the ―Bank‘s operations do not harm people and the 
environment‖).  What is satisfactory to the Bank will depend on what kind of 
information the Bank determines it will need from a recipient in order for the 
Bank to discharge its responsibilities as a trustee.  The Bank also must report to 
donors on the status of the fund and the use of donors‘ resources. 
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These latter requirements are set down as conditions in the grant 
agreement entered into between the Bank as trustee and the 
recipient, and are collectively referred to as the Bank‘s social 
safeguards.270  These safeguards reflect the principles the Bank 
observes in order to keep its operations consistent with generally 
accepted principles of sustainable development.271  In sum, the 
fiduciary safeguards and the social safeguards combined are 
specifically designed to create a clear framework of 
accountability.272 
The Bank‘s lending policies also mandate that the recipient 
follow the World Bank‘s procurement policies and procedures—
provisions designed to ensure that the recipient follows a 
transparent process in procuring goods and services being 
financed by the grant, and that all eligible bidders get a fair 
opportunity to compete.273  Further, they require the Bank to 
 
270 The Bank‘s social safeguards apply to a project‘s environmental footprint 
and other development-related issues.  They require a grant recipient to comply 
with the Bank‘s policies covering a host of matters such as mandated 
environmental assessments and the protection of indigenous people, natural 
habitats, forestry and physical and cultural resources.  The Bank‘s social safeguards 
consist of ten policies intended to serve as a set of minimum standards that all 
Bank-supported operations must meet.  See generally Alex Wilks, World Bank Social 
and Environmental Policies: Abandoning Responsibility?, BRETTON WOODS PROJECT 
(Sept. 2003), available at http://www.brettonwoodsproject.org/doc/env 
/safeguards.PDF (revealing that the World Bank‘s efforts to ―reformat‖ its ten 
safeguard policies made NGOs fear that the Bank intended to evade responsibility 
for social and environmental concerns); World Bank Safeguard Policies, supra note 
269 (noting social safeguards). 
271 Many of these policies were introduced in the 1980s in response to 
pressure from the NGO community to protect the environment and vulnerable 
groups from being harmed by the World Bank‘s operations.  See Kapur, supra note 
73, at 65–66 (noting the strong influence of Washington-based NGOs over the 
World Bank).  See generally Benedict Kingsbury, Operational Policies of International 
Institutions as Part of the Law-Making Process: The World Bank and Indigenous Peoples, 
in THE REALITY OF INTERNATIONAL LAW: ESSAYS IN HONOUR OF IAN BROWNLIE 323 
(Guy S. Goodwin-Gill & Stefan Talmon eds., 1999) (discussing the World Bank‘s 
operational policies and practices and their impact on international law). 
272 Fiduciary safeguards and social safeguards are part of the World Bank‘s 
Operational Policies and Procedures.  See WORLD BANK, THE WORLD BANK 
OPERATIONS MANUAL, OP 4.00, para. 2, tbl.A1 (2005), available at 
http://siteresources.worldbank.org/EXTOPMANUAL/Resources/EntireOpMan
ualExternal.pdf (presuming that a borrower‘s environmental and social safeguard 
system is the same as the Bank‘s when it is aimed at the objectives listed in Table 
A1, which describes appropriate safeguard operations). 
273 See id. at OP 11.00 (outlining procurement policy). 
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monitor and supervise the execution of grants from trust fund 
resources.274 
 This framework of accountability is lost whenever a group of 
donors sets up a Quasi-Entity Fund that excludes application of the 
World Bank‘s fiduciary safeguards and social safeguards to the donor 
governing body‘s selection of recipients.  The Bank‘s internal 
policies275 require that the Bank‘s fiduciary and safeguard policies 
apply to all grants the Bank supervises; however, gaps exist when 
donors retain the right to have non-Bank entities supervise grants 
made from fund resources.  In choosing to retain the right to select 
non-Bank entities to implement and/or supervise, donors must 
decide which substitute standards to apply both in initially vetting 
recipients‘ fiduciary capacity to handle grant resources, and in 
determining what kind of sustainable development policies they 
want recipients to observe in carrying out the grant activities.276 
As experience shows, Quasi-Entity Fund donors and the World 
Bank tend not to appreciate the need to proactively determine who 
will exercise oversight over the recipients‘ use of resources; what 
such oversight will entail, and what standards, policies, and 
procedures will guide the donor governing body‘s discharge of its 
responsibilities in allocating a fund‘s resources.  Accountability 
demands more.277  
 
274 See id. para. 1 (―The Articles of Agreement establish the Bank‘s fiduciary 
responsibility to ensure that the proceeds of its loans are used only for specified 
purposes . . . .‖).  For example, the grant recipient‘s responsibility to execute the 
grant holds the recipient responsible for procuring the goods and services needed 
to carry out grant activities, negotiating contracts, making payments, submitting 
progress and financial reports as required by the grant agreement and performing 
other implementation activities.  See World Bank OP/BP 14.40, supra note 99, at 3 
n.7 (describing responsibilities of grant recipients).  The Bank is responsible for 
supervising and monitoring the recipient‘s performance of these obligations.  See 
id. para. 8, at 5 (―The [task team leader] is responsible for supervising and 
reporting to his/her line manager . . . on progress in implementation of trust-
funded activities.‖). 
275 See generally World Bank OP/BP 14.40, supra note 99 (stating the 
operational policies of the World Bank). 
276 If fund donors decided not to give the donor governing body discretion, 
but instead set rules to administer, accountability would be more easily 
determined.  See Hawkins et al., Delegation Under Anarchy, supra note 55, at 27 
(summarizing the benefits and drawbacks of ―rule-based‖ and ―discretion-based‖ 
delegation of authority).  This would require, however, the creation of a dynamic, 
flexible funding vehicle that could readily respond to changing needs. 
277 Further, in a participatory model of accountability for development aid, 
accountability would flow to all stakeholders.  See Grant & Keohane, supra note 3, 
at 38 (discussing various forms of accountability applicable to multilateral 
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The World Bank itself has expressed concern about the 
accountability of the Quasi-Entity Fund model.  Its internal 
evaluations department, the Operational Evaluation Department 
(―OED‖), identified several failures in accountability in the 
model.278  In a study of twenty-six initiatives, it concluded that the 
roles and responsibilities of the governing officers and bodies 
needed clearer articulation, and that the transparency of their 
decision-making and processes needed improvement to provide 
clearer accountability for their exercise of power over the 
initiatives‘ resources.279  Further, OED found nine different models 
of governance in use in the twenty-six initiatives, with no obvious 
reason for the differences between them.280  The Bank‘s Senior 
Management also raised concerns to the Bank‘s Board of Executive 
Directors (the Bank‘s governing body on a day-to-day basis) about 
the risks the Bank faces in administering increasingly complex 
Quasi-Entity Funds.281  Despite these concerns, neither the Bank 
nor the donor or recipient communities have articulated a 
comprehensive vision regarding what kinds of reform of the 
Quasi-Entity Fund would best serve the global community; nor 
 
organizations, multilateral firms, and NGOs).  In a delegation model, those who 
delegate power hold power-wielders ―accountable through a variety of 
mechanisms for judgment after the fact.‖  Id. at 32–33. 
278 See OED Phase I Report, supra note 38, at 42 (noting, for instance, conflicts 
of interest, whether real or perceived); WORLD BANK, ADDRESSING THE CHALLENGES 
OF GLOBALIZATION: AN INDEPENDENT EVALUATION OF THE WORD BANK‘S APPROACH 
TO GLOBAL PROGRAMS—PHASE 2 REPORT 85 (2004), available at http://www-
wds.worldbank.org/external/default/WDSContentServer/WDSP/IB/2007/04/2
5/000020953_20070425114157/Rendered/PDF/396470PAPER0Ch1obalization01P
UBLIC1.pdf [hereinafter OED Phase 2 Report] (concluding that ―[w]hile pure 
shareholder models of programs are being replaced by stakeholder models, 
program governance are still struggling to balance legitimacy and accountability 
for results with efficiency in achieving them‖). 
279 See OED Phase 2 Report, supra note 278, at xxviii (concluding that the 
―[l]ack of effective governance and management must be addressed if the Bank‘s 
financial support is to continue‖); id. at 53–66 (noting a strong need for the World 
Bank to address the lack of effective governance and management commonly 
found in global programs, the kinds of programs that are funded by Quasi-Entity 
Funds). 
280 See id. at 53–54 (noting that ―programs have adopted their particular 
governance models for reasons of history and of culture,‖ and emphasizing that 
the number of diverse models makes it difficult to differentiate between partners 
and participants, as well as  to judge how effective each governance model is). 
281 See WB TRUST FUNDS MANAGEMENT FRAMEWORK, supra note 18, para. 2.13, 
at 11–12 (discussing the problems arising from complexity, such as multiple layers 
of decision-making, increased financial management requirements, and the need 
for greater administrative processing). 
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have they articulated a vision regarding what role the World Bank 
or other intergovernmental organizations should assume with 
respect to them.282 
Recent developments in the Education Fund indicate that 
donors and the Bank are aware of the need to proactively address 
the accountability lacunae that arise in the Quasi-Entity Fund 
model.  In November 2010, the donors of the Education Fund, in 
collaboration with the full membership of the broader Education 
For All Fast Track Initiative Partnership, agreed to a major 
restructuring of the Fund.283  The changes, in addition to 
expanding the participatory nature and inclusiveness of the Fund, 
limit the range of entities to which the Fund will transfer resources 
and removes the prior opacity about what policies and procedures 
apply when the Fund issues a grant to an entity that will not be 
supervised by the World Bank.284 
Under the restructured fund, the former donor governing 
body, the Steering Committee, has been abolished.285  The original 
Education Fund has been merged with other related funds 
financing primary education and the newly merged fund, named 
the Education For All Fund, is governed by a board of directors 
 
282 See BANTEKAS, supra note 18, at 156–58 (discussing corporate governance 
duties and the lack of clarity regarding such duties in intergovernmental trust 
funds). 
283 See FTI Reform Agenda, EDU. FOR ALL FAST TRACK INITIATIVE (Dec. 03, 2010), 
available at http://www.educationfasttrack.org/news/185/290/Key-Decisions-
and-Next-Steps-Conclude-EFA-FTI-Meetings/d,Whats%20New/ (detailing the 
agreed-upon changes including restructuring the Board of Directors, policy 
reformation, the creation of a single trust fund, and a revision of the "Governance 
of the Partnership" document). 
284 See EDUCATION FOR ALL FAST TRACK INITIATIVE, COVER NOTE TO 
GOVERNANCE OF THE PARTNERSHIP ii (Nov. 2010), available at 
http://www.educationfasttrack.org/media/Revised%20Final%20Governance%2
0Document_Jan%202011.pdf [hereinafter EFA-FTI GOVERNANCE DOCUMENT 
(2010)] (reflecting the changes made to the membership and function of EFA-FTI‘s 
Board of Directors). 
285 See DAVID GARTNER, BROOKINGS INSTIT., TRANSFORMED GOVERNANCE AND 
THE EDUCATION FOR ALL-FAST TRACK INITIATIVE 3 (May 2010), available at 
http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/Files/rc/papers/2010/05_education_gov
ernance_gartner/05_education_governance_gartner.pdf (noting the FTI—whose 
origin can be traced to the 2002 G-8 summit in Canada—has ―evolved from an 
entity formally guided by an annual partnership meeting, to a steering committee 
without substantial authority over funding decisions, to a unified structure of 
board governance‖) 
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who makes all financing decisions.286  The range of possible entities 
that can supervise a grant of Fund resources has been restricted to 
any multilateral or bilateral FTI Partner organization;287 a FTI 
Partner organization being defined as a bilateral aid agency of a 
donor country to the Education Fund or any multilateral 
organization engaged in the primary education sector.288  The 
entity selected to supervise a grant is responsible to the EFA FTI 
Partnership for grants under its oversight.289  The lack of clarity 
about what polices an entity supervising the execution of a Fund 
grant should apply has been resolved in favor of allowing the 
supervising entity to apply its own policies and procedures, 
including those related to the procurement of goods and 
services.290   
The dual reporting role of the Secretariat (to the overall 
Partnership and the Bank as the host organization) remains, 
however.291  Further, although the re-structured fund‘s constituent 
documents declare that the Board of Directors shall monitor the 
use of the Fund‘s resources and ensure that they are being used in 
 
286 See EFA-FTI GOVERNANCE DOCUMENT (2010), supra note 284, para. 4.2 
(outlining the amended mandate of the FTI Board of Directors).  The Board of 
Directors has nineteen members and is a much broader representation of 
interested stakeholders than the Strategy Committee of the former Education 
Fund.  Id. at para. 4.2.1.  The nineteen representatives include six representatives 
from donor countries, six representatives from developing countries eligible to 
receive Fund resources, three representatives from Civil Society, one 
representative from the private sector, and one representative from each of the 
United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization, the United 
Nations Children‘s Fund and an unspecified multilateral or regional development 
bank.  Id. para. 4.2.2(a)–(e).  Decisions are made by consensus where possible or 
by a majority which must include a cross-section of the different categories of 
Board representatives, where consensus cannot be achieved.  Id. at para. 4.2.17. 
287 See id. para. 4.1 (giving the four categories of FTI Partners, all charged 
with monitoring and advising the Board of Directors). 
288 See EDUCATION FOR ALL FAST TRACK INITIATIVE COUNTRY LEVEL PROCESS 
GUIDE (Apr. 2010), available at http://www.educationfasttrack.org/media 
/library/Secure/Board_Documents_May-2010/Final_Country_Level_Process 
_Guide.pdf (providing an ―overview of the basic process of joining and working 
within the EFA FTI Partnership at a country level‖). 
289 See EFA-FTI GOVERNANCE DOCUMENT (2010), supra note 284, para. 3.5.6 
(discussing how such organizations can be designated Coordinating Agencies, 
which have the responsibility to monitor and facilitate fund disbursement). 
290 See id. (noting also the Coordinating Agency's role in monitoring the 
progress and implementation of a country‘s education sector plan). 
291 See id. para. 4.4.6 (detailing how the FTI Secretariat is to report to the 
Board of Directors regarding ―objectives and outcomes,‖ and to the host 
organization regarding the work plan and budget management). 
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accordance with the Board‘s decision,292 the Board, for all practical 
purposes, is entirely reliant on the supervising entities to provide 
oversight.  In the meantime, the World Bank as ―Trustee‖ of the 
Fund would appear (incorrectly) to the outside world, as the entity 
responsible for that oversight role. 
All of the development‘s stakeholders have a stake in 
containing the risks that the accountability gaps in the Quasi-Entity 
Fund model create, not least the World Bank.  Unless we ascribe to 
the view that the World Bank has served its purposes and should 
cease to exist as an organization, there is reason to preserve its 
viability as a development bank.293  This means that the Bank 
should take steps to prevent the Quasi-Entity Fund model from 
becoming the tail that wagged the dog, i.e., to prevent Quasi-Entity 
Funds from becoming a vehicle that, by damaging the Bank‘s 
reputation for sound financial management practices, impedes the 
Bank‘s ability to function as a viable financial institution.294  
Individual donors may have markedly different risk tolerances 
than the Bank, given the Bank‘s dependence on the capital markets 
to raise operating capital.  This difference seems best 
accommodated in a framework that draws a clear line between the 
role of the Bank as an administrator of donors‘ funds and the role 
of the Bank as a lending institution whose lending rates are driven 
by its cost of capital.  Comprehensive change that recognizes this 
difference, and the risks created by lacunae in accountability, is 
overdue. 
3.2. The Deficits in the National Law Entity 
The National Law Entity model, as epitomized by the Global 
Fund, is materially different from the Quasi-Entity Fund.  The 
Global Fund‘s donors broke free of the agency costs that the 
donors to a Quasi-Entity Fund incur as a result of the Quasi-Entity 
Fund‘s extensive dependence on the World Bank.  They also 
 
292 See id. para. 4.2.8 ("The FTI Board of Directors makes funding decisions for 
the FTI Trust Funds, monitors their utilization and ensures they are being used in 
line with FTI objectives and policies . . . ."). 
293 See Pincus & Winters, Reinventing the World Bank, supra note 3, at 18–19 
(noting that the ―Fifty Years is Enough‖ sentiment reflects just one extreme view 
and that while the World Bank has many critics, most of its critics advocate 
reform, not abolition of the institution). 
294 See generally Kapur, supra note 73, at 61–63 (noting how the World Bank‘s 
dependence on global financial markets has shaped the institutional design and 
governance of the World Bank itself). 
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unmasked and plugged the accountability gaps hidden in the 
Quasi-Entity Fund model.  But neither achievement has been 
absolute or cost-free.  Moreover, these gains alone do not establish 
the National Law Entity model as an optimal model for collective 
financing efforts.  Whether this model can be viewed as such 
depends, as a threshold matter, upon the costs at which these gains 
have been achieved.  Further, assuming—even without 
conceding—that the costs are manageable, whether the National 
Law Entity model‘s potential to serve as an optimal model for 
collective financing also depends on whether this model‘s goals are 
impeded by its lack of international legal personality. 
3.2.1. Uncertain Availability 
3.2.1.1. Financial Administration 
The Global Fund secured the financial administration services 
of the World Bank, despite the fact that it operates independently 
from the Bank.  Further, the Global Fund‘s Secretariat and its 
Executive Director have real, not illusory, independence from any 
other entity.  In both of these respects, the National Law Entity 
model succeeds where the Quasi-Entity Fund model fails.  Both 
gains are directly linked to the Global Fund‘s independent legal 
status. 
The World Bank agreed, reluctantly, to serve as Trustee of the 
Global Fund.  It was uneasy about the grassroots, locally-based 
approach the Global Fund donors favored.  Its concession to serve 
as Trustee must be understood within the particular context in 
which the Global Fund was created.  The Fund was a high-profile 
effort that encapsulated the developed world‘s response to an 
urgent epidemic295—a response that many viewed as long 
overdue.296  It is funded by the Banks‘ major shareholders acting 
collectively, whom the Bank was not in a position to refuse. 
When earlier versions of the Fund were under consideration, 
the Bank took the position that it would not serve as trustee of a 
 
295 See Press Release, Secretary-General, Secretary-General Proposes Global 
Fund for Fight Against HIV/AIDS and Other Infectious Diseases at African 
Leaders Summit, U.N. Press Release SG/SM/7779/Rev.1 (Apr. 26, 2001) 
(discussing the high incidence rate of HIV/AIDS in Africa, and broadly outlining 
various steps that need to be taken to curtail the spread of the epidemic). 
296 See RADELET, supra note 139, at 3–7 (examining some of the most common 
criticisms of foreign aid programs and how the Global Fund structure responds to 
the criticisms). 
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fund set up under its auspices if the purpose of that fund was to 
channel funds through country-based mechanisms selected by the 
donors, rather than through the Bank and other intergovernmental 
organizations.297  The Bank based this position on concerns about 
liability and reputational risk.298  As indicated earlier in connection 
with the GEF Trust Fund,299 the Bank views a fund that channels its 
resources through the Bank and U.N. entities as a known quantity, 
from the point of view of the risk the Bank assumes in serving as a 
trustee. 
The Global Fund‘s donors were adamant, however, that the 
fund would not operate through those established channels.  Thus, 
under pressure to help facilitate the Fund‘s creation, the Bank 
opted for the second-best alternative (from the point of view of 
protecting the Bank‘s interests) and conditioned its willingness to 
serve as Trustee on the Fund‘s being set up with a legal personality 
independent of the Bank.300  That way the Fund, not the Bank, 
would bear legal responsibility for any loss, damage, or fraud that 
might result in the course of the Fund‘s operations.301  The Bank 
also saw the Fund‘s legal independence as a way of attenuating, if 
not eliminating, any reputational damage to the Bank that might 
result from something going awry in the course of the Fund‘s 
operations.302 
The Bank‘s agreement to serve as Trustee of the Global Fund, 
therefore, cannot be viewed as indicative of a general willingness 
to assume that role for financing efforts that operate independent 
of it.  In certain limited circumstances, notably in connection with 
highly specialized, narrowly targeted health initiatives, it has 
 
297 See GLOBAL FUND REPORT ON LEGAL STATUS OPTIONS, supra note 171, at 7 
(determining that ―the Global Fund lacks a cost-effective administrative structure, 
independent authorities, and sufficient liability protection‖). 
298 See id. (pointing out concerns that the proposed design of the fund might 
result in redundancy, increased costs, and a subversion of existing programs and 
expertise). 
299 See supra text accompanying notes 165, 167–68 (describing the role of Local 
Fund Agents as well as the legal liability of the Global Fund). 
300 See Triponel, supra note 138, at 183 (discussing the reasons why the Global 
Fund was established as an independent legal entity); GLOBAL FUND FRAMEWORK 
DOCUMENT, supra note 138, at 1 (discussing the purpose and scope of the Global 
Fund). 
301 See GLOBAL FUND REPORT ON LEGAL STATUS OPTIONS, supra note 171, at 2 
(providing background information on the establishment of the Global Fund). 
302 See id. (detailing the historical perspective in the formation of the Global 
Fund, and why it was organized as a private entity as opposed to another form). 
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agreed to serve as trustee for independent initiatives.303  However, 
the criteria that determines whether the Bank will or will not 
provide financial administration services are opaque.  The clear 
demand for collective financing for development gives rise to a 
need for greater certainty regarding the availability of such 
services to donors, whether from the World Bank or an alternative 
institution.  For the National Law Entity to be a viable model for 
new collective financing efforts, donors need assurance that such 
services are available. 
3.2.1.2. Uncertain Commitment to the Responsibilities of 
Independence 
The Global Fund‘s independence from the WHO, the World 
Bank, and all other pre-existing intergovernmental organizations is 
real, but as the Fund‘s history shows, this independence was not 
automatic.304  It resulted from the determined, relentless drive of 
the Fund‘s supporters to preserve the Fund as a financing vehicle 
that operates through country and regional-level channels.  That 
determination caused the Global Fund‘s donors early on to view 
the Administrative Services Agreement between the Fund and the 
WHO, and the convenience of relying on the pre-existing 
institutional apparatus of the WHO to hire Fund staff, as 
temporary measures. 
The independence of the Global Fund‘s Secretariat serves as a 
paragon of what the GEF Trust Fund‘s CEO wants to achieve.  
Further, the Global Fund terminated its Administrative Services 
Agreement with the WHO for the express purpose of relieving its 
Secretariat of the conflict of serving the distinct agendas of the 
Fund and the WHO; this strongly supports the argument that, as 
the GEF‘s CEO claims, such independence is essential if a collective 
financing effort is to achieve its goals.  This evidence squarely 
confronts donors with the implications of their design choices.  The 
National Law Entity offers a means of achieving real independence 
 
303 See Why IFFIm?, IFFIM, http://www.iff-immunisation.org (last visited 
Apr. 12, 2011) (―The International Finance Facility for Immunisation (IFFIm) exists 
to rapidly accelerate the availability and predictability of funds for 
immunization‖); What Is an AMC?, ADVANCE MARKET COMMITMENT FOR VACCINES, 
http://www.vaccineamc.org/about.html (last visited Apr. 12, 2011) (explaining 
that ―[d]onors commit money to guarantee the price of vaccines once they have 
been developed . . . .‖). 
304 See Triponel, supra note 138, at 184–86 (discussing the creation of the 
Global Fund as an independent legal entity). 
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if donors are willing to assume the responsibilities and costs that 
independence entails. 
Many of the accountability gaps the Quasi-Entity Fund model 
generates are resolved by the National Law Entity model.  Its clear 
legal independence puts donors on notice ab initio that they must 
decide on standards and processes for the new entity‘s operations, 
for which they will hold it accountable.  In setting up the 
component parts of the Global Fund, therefore, the donors 
carefully delineated the responsibilities of each part at the global 
and local level.305  They also delineated the standards by which 
each should discharge its responsibilities.  The Country 
Coordinating Mechanism, for example, selects the Principal 
Recipients in accordance with criteria set by the Board of Directors, 
and the Local Funding Agents are selected in accordance with pre-
agreed competitive bidding processes.306  For the most part, 
therefore, with one exception, the confusion about roles and 
responsibilities evident in the Quasi-Entity Fund is absent from the 
National Law Entity as exemplified by the Global Fund.  
Moreover, consistent with best practices identified in principal-
agent theory, each component part‘s responsibilities are aligned 
with its competence and relatively devoid of perverse incentives.307 
The exception to the Fund‘s sound framework of fiscal 
accountability concerns the role of the World Bank as Trustee.  
Labeling the Bank Trustee of the Global Fund is misleading.  As a 
non-voting member of the Board of Directors, the Bank has no 
control over who the recipients of the Fund‘s grants are, or over the 
criteria applied to select them, or over the terms and conditions of 
the grants made to them.308  Vis-à-vis the recipients, the Bank‘s role 
 
305 See GLOBAL FUND FRAMEWORK DOCUMENT, supra note 138, §§ IX–X 
(providing an overview on the process of monitoring programs and of different 
entities‘ fiduciary responsibilities). 
306 See supra text accompanying note 158 (noting that the GUIDELINES AND 
REQUIREMENTS FOR COUNTRY COORDINATING MECHANISMS outline the principles the 
Country Coordinating Mechanisms must advance); Who We Are, THE GLOBAL 
FUND, http://www.theglobalfund.org/en/lfa/ (last visited Mar. 18, 2011) (stating 
that Local Funding Agents ―are selected through a competitive bidding process‖). 
307 See Hawkins et al., Delegation Under Anarchy, supra note 55, at 30–31 
(discussing the effect of delegation on the principal-agent theory). 
308 The Fund‘s grant agreements are concluded between the Fund and the 
recipient, so the Bank as Trustee is not involved in them and simply disburses 
funds to the recipients‘ bank accounts in accordance with the instructions it 
receives from the Secretariat.  See GLOBAL FUND REPORT ON LEGAL STATUS OPTIONS, 
supra note 171, at 2. 
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is solely that of a disbursement or paying agent on behalf of the 
Fund.  Vis-à-vis the Fund‘s donors, its role resembles that of a 
collection agent and custodian or investment manager.  Neither of 
these roles entails exercising the oversight over the Fund‘s 
resources, ordinarily connoted by having the World Bank serve as 
Trustee of a fund.  
In fact, under the Fund‘s structure the Local Funding Agent, 
Principal Recipient, Secretariat, and Board of Directors all have a 
role in overseeing the use of the Fund‘s resources.  In other words, 
fiduciary accountability does exist, but it is not centered in, or 
dependent on, the World Bank.  Accountability, however, not only 
demands clarity in how a principal and an agent allocate their 
respective duties and responsibilities, but also clarity and 
consistency in the terms they use to describe the allocations they 
agree upon.309  Those terms signal to the parties, and to all 
stakeholders, where accountability lies.310  This mislabeling in the 
Global Fund‘s structure is an easy, yet important, fix in future 
efforts seeking to rely upon the National Law Entity approach.311 
3.2.1.3. High Costs 
Apart from this deficit, the National Law Entity, as reflected in 
the Global Fund, achieves formal fiscal accountability.  Viewing 
the donors‘ goal as one which creates a financing mechanism that 
maximizes the likelihood that their resources will be used for the 
purposes for which donors have made them available,312 the 
National Law Entity model, as exemplified by the Global Fund, 
 
309 See Grant & Keohane, supra note 3, at 39–40 (emphasizing that 
accountability depends on the clarification of roles in the principal-agent 
relationship, specifically noting the importance of transparency of responsibilities 
in allocating accountability). 
310 See id. (recognizing that the transparency of responsibilities, standards, 
and sanctions within principal-agent relationships promotes stable 
accountability). 
311 This deficit has the potential to be especially significant from the World 
Bank‘s point of view.  For an institution whose reputation for financial 
management competence is key, both to its ability to borrow funds on 
international capital markets and to receiving continued support from its 
shareholders, perpetuating this misimpression of having responsibility to provide 
supervision for the resources of an entity, over which it has no control is 
imprudent, if not bordering on foolhardiness. 
312 See Hawkins et al., Delegation Under Anarchy, supra note 55, at 23 (arguing 
that while the gains from delegation may motivate states to grant conditional 
authority to international organizations, they do not determine the outcome). 
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appears to achieve some success.  It is an initiative designed by 
donors to fund a specific issue and, by providing for donor control 
and eliminating reliance on entities with competing agendas, it 
achieves focused independence.  That independence is achieved at 
considerable financial cost.  Starting afresh is an expensive 
undertaking.313  The Global Fund‘s Secretariat has a staff of six 
hundred people, and the creation and design of a whole new 
structure complete with new component parts such as the Country 
Coordinating Mechanisms, Principal Recipients, and Local 
Funding Agents, in addition to new standards and processes for 
them, is a major investment. 
3.2.2. Adverse Effects of Non-International Legal Status 
In passing the Swiss Host Act, the Swiss Government has tried 
to remove any disadvantage an entity might experience under 
Swiss law as a result of not having international legal personality.  
The privileges and immunities the Swiss government extends to a 
financing effort under Swiss law, however, do not extend beyond 
Switzerland except under the laws of those countries that decide to 
confer a similar status on a given entity under their own respective 
laws.314  For this reason, whether the National Law Entity model is 
an optimal vehicle for collective financing depends in part on 
whether a financing effort‘s attainment of its goals is likely to be 
impeded by not having legal personality under international law. 
The record shows that having international legal personality is 
not as critical as one might expect if creating the financing effort 
under a jurisdiction such as Switzerland is an option.  International 
legal personality does not automatically bring with it legal 
capacity.315  As evinced by the experiences of the GEF and the 
 
313 See id. at 26–27 (noting the expense of instituting proper control 
mechanisms for agents). 
314 For example, the United States has conferred the equivalent of 
International Organization status on the Global Fund under U.S. law.  See Exec. 
Order No. 13,395, 71 C.F.R. 3203 (Jan. 13, 2006), available at 
http://www.thefederalregister.com/d.p/2006-01-19-06-554 (extending the 
application of the International Organizations Immunities Act, 22 U.S.C. § 288 and 
288f–6, to the Global Fund).  See also GLOBAL FUND REPORT ANNEX 6, supra note 
142, at 13 (noting that the status the Swiss Government has conferred on the 
Global Fund is a step short of the status it has conferred on the International 
Federation of the Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies, which enjoy the full 
equivalent of intergovernmental organization status under international law). 
315 See JAN KLABBERS, AN INTRODUCTION TO INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTIONAL LAW 
47 (2d ed. 2009) (noting the different ways of describing international legal 
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experience of the Global Fund‘s initial agreement with the WHO, 
the most important factor affecting an effort‘s autonomy is 
independent legal capacity, which the National Law Entity 
provides.  Although an organization might be recognized as 
having legal personality under international law, it needs legal 
capacity to function and make legally valid agreements, such as 
employment agreements in the example above.  Indeed, this has 
led some commentators to view international legal personality as a 
somewhat empty concept.316 
At the same time, certain advantages do accrue from 
international legal status that would benefit a new financing effort.  
For example, international organization status can provide an 
entrée into meetings and policy discussions with government and 
other intergovernmental entities that are important to an 
organization‘s work.  Just as the right to apply for observer status 
in the U.N. is limited to international organizations, 317 the right to 
participate in other governmental and inter-governmental 
meetings and fora, both in the developed and the developing 
world, is more likely to be granted to a financing effort that has 
international organization status. 
International organization status may also affect an entity‘s 
access to resources.  International organizations may be written 
directly into UNDP and other international organizations‘ funding 
arrangements for particular activities instead of having to compete 
on a public procurement basis.318  Further, international 
organizations automatically qualify for certain kinds of funding 
under various government programs, which may not be available 
to an organization operating at a national level. 319  In addition, 
international organization status enables an entity to enter into 
 
personality); AMERASINGHE, supra note 187, at 77–78 (recognizing that 
international personality does not automatically grant the ability to perform 
functions with international consequences). 
316 See KLABBERS, supra note 315, at 52–53 (contending that the notion of 
―international legal personality‖ is relatively weak and difficult to apply to 
concrete legal actions). 
317 See ALVAREZ, supra note 187, at 154–56 (noting the objections to extending 
participation rights to non-state actors). 
318 See KLABBERS, supra note 315, at 125–27 (discussing the sources of income 
for international organizations); AMERASINGHE, supra note 187, at 359 (discussing 
the various methods of funding by international organizations). 
319 See KLABBERS, supra note 315, at 128–29 (describing the obligatory funding 
of donor countries to qualified organizations under the Articles of the United 
Nations). 
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international agreements, such as Headquarters Agreements with 
host states.320  Headquarters Agreements frequently provide for 
preferential treatment on taxes and other matters for the 
organization, privileges and immunities for organization staff, and 
ambassadorial rank for the organization‘s head.321  This higher 
status translates into vastly improved access to government 
officials and diplomats, enabling the organization to make its case 
directly to governments.322  States do not enter into Headquarters 
Agreements with national law entities that are not subjects of 
International Law.323  For these reasons, an optimal collective 
financing vehicle for development would have both legal capacity 
and international personality. 
4. PROPOSALS FOR CHANGE 
The special purpose fund phenomenon, operationalized in the 
emergence of the Quasi-Entity Fund and National Law Entity 
models, shows that the institutions charged with primary 
responsibility for international development finance need to 
change.  The existing institutions date back to a polarized state-
centric world when development aid cooperation was linked to 
Cold War allegiances and the key donors and recipients consisted 
of states.  Cold War allegiances are now giving way to shared 
concern about global threats and stymied progress in countries that 
make up the poorest of the poor.  Donors now include a range of 
private sector actors, as do recipients.  Many stakeholders are seen 
as having a legitimate voice in the design of aid programs as well. 
These funds suggest that an overhaul of the international legal 
order for development is needed.  As a long-term goal, an overhaul 
should include re-designing those organs of the U.N. engaged in 
development, as well as the structure and responsibilities of the 
 
320 See id. at 256 (discussing the treaty-making powers of international 
organizations and noting that most organizations conclude a headquarters 
agreement with their host state). 
321 See AMERASINGHE, supra note 187, at 337 (recognizing that many 
agreements result in privileges and immunities for international organizations in 
―exercising their functions in relation to the organization‖). 
322 See id. at 337–38  (noting how the privileges and immunities translate into 
beneficial improvements that fulfill the proposed functions of the organizations). 
323 See id. at 315–17, 338–39 (noting that subjects of international law, 
including states and international organizations, enter into agreements, such as 
Headquarters Agreements  affording entities privileges and immunities only with 
entities that are similarly subjects of international law). 
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World Bank to serve the needs these funds reflect.  These needs 
include a greater degree of participation in decision-making by 
donors, recipients and other interested parties, such as NGOs.  A 
case could also be made for greater consolidation and a merger of 
UNDP and IDA.  If we were to begin from scratch today, for 
example, in designing a new order for collective financing 
initiatives to provide grant funds, the divisions between these 
institutional bodies would make little sense. 
Further, within these institutions, the need for major change is 
obvious.  The U.N.‘s development efforts, dispersed amongst a 
range of under-funded programs, fall short.324  Donors‘ repeated 
preference for donating to special purpose funds, instead of IDA— 
the component of the World Bank Group these same donor 
governments specifically created to serve the needs of the countries 
which are the primary beneficiaries of special purpose funds, must 
eventually force consideration of how IDA should change. 325  In 
the short-term, pending implementation of broader reform, there 
are several concrete steps that should be taken to improve the 
capacity of the ad hoc models to meet immediate needs and to 
reduce the adverse impact their deficits could have on the overall 
aid effort. 
Starting with the Quasi-Entity Fund, as currently conceived, it 
is rife with uncontained conflicts of interest and destined to 
disappoint stakeholders‘ hopes and expectations.  In accordance 
with basic principal-agent theory, the necessity of an alignment 
between the principal‘s and the agent‘s incentives means that a 
collective financing initiative for development should either be 
subject to the control and authority of the Bank, as a traditional 
World Bank Trust Fund is, or be subject to the control and 
authority of a separate, autonomous entity.  The Quasi-Entity Fund 
model aims to serve as something in between, but, instead, results 
in unabated agency costs and poor accountability. 
The poor accountability in the Quasi-Entity Fund model, 
stemming largely from the multiple roles the World Bank assumes, 
has many negative consequences.  Those consequences include a 
 
324 See de Senarclens, supra note 1, at 10, 32–33 (discussing the U.N.‘s critical 
role as a social and economic regulator while noting significant defects in the U.N. 
system). 
325 To the extent that the distribution of IDA‘s voting shares may credibly be 
viewed as a disincentive for donors to donate additional funds to IDA, perhaps 
re-evaluating that distribution would be a fruitful starting point. 
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lost opportunity for all of development‘s stakeholders because the 
Bank‘s multiple roles preclude it from serving as an objective 
standard-setter of fiduciary and sustainable development 
safeguards for new initiatives.  The Bank has both the expertise 
and the experience to perform a valuable function as standard-
setter.  If, however, the Bank is in a position where, as an 
institution, it is competing for a fund‘s resources with those for 
whom it is setting standards, the objectivity of those standards is 
tainted. 
The poor accountability in the model also means that it fails as 
a useful template for financing efforts that involve a mix of public 
and private donors, as the Green Climate Fund is intended to be.  
A key concern of private sector donors is the avoidance of any risk 
of liability for an initiative‘s acts or omissions.326  In the absence of 
clarity with regards to the scope of a donor governing body‘s 
responsibilities, that concern cannot be assuaged.327 
Perpetuating the poor accountability of the Quasi-Entity Fund 
model poses risks.  At a minimum, the lack of clarity about the 
responsibilities of its component parts give rise to endless turf 
battles and the inefficiencies that such battles entail.  At worst, the 
lack of clarity has the potential to result in lax and unsupervised 
application of inadequate standards, which could damage the 
credibility of the overall aid effort.  In between these extremes, the 
model‘s poor accountability presents risks for the World Bank as 
an institution and, by extension, for those countries that depend on 
the Bank for loan finance. 
The risk to the World Bank stems from the proclivity of donors 
using this model to expect the Bank as trustee to provide a greater 
degree of fiduciary oversight than it has the power to provide.  
Although the Bank can expressly limit its liability by including 
exculpatory clauses in its agreements with donors, such clauses 
will not protect the World Bank‘s reputation if, for example, a 
major fraud occurs in a fund with which it is associated.  This risk 
is significant because the Bank‘s reputation as a competent 
financial institution (which remains intact notwithstanding 
 
326 See Sophie Smyth, Can Business Learn to Love the Environment?  The Case for 
a U.S. Corporate Carbon Fund, 58 RUTGERS L. REV. 451, 474 (2006) (recognizing that 
the creation of a U.S. corporate carbon fund would necessitate devising 
mechanisms to shield private participants from individual liability). 
327 See id. (discussing that in order to create a shield against donor or 
participant liability, the scope of the World Bank‘s fiduciary duties must be 
clarified). 
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widespread criticism of its development effectiveness) is key to the 
very essence of how the Bank operates.328  Guarding the Bank‘s 
fiscal reputation is more difficult than might appear since it comes 
under constant pressure from powerful member countries to meet 
their needs.329 
This pressure inhibits the articulation of a coherent vision for 
the Bank‘s supporting role in these initiatives.  One might expect 
that a proposed way forward would come from the Bank‘s 
leadership, but the silence of the Bank‘s leadership on this issue is 
deafening.  The uncomfortable reality is that confronting this issue 
means confronting the murky and contentious issue of where the 
interests of the Bank as an institution begin and the interests of its 
more powerful members end.330  In other words, confronting this 
issue means confronting the degree to which the Bank is a 
 
328 See INFORMATION STATEMENT, supra note 2, at 1–6 (explaining how the 
World Bank raises the funds it uses to make loans by issuing bonds on 
international capital markets.  The Bank derives most of its operating capital from 
the proceeds of its bonds.  Absent this capacity to borrow funds on international 
capital markets, the Bank would have no access to the funds it uses to make loans 
to the developing world, and therefore could not function as a development bank.  
Accordingly, the World Bank cannot afford to administer externally financed 
funds at the risk of jeopardizing the reputation it has in the international capital 
markets as a robust financial institution); id. at 101 (noting that the ―IBRD is not 
required to post collateral under‖ the derivatives agreements it has entered into 
with counterparties, as long as it maintains its AAA credit rating). 
329 See Pincus & Winters, Reinventing the World Bank, supra note 3, at 14–20 
(discussing the Bank‘s difficulty preserving a singular focus because of the intense 
pressure it comes under from member states and other entities to undertake 
various mandates).  The issue of whether to serve as trustee of a fund is also 
subject to internal pressures as the Bank is not a monolithic institution.  See 
Sarfaty, supra note 22, at 667–76 (detailing, for example, differing views within the 
World Bank on the issue of human rights).  Every proposal for a new collective 
financing effort sparks differing interests among different fiefdoms within the 
institution.  For example, departments poised to get funds from an effort to add to 
its particular lending agenda (such as the Environment Department in the case of 
the GEF Trust Fund) will be vocal advocates in favor of the Bank‘s agreeing to 
administer a fund because the gain to it will be immediate; the fund offers it the 
promise of additional funds, freed from the internecine struggles that attach to the 
Bank‘s internal budget wars.  Support for protecting the Bank‘s broader 
institutional interests, however, is likely to be more diffuse.  Id.  The Bank‘s Trust 
Fund Management Department may be keenly aware of the risks of administering 
a fund for which the Bank‘s tasks as trustee are unmanageable and may clamor in 
opposition.  But as an arm of the Bank‘s back office, expected to service and 
facilitate the front lines of the Bank‘s lending operations, the Trust Fund 
Management Department‘s view is unlikely to prevail. 
330 See Barnett & Finnemore, supra note 3, at 714 (discussing the difficulty in 
determining whether the interests and agenda of an international organization 
reflect or divert from the intentions of its founding member states). 
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principal in its own right as an institution as opposed to being 
merely a loyal puppy of its more powerful member countries.331 
In spite of these shortcomings, however, the direction taken by 
the Quasi-Entity Fund appears to be viewed, generally, as in the 
interests of development.  Therefore, the goal is to identify a 
judicious fund design that captures the advantages of this shift 
without jeopardizing the Bank‘s function as a development bank or 
these funds‘ goals as a source of grant finance.  No one change will 
serve as a universal cure-all.  Cumulative changes are needed.   
 In the interests of reducing the risk of agency slack in this 
model, the following changes should be considered.  First, the 
donor community should press the World Bank to formally 
disaggregate the Bank‘s functions as a financial administrator from 
its other functions by creating a new legally distinct sixth member 
of the World Bank Group—an International Development Fund 
Administrator entity that would provide new financing efforts 
with financial administration services.  In addition to providing 
financial administration services, a new legally distinct 
International Development Fund Administrator entity could also 
serve as a standard setter and provide new financing efforts with 
advice on such issues as, standards for assessing financial record-
keeping capacity and procurement best practices.  These efforts 
would be untainted and unconstrained by the agenda of other 
World Bank Group entities.  Furthermore, donors should aim for a 
model that allows for autonomy of the collective financing effort 
and, therefore, proactively manages the conflicts of interest 
inherent in the Quasi-Entity Fund model.  The conflict of interest 
that arises between functionally independent secretariats and the 
World Bank is inevitable. Perpetuating a model that produces the 
stalemates, stand-offs, and contradictory agendas, that such 
conflicts of interest generate, hurts those who both give and receive 
assistance to or from the initiatives that these secretariats serve.  
Some competition and tension is inevitable as viewpoints and 
priorities differ.  But stalemates, stand offs, and paralysis are not 
inevitable.  They, unlike a conflict of views, result from a lack of 
 
331 See Milner, supra note 4, at 112 (discussing how ―in a multilateral setting 
the principal-agent problem becomes even more acute).  See also WOODS, supra 
note 17, at 179–80 (pointing out that the agendas of the IMF and the World Bank 
are affected by the preferences of their most powerful members, their bureaucratic 
agendas and the politics of the countries to which they provide assistance); Kapur, 
supra note 73, at 65–67 (discussing the dilemma of determining the role of the 
World Bank in the context of ―the continued dominance of the United States‖). 
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clarity about who is in charge.  Change is also needed to address 
the accountability gaps in the Quasi-Entity Fund and the following 
steps should be considered.  First, donors and the World Bank 
should delineate clearly the respective roles and responsibilities of 
the component parts of a Quasi-Entity Fund to avoid gaps in 
oversight or misperceptions about where responsibility lies.  The 
responsibilities of the component parts of a Quasi-Entity Fund 
should be aligned with formal authority, technical competence, 
and dedicated resources to discharge them. 
Second, donors should specify whether the World Bank‘s social 
and fiduciary safeguards will apply to grants financed by a fund 
and if World Bank policies do not apply, what alternatives apply 
and who will assume responsibility for seeing that they are 
observed.  Experience also demonstrates the importance of 
identifying upfront the source and substance of the standards that 
a fund‘s donor governing body will apply when allocating a fund‘s 
resources.  The issue of what operational standards recipients 
should apply is a delicate one—allowing for standards different 
from the World Bank‘s social safeguards, for example, could end 
up facilitating end-runs around those standards.  As these 
standards exist to protect the environment and vulnerable groups, 
the interests of development‘s stakeholders would not be served 
by allowing collective funding initiatives to undercut those 
standards. 
Third, the World Bank as a trustee of a Quasi-Entity Fund 
should not assume responsibility for overseeing non-World Bank 
recipients‘ use of the fund‘s resources unless it is given the powers 
and resources (including manpower and training as needed) to 
perform that role.  Further, if the World Bank does not assume that 
role, donors need to find a replacement watchdog or set up 
mechanisms for the donor governing body to exercise oversight. 
The National Law Entity has promise.  But as an approach to 
collective financing, it is not clear that this model is the optimal 
combination of old and new norms.  Devising new practices and 
institutions is a costly exercise that, to some extent, throws the 
baby out with the bath water.  A financing vehicle that better 
integrates the knowledge base and experience of the World Bank‘s 
and others‘ fiduciary and sustainable development policies would 
better serve all stakeholders‘ interests.  Pending the creation of 
such a vehicle, however, thought could be given to improving the 
National Law Entity model in the following ways. 
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol32/iss4/1
SMYTH.DOC 4/24/2011  9:51 AM 
2011] COLLECTIVE FINANCE CHALLENGE 1053 
A way should be found to give initiatives both legal capacity 
and international legal personality.  If, for example, the creators of 
new initiatives were to express an intention to confer international 
legal personality in the initiative‘s constituent documents, in 
addition to complying with the requirements necessary for an 
initiative to have legal capacity under a national law regime, that 
would be a start.  Efforts should then be taken to encourage other 
countries to recognize that status and to facilitate the process of 
their doing so.332 
The World Bank should clarify the criteria for determining 
when and whether it, or any new member of the World Bank 
Group that might be created for this purpose, will provide 
financial administration services. 
When the World Bank‘s role is limited to serving as a conduit 
of funds, the World Bank should not adopt the label of a ―trustee‖ 
or any other label that connotes a fiduciary duty that the Bank does 
not have the authority to discharge.  The less loaded ―Financial 
Administrator‖ label would be more appropriate. 
A model National Law Entity form should be devised to allow 
for replication and the lowering of the transaction costs involved in 
creating a new entity. 
5. CONCLUSION 
Success in creating credible collective development finance 
efforts will be easier to achieve if the international legal order 
provides the institutions, mechanisms, and norms necessary for 
such efforts to operate with purposive integrity.  This Article offers 
the theoretical logic for improvements and some suggestions for 
what those improvements should be.  The core conclusion is this:  
even if international development finance is hampered by 
disillusionment with past aid efforts, divergent motivations, and 
seesawing political preferences, the overall aid effort will be 
strengthened by the creation of a baseline set of institutions, 
mechanisms, and norms that facilitate collective efforts for 
purposes that both donors and recipients support, with minimal 
 
332 See KLABBERS, supra note 315, at 47 (discussing competing interpretations 
of the ICJ‘s Reparation for Injuries opinion on the issue of the international legal 
personality of organizations); AMERASINGHE, supra note 187, at 66–69 (providing 
an overview of the dynamic between international legal personality and legal 
capacity, specifically noting that there are many benefits and rationales for 
according international organizations international legal personality). 
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agency costs.  In due course, enhanced credibility for development 
finance must be earned by the delivery of results and increased 
participation in framing what ideal results would be.  Achieving 
improved assurance that funds made available will be used for the 
purposes for which they are given, however, is a necessary first 
step towards achieving those broader objectives.  
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